The knowledge of intelligence agencies in the Cold War world

Author(s):  
Rüdiger Bergien ◽  
Debora Gerstenberger ◽  
Constantin Goschler
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Krieger

This article discusses German's foreign intelligence services through the context of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). Unlike other intelligence services of other nations, Germany has no separate military intelligence. The BND serves as Germany's sole foreign and military espionage agency. It also does not have an acknowledged capacity of covert operations compared to the intelligence agencies of other nations. The BND was established in 1956 as part of the West German rearmament within the NATO framework; however, by the time of its establishment the Bonn government had already abandoned its previous efforts to build a military intelligence organization from scratch and with people of its own. Because of this, the BND was under American operational control during the Cold War and German intelligence professionals have served as mercenaries for the Americans over a period of ten years, giving Americans an unique intelligence asset inside the West German government. In this article, the discussions include the evolution of the BND and the current issues faced by the German intelligence services.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-430
Author(s):  
Paul Lashmar

Until the end of the Cold War the UK intelligence services were not officially acknowledged, and their personnel were banned from entering the public sphere. From 1989 the UK government began to put the intelligence services on a legal footing and to release the identity of the heads of the intelligence agencies. Since then, public engagement by the intelligence agencies has gathered pace. What this article hypothesises is that there is now, in the UK, an effective intelligence lobby of former insiders who engage in the public sphere – using on the record briefings – to counter criticism of the intelligence community and to promote a narrative and vision of what UK intelligence should do, how it is supported and how oversight is conducted. Content analysis and framing models of non-broadcast coverage of intelligence debates, focusing on the 36 months after the Snowden revelations, confirm an active and rolling lobby of current and former intelligence officials. The paper concludes that the extent of the lobby’s interventions in the public sphere is a matter for debate and possible concern.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Lukes

U.S. intelligence officials in early postwar Czechoslovakia had access to some of the Czechoslovak government's highest-ranking individuals and plenty of time to prepare for the looming confrontation with the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Yet the Communist takeover in February 1948 took them by surprise and undermined their networks. This article discusses the activities of four Czechoslovak security and intelligence agencies to demonstrate that the scale of the U.S. failure in Prague in 1945–1948 was far greater than often assumed, especially if one considers the substandard size and quality of Czechoslovakia's Communist-dominated special services after the war.


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