Institutional Change in Nepal: Liberalization, Maoist Movement, Rise of Political Consciousness and Constitutional Change

Most studies of public opinion regarding constitutional change focus on ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in consolidated democracies, but in comparative terms most institutional change takes place in unstable political contexts. We contend that mass preferences towards institutional choices are likely to differ significantly in turbulent contexts as compared to stable polities. In this article, we consider the issue of public preferences towards proposals for regional decentralisation in the context of post-Soviet Ukraine, a society that has been in the throes of political change for the last decade. Using surveys conducted in war-torn Ukraine in 2014, we find that under conditions of political uncertainty, the institutional preferences of citizens are connected to group identities and ideological orientations rather than instrumental concerns.

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Political Science and Constitutional Politics: Exploring Possibilities of Constitutional Change from Institutional Change Theories

21st centry Political Science Review ◽

10.17937/topsr.21.3.201112.307 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 21 (3) ◽

pp. 307-327

Author(s):

JaungHoon

Keyword(s):

Institutional Change ◽

Political Science ◽

Constitutional Change ◽

Constitutional Politics

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Institutional Incentives and Informal Local Political Groups (Phuak) in Thailand: Comments on Allen Hicken and Paul Chambers

Journal of East Asian Studies ◽

10.1017/s1598240800004872 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 125-147 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michael H. Nelson

Keyword(s):

Institutional Change ◽

Structural Changes ◽

Political Leadership ◽

Political Leader ◽

Constitutional Change ◽

Institutional Incentives ◽

New Form ◽

Political Groups

Post-1997 Thai politics have been shaped by the effects of two momentous events that occurred almost at the same time: the introduction of far-reaching structural changes by the 1997 constitution, and the appearance of a singularly overbearing and centralizing political leader—Thaksin Shinawatra. To political analysts, this situation has provided uniquely rich opportunities to observe over a number of years whether constitutional engineering had the envisaged effect of restricting the politicians' “undesirable” actions, and whether the intended institutional change was realized. However, the coincidence of constitutional change and the occurrence of Thaksin has also made it necessary to distinguish the effects of structural changes from the effects of the new form of political leadership.

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