The Syrian Constitution at the end of the civil war: Is there a constitutional way to democratization?

The 2012 Syrian Constitution has been largely (dis)regarded as embodying a mere policy intent to placate contestation, leaving the resorts of monocratic power untouched. While this might be true, there were formal changes whose study is worthwhile to understand the possibilities for some degree of democratization. This article delves into the 2012 charter and its main innovations, asking, first, from a descriptive-analytical perspective, what are the main trends underlying contemporary Syrian constitutional politics? Second, from an explanatory perspective, what specific constitutional provisions prevent the rule of law and the material constitutional transformation in democratic terms? What legal-institutional mechanisms account for this phenomenon? While the 2012 formal constitutional changes can be conceived as a ‘blueprint’ revealing governmental priorities, the outstanding democratic deficits might help to identify the opposition's priorities. Together, they contribute to delineate a bargaining range for the ongoing constituent negotiations.

Courting Constitutionalism

Over the last decade, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has emerged as a powerful and overtly political institution. While the strong form of judicial review adopted by the Supreme Court has fostered the perception of a sudden and ahistorical judicialisation of politics, the judiciary's prominent role in adjudicating issues of governance and statecraft was long in the making. This book presents a deeply contextualised account of law in Pakistan and situates the judicial review jurisprudence of the superior courts in the context of historical developments in constitutional politics, evolution of state structures and broader social transformations. This book highlights that the bedrock of judicial review has remained in administrative law; it is through the consistent development of the 'Writ jurisdiction' and the judicial review of administrative action that Pakistan's superior courts have progressively carved an expansive institutional role and aggrandised themselves to the status of the regulator of the state.

Constitutional Politics

In 1948, the Constitution was enacted by the Constitutional National Assembly, and a presidential system was adopted. But it was a hybrid system with both presidential and parliamentary system elements. Even though nine constitutions have been promulgated since then, this characteristic has remained fundamentally unchanged. Under the authoritarian regimes, the dictators forcibly revised the Constitution to strengthen their power and extend their terms of office. Constitutional politics, then, was fraught with serious conflict. South Korea was democratized in 1987, and the Constitution was democratically revised accordingly. The most important thing in this new Constitution was the restoration of the popularly elected presidential system. But the 1987 Constitution was modelled on the 1962 Constitution, and does not fit well with today’s democratized and diverse Korean society. The need to decentralize the authority and power of central government is another reason for constitutional reform.

Sytuacja autorytarna i rządy prawa. Socjologiczno-prawne wyjaśnienia kryzysu konstytucyjnego

The paper surveys the existing explanations of the current Polish constitutional crisis. For that sake the paper adopts a socio-legal perspective and introduces the concept of authoritarian situation, interpreted as a complex of social conditions which enable and/or facilitate the authoritarian form of government. As the examined studies prove, such an authoritarian situation has made a constitutional crisis in Poland possible. The paper discusses the explanations which concentrate on various factors conditioning the crisis, such as: class antagonism, the conflict of ideologies, the general legal culture of Polish society, professional legal culture, binding legal rules, and the condition of legal institutions (of law-making, law-applying, and constitutional politics). This discussion allows a conclusion that the causes of the constitutional crisis are multiple and much deeper than the current political conflict.

Constitutional Design of Electoral Governance in Federal States

This article explores the constitutional politics of electoral governance in federations by focusing on the role of election commissions, drawing mainly on examples from Asia. All democracies face the challenge of insulating electoral governance from interference and capture. Compared to unitary states, federations confront the additional dilemma of how to disperse authority over electoral governance across multiple orders of government. Federal democracies must decide whether electoral governance should be a matter for the center or the states. I argue that the basic choice is between what I will call the ‘unitary model’ and the ‘division of powers model.’ The main institution of electoral governance is the electoral management body or ‘EMB.’ In the unitary model, a central EMB administers both national and state-level elections. In the ‘division of powers model’, both a central and state-level EMBs exist, with the state commissions administering elections in the component units of the federation. In federal democracies generally, but especially in Asia, the allure of the unitary model has been strong. The article draws on the example of the Constituent Assembly in India to illustrate what is at stake in how federal constitutions allocate authority over electoral governance.

Flanders

This chapter considers a case, Flanders, where secessionism has not gained strength despite many episodes fuelling tensions between the two main communities and significant, though episodic, cynicism about the future of the country. The singular political development of the Belgian state, which has involved an incremental and open-ended process of decentralization, has meant that Flemish autonomy is dynamic. Belgium is famous for its seemingly incessant constitutional politics leading to reforms of the state that transform the country’s institutional architecture in innovative ways. For Flanders, these state reforms have meant a gradual expansion of autonomy. Moreover, the reforms are never meant to conclude a process of decentralization; they always leave issues to be dealt with at an ulterior date. State reforms are high-profile events that often occur to manage a crisis between the two communities and are subject to government formation agreements in the context of the country’s consociational practices. Flemish parties can typically have a state reform if most of them want one or else the country remains without a government, which is something Francophone parties want to avoid for fear it makes Belgium seem unworkable and therefore feeds Flemish secessionist arguments. As Flemings know there is a forthcoming state reform that will enhance their collective autonomy and address some issues perceived as important for their national identity and interests, there is little incentive to support secessionist positions.