The Financial Panic of 2007-2008

2017 ◽  
pp. 250-269
Keyword(s):  
Financial Panic

The Financial Crisis on Trial: What Went Wrong

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
John H. Sturc
Keyword(s):  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
Investment Bankers ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Business Executives ◽  
Mortgage Backed Securities ◽  
Financial Panic ◽  
Criminal Intent ◽  
Selection Of

Americans demanded retribution from the mortgage lenders whose subprime loans defaulted and from investment bankers whose mortgage-backed securities sharply declined in value in 2007, leading to financial panic and the Great Recession. From 2008 to 2019, the federal government extracted hundreds of billions in fines from dozens of corporations, but few individual business executives were held accountable, and no senior banker was convicted of a crime. I use the trial court record of five government enforcement cases against individuals to explain this apparently anomalous result. I conclude that, in addition to a lack of funding, the prosecution effort was hindered by the government’s erroneous selection of cases to pursue. Further, the diffused nature of decision making in the mortgage finance market made it difficult to prove that any one senior-level participant had the criminal intent necessary for a conviction or a Securities and Exchange Commission civil fine or injunction. The trial results also support the argument that the growth and consolidation of investment banks from 1990 to 2008 created incentives for misconduct within the firms.

Why did the equity home bias fall during the financial panic of 2008?

World Economy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 1343-1372
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Wynter
Keyword(s):  
Home Bias ◽  
Equity Home Bias ◽  
Financial Panic

Investing For Middle America: John Elliot Tappan And The Origins Of American Express Financial Advisors. By Kenneth Lipartito and Carol Heher Peters. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. x, 268. $27.95.

2003 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-286
Author(s):  
Benjamin Chabot
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Life Insurance ◽  
Financial Advisors ◽  
Financial Instrument ◽  
Savings Banks ◽  
American Express ◽  
Financial Panic ◽  
Coupon Bond

In this enjoyable work, Kenneth Lipartito and Carol Peters share with us the story of John Elliot Tappan, a Minneapolis lawyer who brought financial innovation to the American heartland. In an era before mutual funds, money market accounts, and in many locations safe diversified savings banks, Tappan saw the need for a safe, small denomination, financial instrument for middle-class savers. The result was Investors Syndicate and its “face-value” certificate, a combination of zero-coupon bond and term life insurance that savers of modest means could purchase in small installments. By providing the small investor with a safe means of saving a small amount each month, Investors Syndicate (latter IDS and American Express Financial Advisors) would grow into one of the nations financial behemoths. Along the way, Tappan and his company would overcome financial panic, depression, war, epidemic, and corrupt postal inspectors (the federal regulators of the day).

Notes on the Financial Panic of 1907

1908 ◽  
Vol 11 (81) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Francis B. Forbes
Keyword(s):  
Financial Panic

scholarly journals The East Asian Crisis in Kindleberger-Minsky’s Framework

2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-285
Author(s):  
OMAR F. SAQIB
Keyword(s):  
East Asian ◽  
Asian Crisis ◽  
Financial Panic

ABSTRACT The paper reviews the 1997 East Asian crisis within the framework of the five stages of displacement, boom, overtrading, revulsion, and tranquility of the Kindleberger-Minsky model. It further notes that the recent interpretations of the crisis, based on the hypotheses of fundamental imbalances and financial panic, conform to the stages of the Kindleberger-Minsky model.

scholarly journals Asian Crisis and Finance Theory

1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Jayanth R Varma
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
National Level ◽  
External Debt ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Asian Crisis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Financial Panic ◽  
Capital Outflows ◽  
Finance Theory

The Asian crisis did not involve generalized financial panic. Stock markets behaved rationally and the crash in exchange rates is explained by the presence of credit risk. According to Jayanth R Varma, the crisis highlights the need for better risk management at the national level focusing less on the size of the external debt and more on its currency and maturity composition. There should be more freedom in capital outflows and less reliance on the banking system. IMF assistance to crisis stricken countries should be in the form of a currency swap which addresses the root cause of the crisis and subjects the IMF itself to financial discipline.

scholarly journals Financial panic and emerging market funds

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (23) ◽  
pp. 1793-1805 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yothin Jinjarak ◽  
Huanhuan Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Market ◽  
Financial Panic

THEORY AND HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES: EXPLAINING THE PANIC OF 1873

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Nitschke
Keyword(s):  
Cultural History ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
History Of Capitalism ◽  
Joint Application ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Financial Panic ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Impact

This article demonstrates the value of a joint application of the theory and history of financial crises of 1873. It weaves together concepts of financial and banking panic theory with a narrative explanation of the causes and triggers of the Panic of 1873. Basic concepts of economic theory, it suggests, can act as both a framework and a starting point to the historical interpretation of a financial panic.Employing such theory, however, ultimately reinforces the need for contextual cultural explanations of financial panics. A theoretically grounded view of the cultural history of capitalism—and its sudden crises—can help explain why and how some structures of exchange systematized and conditioned human confidence within specific historical contexts.Drawing together theoretical models of banking panic and historical evidence, this article thus emphasizes the importance of Gilded Age money-making culture for understanding the impact of Philadelphia financier Jay Cooke upon the causes of the Panic of 1873. Cooke's sudden and unexpected bankruptcy caused the deconstruction of confidence on the stock exchange and throughout the country. The cultural idiosyncrasy of Cooke's outstanding position in all matters of American finance multiplied the asymmetry that occurred in the wake of a major information shock.

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