Alternative Explanations I: The Alternative Explanation Response

2017 ◽  
pp. 55-74
Author(s):  
Jerome Gellman
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation

Association of pituitary adenoma with neuronal christoma: A TEM study

1994 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 232-233
Author(s):  
Eva Horvath ◽  
Kalman Kovacs ◽  
B. W. Scheithauer ◽  
R. V. Lloyd ◽  
H. S. Smyth
Keyword(s):  
Growth Hormone ◽  
Pituitary Adenoma ◽  
Pituitary Tumor ◽  
Nervous Tissue ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Growth Hormone Releasing Hormone ◽  
Cell Hyperplasia ◽  
Releasing Hormone ◽  
Secretory Neurons

The association of a pituitary adenoma with nervous tissue consisting of neuron-like cells and neuropil is a rare abnormality. In the majority of cases, the pituitary tumor is a chromophobic adenoma, accompanied by acromegaly. Histology reveals widely variable proportions of endocrine and nervous tissue in alternating or intermingled patterns. The lesion is perceived as a composite one consisting of two histogenetically distinct parts. It has been suggested that the neuronal component, morphologically similar to secretory neurons of the hypothalamus, may initiate adenoma formation by releasing stimulatory substances. Immunoreactivity for growth hormone releasing hormone (GRH) in the neuronal component of some cases supported this view, whereas other findings such as consistent lack of growth hormone (GH) cell hyperplasia in the lesions called for alternative explanation.Fifteen tumors consisting of a pituitary adenoma and a neuronal component have been collected over a 20 yr. period. Acromegaly was present in 11 patients, was equivocal in one, and absent in 3.

Attitude Accessibility as an Alternative Explanation for How Inoculation Confers Resistance

2003 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Pfau ◽  
David Roskos-Ewoldsen ◽  
Michelle Wood ◽  
Suya Yin ◽  
Jaeho Cho ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Attitude Accessibility

Does the Name-Race Implicit Association Test Measure Racial Prejudice?

2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don van Ravenzwaaij ◽  
Han L. J. van der Maas ◽  
Eric-Jan Wagenmakers
Keyword(s):  
Diffusion Model ◽  
Implicit Association Test ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Racial Prejudice ◽  
Decision Time ◽  
Association Test ◽  
Implicit Association ◽  
Model Decomposition ◽  
Test Measure

Research using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has shown that names labeled as Caucasian elicit more positive associations than names labeled as non-Caucasian. One interpretation of this result is that the IAT measures latent racial prejudice. An alternative explanation is that the result is due to differences in in-group/out-group membership. In this study, we conducted three different IATs: one with same-race Dutch names versus racially charged Moroccan names; one with same-race Dutch names versus racially neutral Finnish names; and one with Moroccan names versus Finnish names. Results showed equivalent effects for the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Finnish IATs, but no effect for the Finnish-Moroccan IAT. This suggests that the name-race IAT-effect is not due to racial prejudice. A diffusion model decomposition indicated that the IAT-effects were caused by changes in speed of information accumulation, response conservativeness, and non-decision time.

Unconscious recognition in prosopagnosia: An alternative explanation

1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha J . Farah ◽  
Randall C. O'Reilly ◽  
Shaun P. Vecera
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation

An Alternative Explanation for the Shape of 'Log-Spiral' Bays

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Littlewood ◽  
A. Brad Murray ◽  
Andrew D. Ashton
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation

Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Nolfi
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
The Way

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.

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