Pragmatism and the Importance of Truth

This paper develops a position I call “apathetic pragmatism.” Apathetic pragmatism is a form of pragmatism that, through advocating “apathy” about the topic of truth, avoids the troubled identification of utility and truth found in classical and neo pragmatist theories of truth. Initially explored by Stephen Stich, I argue Stich’s case for apathetic pragmatism relies upon a theory of truth that causes vicious circularity. I then pursue a different route to apathetic pragmatism, one that sees apathetic pragmatism as a “paradigm shift” in relation to previous forms of pragmatism. It is a paradigm shift where pragmatism becomes a normative view concerning the questions that are necessary to ask, not an attempt to answer questions assumed necessary.

Hegel's A Priori and the Critique of Three Aprioristic Readings of the Science of Logic

The goal of my essay is to clarify the status of the a priori in Hegel's Science of Logic. My claim is that in order to make possible an appreciation of the originality of Hegel's position we need to map a context of discussion and to dissolve a set of preconceptions about Hegel's idea of philosophy. My argument will be articulated in two parts. In the first part, I will analyse four possible positions regarding the issue of the aprioricity of the Logic, I will defend a fifth position, and I will draw a distinction between apriorism and a priori. In the second part, I will examine three distinct charges of apriorism against Hegel's Logic: the charge of assuming God's point of view of the universe, the charge of vicious circularity between the beginning and the end of the Logic, the charge of self-sufficiency of the Logic. As a result, I hope to show that these charges are unfounded, and to clear the ground for an adequate evaluation of Hegel's own sublation (Aufhebung) of the a priori/a posteriori divide.

Desigualdade, pobreza e diferença: precariedade na vida escolar

Desigualdade, pobreza e diferença: precariedade na vida escolar Resumo: O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar a desigualdade, a pobreza e as diferenciações inferiorizadoras – discriminações e segregações – e seus efeitos de precarização sobre a vida escolar: reprovação e abandono escolar. O centro crítico da análise encontra-se na circularidade viciosa pela qual, num sentido, a desigualdade e a pobreza determinam diferenciações inferiorizadoras que resultam em fracasso escolar e, no sentido inverso, o fracasso escolar resulta em mais pobreza e mais desigualdade. Tal processo selaria a impossibilidade de cumprimento do direito universal à educação, inscrito como promessa nos ideais da democracia liberal. O estudo pode ser caracterizado como bibliográfico, embasado em autores do campo da economia, sociologia, direito e filosofia, com especial apoio em documentos da ONU, UNESCO, OCDE e Constituição Federal brasileira. Os resultados do estudo apontam para as graves responsabilidades das políticas públicas, dos sistemas de ensino e dos projetos pedagógicos das unidades escolares em interromper a circularidade dessa precarização. Palavras-chave: Desigualdade. Pobreza. Diferença. Precariedade. Fracasso escolar. Desigualdad, Pobreza y Diferencia: Precariedad en la Vida Escolar Resumen: El artículo analiza la desigualdad, la pobreza y las diferenciaciones inferiorizadoras - discriminaciones y segregaciones - y sus efectos de precarización sobre la vida escolar: reprobación y abandono escolar. El centro crítico del análisis se ubica en la circularidad viciosa por la cual, en un sentido, la desigualdad y la pobreza determinan diferenciaciones inferiorizadoras que resultan en fracaso escolar y, al inverso, el fracaso escolar resulta en más pobreza y más desigualdad. Esa circularidad sellaria la imposibilidad de cumplimiento del derecho universal a la educación - promesa de la democracia liberal. El estudio es bibliográfico, desde autores en la economía, sociología, derecho y filosofía, con especial apoyo en documentos de la ONU, UNESCO, OCDE y la Constitución Federal brasileña. Se apunta a las graves responsabilidades de las políticas públicas, de los sistemas de enseñanza y de los proyectos pedagógicos de las unidades escolares en interrumpir la circularidad de esa precarización. Palabras-clave: Desigualdad. Pobreza. Diferencia. Precariedad. Fracaso escolar. Inequality, Poverty and Difference: Precariousness in School Life Abstract: This article aims to analyze inequality, poverty and specific social differences - discrimination and segregation - and their impacts on precariousness of school life: failure and school dropout. The center of analysis lies in the vicious circularity by which, in a direction, inequality and poverty determine the differentiation of people that result in school failure, and on the way round, school failure results in more poverty and more inequality. Such circularity is an impossibility of compliance with the universal right of education - a promise of liberal democracy. It’s about a bibliographic study of a wide range of authors on economics, sociology, law and philosophy, with references to UN, UNESCO, OECD documents and the brazilian Federal Constitution. The results of the study point out to the responsibilities of public policies, educational systems and the pedagogical projects of the school units, to interrupt the circularity of this precariousness. Keywords: Inequality. Poverty. Precariousness. Difference. School Failure. Data de registro:08/07/2019 Data de aceite: 27/05/2020

The unbearable circularity of easy ontology

In this paper, I argue that Amie Thomasson’s Easy Ontology rests on a vicious circularity that is highly damaging. Easy Ontology invokes the idea of application conditions that give rise to analytic entailments. Such entailments can be used to answer ontological questions easily. I argue that the application conditions for basic terms are only circularly specifiable showing that Thomasson misses her self-set goal of preventing such a circularity. Using this circularity, I go on to show that Easy Ontology as a whole collapses.

On Grounds, Anchors, and Diseases: A Reply to Glackin

Shane Glackin's 2019 Philosophical Quarterly article aims to (a) offer a framework for understanding the philosophical debate about the nature of disease and (b) utilise this framework to reply to several standard objections to normativist (particularly social constructivist) theories of disease. Specifically, Glackin claims his model avoids three central challenges to normativism, which we term the ‘Flippancy Problem’ (which charges that normativism implies diseases can be cured by adjusting our attitudes towards them), ‘Repugnancy Problem’ (which charges that normativism implies we must endorse repugnant historical views regarding ‘conditions’ like Drapetomania as ‘genuine diseases in their day’), and the ‘Explanatory Problem’ (which charges that normativism cannot explain why diseases warrant certain kinds of medical intervention without lapsing into vicious circularity). Although we find Glackin's framework helpful in clarifying the terrain of the debate, we argue these three challenges continue to afflict his preferred construal of the normativist/social constructivist position.

Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge

According to externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism, it's possible to gain knowledge through a perceptual experience without being in a position to know that the experience is reliable. As a result, both of these views face the problem of making knowledge of perceptual reliability too easy, for they permit deducing perceptual reliability from particular perceptual experience without already knowing that these experiences are trustworthy. Ernest Sosa advocates a two-stage solution to the problem. At the first stage, a rich body of perceptual animal knowledge is acquired. At the second stage, perceptual knowledge becomes reflective after deducing perceptual reliability from the initial body of perceptual animal knowledge. I defend the alternative approach of rejecting both externalist reliabilism and dogmatic foundationalism. According to the alternative view, perceptual knowledge and knowledge of perceptual reliability require each other. Such a cognitive structure seems viciously circular. I propose that the appearance of vicious circularity dissipates when the relationship in question is viewed, not as one of temporal priority, but instead as synchronic mutual dependence. At a given time, one cannot have perceptual knowledge without knowledge of perceptual reliability, and vice versa. Such mutual dependence, I argue, is benign.

Althusser’s Science: Naming the Epistemological Break

This chapter argues that Louis Althusser’s strident anti-Hegelianism and adoption of French historical epistemology was integral in his refoundation of Marxist thought. At the same time, the roots of the Platonic rationalist trajectory found in Badiou and Meillassoux are located in Althusser’s work. The chapter shows that the vicious circularity enjoined by Althusser’s theorisation of the epistemological break grants authority to philosophers to issue judgement on the novelty of events. The concluding section argues that despite the similar vocabularies of late-Althusser’s philosophy of the encounter and Badiou’s Being and Event, it is the unresolved issues of Althusser’s mid-1960s research programme which underpins Badiou’s philosophy.

Where Does Time Go?

It is a classical argument against the objectivity of the flow of time that it would not be possible to make sense of its direction without stepping into a vicious circularity. This paper is dedicated to discuss some of the objections Tim Maudlin has recently put forward against this argument, while outlining an alternative and more effective way out of it.