Philosophy, Literature, and Intellectual Responsibility

2018 ◽  
pp. 225-240
2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-121
Author(s):  
Ade Kunle Amuwo

Abstract:The academic political scientists—mainly professors—who were hired by the Babangida military government in Nigeria between 1985 and 1993, ostensibly to theorize and articulate a new political culture and morality through the political transition program (PTP), have been objects, both then and ever since, of serious criticism concerning their role and contribution to a program that promised much but delivered little or nothing. The major criticism is that the political scientists, despite an initial commitment to help the military fashion a new political order, lost their “science” by providing an intellectual cover for the general's schemes and enriched the “political,” including the politics of corruption and self-enrichment. We examine this critique and show that these individuals, by choosing to remain in office—if not in power—even after witnessing so many broken promises by the regime, tarnished their intellectual integrity and moral credibility. Appointed to serve as an instrument of legitimization for the regime, they contained, constricted, and shrank the political and intellectual space rather than facilitating intellectual and democratic empowerment.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi

AbstractThe contemporary explosion of information makes intellectual responsibility more needed than ever. The uncritical tend to believe too much that is unsubstantiated; the overcritical tend to believe too little that is true. A central problem for this paper is to formulate standards to guide an intellectually rigorous search for a mean between excessive credulity and indiscriminate skepticism. A related problem is to distinguish intellectual responsibility for what we believe from moral responsibility for what we do. A third problem is how to square intellectual responsibility in retaining our views with the realization that peers we respect disagree with us. Much of the paper is directed to articulating principles for dealing with such disagreements.


Author(s):  
Anastasia V. Ugleva ◽  

One of the most interesting and widely discussed trends in modern epistemology is the so-called intellectual ethics, normative in its essence, centered around the concept of epistemic virtue, based on the idea of metaphysical anthropology, supplemented by elements of theology. The last consists in the idea of a certain “gift” to a person from the side of the Supreme Being, which is God – and this gift lies in the epistemic virtues inherent in the individual. This subject-centered concept emphasizes the intellectual and epistemic qualities of the cognizing subject that guarantee the truth of their beliefs. However, if is God the true guarantor of their “epistemic reliability” and the possibility of thus identifying justified belief with knowledge? The reliability of the cognitive human ability is seen in the realization of virtus as “perfection in being for the good”, in this case epistemic, the only guarantee of which can only be divine will. Is it so? This article attempts to answer this question in the course of reconstruction and analysis of the epistemological-theistic approach to defining one of the key epistemic virtues of the cognizing subject – intellectual responsibility.


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