The human rights-related aspects of indigenous knowledge in the context of common law equitable doctrines and the Kiobel decision

2014 ◽  
pp. 171-202
Author(s):  
David Orozco ◽  
Kevin McGarry ◽  
Lydie Pierre-Louis
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Indigenous Knowledge ◽  
Common Law

“As Slow as a Tortoise, and as Clever as a Hare.” Folktales as Lessons on Democracy, Equal Opportunities, and Human Rights among the Ndebele

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindiwe Ndlovu ◽  
Faith Sibanda
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Indigenous Knowledge ◽  
Indigenous People ◽  
Developing World ◽  
Equal Opportunities ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Animal Community ◽  
Do So

Indigenous African societies have, for a long time, been using their knowledge for the betterment of their lives. They have also demonstrated an ability to manipulate their immediate or remote surroundings to live sustainably. Those who claim to fight for equal and human rights in Africa do so under the misconception that they, and the developing world, have historically and inherently violated, and continue to violate, human rights in numerous ways. While this might not be completely dismissed, there is a plethora of evidence from African folktales to demonstrate that Africans have not only respected human rights, but have also encouraged equal opportunities for every member of their society. This article cross-examines Ndebele folktales with the intention of demonstrating that African indigenous knowledge exhibited through folktales was a well-organised system, which ensured respect for human rights for all members, regardless of their physical or social stature. Central to this discussion are the folktales which focus on the role played by the vulnerable members of the animal community, who replicate their human counterparts. Folktales are unarguably a creation by the indigenes and emanate from their socio-political experiences, as well as their observations of the surroundings. This suggests that indigenous people already had an idea about human rights as well as the need for equal opportunities since time immemorial. 

Reconciling Rights and Obligations

2003 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 140-172
Author(s):  
Pernille Ironside
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Northern Nigeria ◽  
Law System ◽  
Constitutional Legality ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
Criminal Matters

This article examines the debate concerning the recent reinstatement of Shari`ah law with respect to criminal matters in Northern Nigeria. The discussion explores the inherent challenges in reconciling the equally entrenched and passionate views of pro-Shari`ah supporters on their right to freedom of religion with those that question its application in terms of human rights norms and obligations, and its constitutional legality. The analysis concludes that Shari`ah laws can coexist with Nigeria’s common law system and remain relevant in the context of Islam, provided that its principles are adapted and modernized to comport with international standards for due process and are interpreted and applied consistently.

Municipal Courts and the International Interpretive Principle: Al-Kateb v Godwin

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Global Problems ◽  
The Common ◽  
International Human ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

This article examines the decision in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. It revisits the suggested ‘heresy‘ that international human rights law may influence the interpretation of the Australian Constitution and other legal texts. Accessing universal human rights law, including in constitutional adjudication, was endorsed in the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 1988. The author suggests that interpreting statutory language in this way is not dissimilar to the common-law principle of interpreting statutes so as to uphold basic rights. But should an analogous approach be permissible in deciding the meaning of constitutional language? Although arguably invoked by the majority of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, in the context of declaring the common-law, so far this approach has not been accepted for constitutional elaboration in Australia. But should this be so in the age of global problems and internationalism?

Is there a Duty to Prevent Harm in Tort? A Common Law Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Statutory Duty ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Common

Abstract In this paper, I will examine the extent to which the common law of tort in England and Wales imposes a duty to prevent harm on public authorities and private individuals. As will be seen, the starting point for the common law is that such liability should, in both cases, be regarded as exceptional. This must, however, be weighed against duties to prevent harm that arise under the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty. Public authorities may also face claims that their failure to prevent harm is in breach of ECHR arts 2 or 3. While the law is complex, this paper identifies three key arguments that explain the current legal position at common law, namely that: (i) tort law should treat private and public parties alike: (ii) human rights claims should be treated as distinct from private law claims and (iii) libertarian concerns signify that a duty to prevent harm should be exceptional and needs to be justified. While these arguments provide both an explanation of and a justification for the current law, this article questions to what extent the treatment of public authority liability may be regarded as unduly harsh on vulnerable claimants.

Professional secrecy and legal professional privilege

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorg Sladič
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Family Life ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Professional ◽  
The Right

Legal privilege and professional secrecy of attorneys relate to the right to a fair trial (Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) as well as to the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The reason for protecting the lawyer via fundamental rights is the protection of fundamental rights of the lawyer’s clients. All legal orders apply legal privileges and professional secrecy; however, the contents of such are not identical. Traditionally there is an important difference between common and civil law. The professional secrecy of an attorney in civil law jurisdictions is his right and at the same time his obligation based on his membership of the Bar (that is his legal profession). In common law legal privilege comprises the contents of documents issued by an attorney to the client. Professional secrecy of attorneys in civil law jurisdictions applies solely to independent lawyers; in-house lawyers are usually not allowed to benefit from rules on professional secrecy (exceptions in the Netherlands and Belgium). On the other hand, common law jurisdictions apply legal professional privilege, recognized also to in-house lawyers. Slovenian law follows the traditional civil law concept of professional secrecy and sets a limited privilege to in-house lawyers. The article then discusses Slovenian law of civil procedure and compares the position of professional secrecy in lawsuits before State’s courts and in arbitration.

scholarly journals Roles of the Courts in New Zealand in Giving Effect to International Human Rights - with Some History

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Effect ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 

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