Identifying the Chi in Commonwealth Caribbean Law: The Contribution of the Common Law and Human Rights Law to Constitutional Interpretation

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derrick V. McKoy
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Commonwealth Caribbean

Municipal Courts and the International Interpretive Principle: Al-Kateb v Godwin

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kirby
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Global Problems ◽  
The Common ◽  
International Human ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

This article examines the decision in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. It revisits the suggested ‘heresy‘ that international human rights law may influence the interpretation of the Australian Constitution and other legal texts. Accessing universal human rights law, including in constitutional adjudication, was endorsed in the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms 1988. The author suggests that interpreting statutory language in this way is not dissimilar to the common-law principle of interpreting statutes so as to uphold basic rights. But should an analogous approach be permissible in deciding the meaning of constitutional language? Although arguably invoked by the majority of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, in the context of declaring the common-law, so far this approach has not been accepted for constitutional elaboration in Australia. But should this be so in the age of global problems and internationalism?

A tale of the land, the insider, the outsider and human rights (an exploration of some problems and possibilities in the relationship between the English common law property concept, human rights law, and discourses of exclusion and inclusion)

Legal Studies ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Grear
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Conceptual Structure ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Land Law ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Legal Actor ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the interplay between discourses of exclusion and inclusion in the relationship between land law and human rights. It explores the common law conception of property in land and its relationship with the conceptual structure of property before suggesting that the particular form the conception takes in the English common law is problematic as a discourse of exclusion in the light of inclusive human rights considerations. However, further submerged exclusions in law are also explored, suggesting a problematic ideological continuity between land law and human rights law, notwithstanding identifiable surface tensions between them as contrasting discourses. Once the continuity of hidden exclusions is identified, the paper explores the theoretical unity between the deep structure of property as ‘propriety’ and human rights as ‘what is due’, and suggests their mutual potential for embracing more inclusive concerns. Finally, two modest proposals for future theoretical reform are offered: the need for a more anthropologically adequate and inclusive construct of the human being as legal actor, and the need for a more differentiated, context-sensitive formulation of the common law1 property conception, one capable of reconciling conceptually necessary elements of excludability with inclusive human rights impulses.

scholarly journals HUMAN RIGHTS, ‘ARRANGED’ MARRIAGES AND NULLITY LAW: SHOULD CULTURE OVERRIDE OR INFORM FRAUD AND DURESS?

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 62-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jocelynne Scutt
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Forced Marriage ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Arranged Marriages ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Common ◽  
High Level

Nullity law in Australia and Fiji provides that marriages can be void on various grounds, including duress and fraud. Despite some differences, United Kingdom (UK) law says marriages can be void or voidable on similar grounds. Courts in each jurisdiction have granted annulment in cases of forced marriage where duress “threatens life and limb”. Courts now say lesser force or threats, including pressure to comply with religious or traditional duty, can nullify marriage. Yet courts continue to require high level force such as passport confiscation, physical abuse, threats of eviction from the family home, and economic harm. This, as with allegations of fraud which receive short shrift, results from returning to common law authorities decided before migration resulted in significant demographic changes, particularly regarding culture and religion. UK authority draws a distinction between “forced” and “arranged” marriages, saying nullity is granted rightly in cases of the former, yet because “culture” “sanctifies” the latter, refusing nullity is right. Yet is this distinction valid? Should such marriages be recognised by Australian, Fijian and UK courts as contracted with full and free consent of the parties? An exploration of contemporary cases against the common law background to fraud and duress as nullity grounds indicates that allowing culture to be the measure denies women’s (and sometimes men’s) entitlement to contract marriage with full and free consent according to international human rights law.

Is there a Duty to Prevent Harm in Tort? A Common Law Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Statutory Duty ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Common

Abstract In this paper, I will examine the extent to which the common law of tort in England and Wales imposes a duty to prevent harm on public authorities and private individuals. As will be seen, the starting point for the common law is that such liability should, in both cases, be regarded as exceptional. This must, however, be weighed against duties to prevent harm that arise under the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty. Public authorities may also face claims that their failure to prevent harm is in breach of ECHR arts 2 or 3. While the law is complex, this paper identifies three key arguments that explain the current legal position at common law, namely that: (i) tort law should treat private and public parties alike: (ii) human rights claims should be treated as distinct from private law claims and (iii) libertarian concerns signify that a duty to prevent harm should be exceptional and needs to be justified. While these arguments provide both an explanation of and a justification for the current law, this article questions to what extent the treatment of public authority liability may be regarded as unduly harsh on vulnerable claimants.

scholarly journals Roles of the Courts in New Zealand in Giving Effect to International Human Rights - with Some History

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Effect ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Domestic Law

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 

1. What is equity?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Pearce ◽  
Warren Barr
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Human Rights Abuse ◽  
The Common

This chapter defines equity. Equity is both a different system of law which recognizes rights and obligations that the common law does not, and a system which seeks to address the inherent gaps which can exist in following any set of rules. Equity plays a large, but largely hidden, role in all our lives. For instance, buying houses with a partner, borrowing money, investing in private or company pensions, making complex arrangements in a will, or preventing human rights abuse all use some form of mechanism developed in equity, such as trust. Thus, equity, even if we do not always appreciate it, intrudes into many parts of our lives.

20. Human Rights IV: The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998

2021 ◽  
pp. 528-578
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Status ◽  
Legislative Policy ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Executive Action ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact

This chapter analyses some of the leading cases in which the courts addressed different aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, and draws out the constitutional implications of the courts’ initial conclusions. The discussions cover the interlinked issues of the extent to which the courts have recognised a distinction between Convention articles and Convention Rights, the approach taken to statutory interpretation mandated by s 3, and the use of Declarations of Incompatibility under s 4; the doctrine of judicial ‘deference’ to legislative policy decisions; the ‘horizontality’ of the Act and its impact on the development of the common law; and the status of proportionality as a ground of review of executive action. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether the Act has triggered a shift in understandings on the proper scope of the doctrines of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law within the modern constitutional order.

Legal aspects of fitness for work

2013 ◽  
pp. 21-41
Author(s):  
Gillian S. Howard
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Employment Law ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Law System ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right

The English legal system is based on the common law. The common law system in England and Wales developed from the decisions of judges whose rulings over the centuries have created precedents for other courts to follow and these decisions were based on the ‘custom and practice of the Realm’. The system of binding precedent means that any decision of the Supreme Court—the new name for the former House of Lords (the highest court in the UK)—will bind all the lower courts, unless the lower courts are able to distinguish the facts of the current case and argue that the previous binding decision cannot apply, because of differences in the facts of the two cases. However, since the UK joined the European Union (EU), the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) now supersede any decisions of the domestic courts and require the English national courts to follow its decisions. (Scotland has a system based on Dutch Roman law, and some procedural differences although no fundamental differences in relation to employment law.) The Human Rights Act 1998 became law in England and Wales in 2000 (and in Scotland in 1998) in order to incorporate the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. The two most important Articles applicable to employment law are Article 8(1), the right to respect for privacy, family life, and correspondence, and Article 6, the right to a fair trial.

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