Immigration vs. Foreign Investment to Ease the Ageing Problems of an Ageing Open Economy

Author(s):  
Lakshmi K. Raut
2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark L. Muzere

<p class="MsoBodyText2" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 34.2pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper considers the effects of restricting capital outflows on foreign investment in a developing country. It is shown that a developing country may restrict capital outflows if domestic economic conditions are poor, and it may liberalize capital outflows if domestic economic conditions are strong. Restricting capital outflows has large impact if the investment horizon is short. Furthermore, restricting capital outflows may discourage foreign investors from investing in the developing country. This result is consistent with the home equity bias.</span></span></p>


2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (12) ◽  
pp. 1525-1532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna G. Iyer ◽  
Alicia N. Rambaldi ◽  
Kam Ki Tang

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Hale

AbstractThis article examines the evolving debate over takeover bids by foreign state-owned and influenced enterprises (SOEs) in the context of CNOOC's successful 2012 acquisition of Nexen Inc., historical debates over foreign investment in Canada and the ongoing adaptation of Canadian trade and investment policies to global shifts in economic activity and power. It views SOE-related policy changes as responses to four broad factors: Canada's adaptation to changing global investment patterns as a small, open economy, efforts to diversify Canada's trade and investment relations while balancing domestic regional and sectoral interests, the extension of trade-related principles of reciprocity to investment policies and competition among governmental and economic interests in the allocation of discretion in corporate governance and related regulatory policies.


2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-346
Author(s):  
SANTANU CHATTERJEE

The choice between private and government provision of a productive public good like infrastructure (public capital) is examined in the context of an endogenously growing open economy. The accumulation of public capital need not require government provision, in contrast to the standard assumption in the literature. Even with an efficient government, the relative costs and benefits of government and private provision depend crucially on the economy's underlying structural conditions and borrowing constraints in international capital markets. Countries with limited substitution possibilities and large production externalities may benefit from governments encouraging private provision of public capital through targeted investment subsidies. By contrast, countries with flexible substitution possibilities and relatively smaller externalities may benefit either from governments directly providing public capital or from regulation of private providers. The transitional dynamics also are shown to depend on the underlying elasticity of substitution and the size of the production externality.


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