scholarly journals Conceptual confusing similarity and pictorial trade marks

2022 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-443
Author(s):  
Rob Batty

Several high-profile rebrands, including those by Twitter and Starbucks, have involved removing text from logos. This move towards wordless, pictorial trade marks raises a difficult question about how the scope of protection of a registered trade mark should be determined. This article examines the particular issue of how much weight should be given to the idea or concept underlying a pictorial mark when assessing whether a defendant’s junior mark is ‘confusingly similar’. Drawing on legal principles and case examples from Europe, the United Kingdom, Singapore and New Zealand, it is claimed that courts and adjudicators should be careful not to overweight conceptual similarity. It is argued that a lack of care in assessing conceptual similarity risks awarding one trader overbroad protection, which may be tantamount to conferring on one trader a monopoly in an idea. A lack of care may also undermine the logic of a registration system by untethering protection from what is recorded on the Register, and may make trade mark law less predictable and certain. * The author declares that he was junior counsel in a case discussed in this article, Carabao Tawandang Co Ltd v Red Bull GmbH HC Wellington CIV-2005-485-1975, 31 August 2006. The views represented in this article are the author’s own, and do not reflect the views of his employer at the time, or the views of the client represented in that particular case.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-114
Author(s):  
Rob Batty

The ‘cluttering’ of trade mark registers with unused trade marks is an issue of contemporary concern. One mechanism that can be used to prevent ‘deadwood’ trade marks from getting on the Register in the first place is to ensure that a trader has a genuine intention to use the trade mark. Indeed, the enactment of the first registration legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) was followed by a judicial insistence that a trader could not ‘properly register a trade mark’ if the trader did not have bona fide and present intention to use the trade mark. An intent to use requirement remains a feature of New Zealand (NZ) law, though it has a much reduced sphere of operation under the Trade Marks Act 2002. Tracing historical developments, this article examines how the regulation of the intent to use requirement has evolved under NZ law. This exercise provides a useful lens for understanding how and why the intention to use requirement operates as it currently does. Further, by examining the history of the intent to use requirement, the article also illuminates that there is nothing intractable about how NZ trade mark law has opted to regulate intention to use, and NZ law may be adjusted to better address concerns like cluttering.


Author(s):  
Paul Torremans

This chapter discusses the international and European aspects of trade marks. Trade mark law is based on the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, with the Madrid system offering an international registration system. Inside the EU, one can also register a single trade mark for the whole of the Community by means of the Community Trade Mark Regulation. Trade mark law also has a substantial interaction with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods, but minimal conflict with competition law.


Author(s):  
Richard Arnold

This chapter discusses UK case law in the domain of intermediary liability and trade mark infringement, while situating this common law perspective within EU trade mark law, the e-Commerce Directive, and the Enforcement Directive. The chapter first describes liability stemming from legal principles which are not particular to intermediaries, including primary and accessory liability of online intermediaries for trade mark infringement. Later, the chapter reviews liability depending on the application of principles which are specific to intermediaries, the intermediary liability proper. In this context, the chapter looks into injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used to infringe trade marks that are made available in national jurisdictions under the implementation of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. Although other kinds of injunctions against intermediaries are available, the chapter focuses on website-blocking injunctions, which have been recently ported from the copyright domain, where they have been more traditionally deployed, to the trade mark domain.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 583
Author(s):  
Michael McGowan

This article examines the relatively new fields of colour and shape trade marks. It was initially feared by some academics that the new marks would encroach on the realms of patent and copyright.  However, the traditional requirements of trade mark law, such as functionality and descriptiveness, have meant that trade marks in colour and shape are extremely hard to acquire if they do not have factual distinctiveness. As colour and shape trade marks have no special restrictions, it is proposed that the combination trade mark theory and analysis from the Diamond T case should be used as a way to make them more accessible. The combination analysis can be easily applied because every product has a three dimensional shape and a fourth dimension of colour.


Author(s):  
Annette Kur ◽  
Martin Senftleben

Under European trade mark law, protection is only acquired through registration (Article 6 EUTMR; Article 1 TMD). Whether the mark is actually used or not is of no relevance at this stage: neither is it a requirement for protection, nor does it grant a substantive right under the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) or the Trade Mark Directive (TMD). However, such protection may follow from national law. Member States are free to grant use-based trade mark protection within their jurisdiction, and in a number of them—Austria, Germany, Italy, the Nordic countries, and, in the form of passing off, the United Kingdom—such protection is available under terms that may differ from country to country. The specificities of the legal regime applying to such signs are independent from the provisions in the TMD.


2019 ◽  
pp. 290-319
Author(s):  
Stavroula Karapapa ◽  
Luke McDonagh

This chapter focuses on trade mark infringement, setting out the rights of a trade mark owner to prevent others from making use of any sign which is the same as or similar to the registered mark in the course of trade. A claimant who brings a trade mark infringement action will have to show two things: that an act of infringement has been committed, and that such conduct falls within the scope of protection afforded to the registered mark. Once these two points have been established, the court will normally find in favour of the claimant unless one or more of the counter-arguments raised by the defendant succeeds. A defendant who is sued for trade mark infringement, besides denying that infringement has been made out or raising one of the statutory defences, will usually try to counterclaim that the mark should be revoked or declared invalid.


Author(s):  
L. Bently ◽  
B. Sherman ◽  
D. Gangjee ◽  
P. Johnson

This chapter is about the various defences that are available to a person who has been accused of infringing a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act 1994. A prominent limitation on the scope of protection, which operates defensively, is whether the defendant has made a legally relevant use of the mark. Besides this, the defendant is excused if the mark has been used (i) as the defendant’s own name or address, (ii) for descriptive purposes, or (iii) to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service. These threeuses are subject to a proviso testing for whether the use has been in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters. Additional defences facilitate comparative advertising and permit parallel importation via the exhaustion of the trade mark owner’s rights upon first sale.


1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-273
Author(s):  
JENNIFER DAVIS

In British Sugar plc v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd. [1996] RPC 281, Jacob J. asked whether the 1994 Trade Marks Act enables “big business to buy ordinary words of the English language at comparatively little cost”. His answer was a resounding “no”. In Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products, 22 December 1997, he asks whether trade mark law, by conferring a perpetual monopoly, can interfere with the freedom to manufacture artefacts of a “desirable and good engineering design”. The educated reader might hazard that he would again answer in the negative. And so it transpires. The thrill of the chase is to see how Jacob J. interprets the Act to reach this conclusion.


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