scholarly journals The Principle of Proportionality Reflected in the Case-law of the Constitutional Court of Romania

2015 ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
MONA-MARIA PIVNICERU ◽  
KAROLY BENKE
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Complex Image ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
Proportionality Test

This study aims at presenting a more complex image of the principle of proportionality through an analysis that combines the theoretical and the jurisprudential perspectives. The precondition of this analysis is the classic opinion of this originally German principle which requires a distinction between the objective and subjective conditions of limitation/restriction of fundamental rights/freedoms, each of which shall be subject to a separate test in order to determine whether limitations/restrictions thus established are justified. However, we reveal the way in which such principle has been accepted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, of the European Court of Justice and of the Constitutional Court of Romania, indicating the variations achieved in their case-law. As concerns the acceptance manner of the principle of proportionality in the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Romania, we analyze the fundamental differences between the classic principle of proportionality, which intrinsically characterizes the relative fundamental rights/freedoms, and the principle of proportionality covered by Article 53 of the Constitution. Likewise, the focus is on the analysis of subjective conditions of limitation of fundamental rights/freedoms in the light of the proportionality test conducted by the Constitutional Court of Romania and on the need for a precise constitutional review in order to avoid the development of distorted forms of implementation of this principle

scholarly journals The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to its Core

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maja Brkan
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
The Eu

Essence of fundamental rights – Article 52(1) of the Charter – Multi-level protection of fundamental rights in Europe – Sources of essence – European Court of Justice case law on ‘very substance’ of fundamental rights – Constitutional traditions common to the Member States – European Court of Human Rights – Court of Justice of the EU – Schrems – Principle of proportionality – Absolute theory – Relative theory – Classification of interferences with essence – Objective interference – Subjective interference – Absolute rights – EU methodology for determination of interference with essence

The unexpectedly talkative ‘dumb son’: the Italian Constitutional Court’s dialogue with the European Court of Justice in protecting temporary workers’ rights in the public education sector

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-524
Author(s):  
Barbara Guastaferro
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Italian Legislation

Judicial cooperation – Italian Constitutional Court – National Constitutional Courts’ attitude towards preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice – First and second preliminary reference of the Italian Constitutional Court inindirectproceedings – Constitutional review of national legislation inconsistent with EU law – Relationship between EU law and constitutional concerns – Added value of Constitutional Courts in protecting constitutional identity – Multilevel protection of fundamental rights – EU Framework agreement on fixed-term work and European Court of Justice case law – Italian legislation on fixed-term work – Italian legislation on recruitment in State schools – Abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts – Judicial defence of workers’ rights – Cooperation between judges and legislators – Balancing between social rights and budgetary constraints –Mascolocase –Tariccocase

The Domestic Reach of General Principles of Law: First City Trading Revisited

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Grief
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Academic Evaluation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
General Principles Of Law

This is a critical analysis—in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law—of the judgment in R v MAFF, ex p First City Trading, or at least of that part of the judgment concerning the domestic reach of general principles of law. Laws J held that the legal status of the general principles ‘made’ by the ECJ is inferior to that of the principles enshrined in the Treaty, and that therefore the domestic reach of the former is narrower than that of the latter. In the years since the judgment was delivered, however, it does not appear to have been considered by the ECJ and there seems to have been little academic evaluation of its cogency and implications. One commentator considered that the distinction drawn by the judge seemed correct. Another was critical, asserting that ‘the distinction between principles based on Treaty provisions and general principles of law cannot be deduced from the case law of the Court of Justice’. The possible entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which recognises that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (and thus presumably the rights, freedoms and principles within it) has ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’, makes it appropriate to revisit the judgment and consider whether Laws J’s approach was correct.

scholarly journals La aplicación judicial de la CDFUE; un decálogo a partir de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea

2017 ◽  
pp. 333
Author(s):  
Rafael Bustos Gisbert
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Basic Point ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

En este ensayo se pretende examinar cuáles son las pautas que ha de seguir el juez nacional cuando se enfrenta a la aplicación de la CDFUE. El punto de referencia básico en esta materia ha de ser la jurisprudencia sobre el tema del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. De forma complementaria habrá de tenerse en cuenta la posición del Tribunal Constitucional y del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. A partir de lo ocurrido en los casos más importantes hasta ahora planteados se pretende esclarecer cuándo y cómo ha de seguirse la jurisprudencia de los tres altos tribunales.This essay tries to establish the basic patterns that judges must follow when facing the adjudication of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The basic point of reference is the case law of the European Court of Justice. But they also must be take into account the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. After the study of the most important cases in the topic, the essay attempts to clarify when and how to follow the jurisprudence of these High Courts.

scholarly journals Ne bis in idem: a separation of acts in transnational cases?

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-115
Author(s):  
Márk Némedi
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Ne Bis In Idem ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This paper analyses the case-law of the European Court of Justice on the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases and evaluates the findings in light of the different concepts of legal interests inherent in the concept of crime as a material notion. I argue that the application of the interpretation of the ECJ to crimes against collective interests is insufficiently justified. As a result, the interpretation of ne bis in idem based on material facts appears only partially correct and a sense of distrust seems to be cemented between member states creating obstacles to a successful reform of the principle. Part one attempts to defend that the reasoning put forward by the court lacks relevance and evaluates how this affects mutual trust. Part two analyses this interpretation in the light of different forms of legal interest. Part three examines how later case-law has tried to explain the problematic interpretation of early cases and its relationship with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The article will conclude by summarising the findings which may put into perspective the more general challenges of cooperation in criminal matters within the EU.

COMPANIES AND THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Oliver
Keyword(s):  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Double Jeopardy ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article explores the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court on the fundamental rights of commercial companies. The rights considered include property, the privilege against self-incrimination, freedom of speech, double jeopardy, the right to make political donations, and the freedom of religion. The article highlights the dangers of taking the fundamental rights of companies too far, as has recently occurred in the US; and it advocates a cautious and coordinated approach to this delicate issue, which has become increasingly important on both sides of the Atlantic.

scholarly journals ¿Es real el diálogo entre tribunales? Cuestión prejudicial y control de constitucionalidad por vulneración de derechos y libertades fundamentales

2017 ◽  
pp. 529
Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Constitution

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.

scholarly journals The Federal Constitutional Court Decisions: „The Right to be Forgotten I” and „The Right to be Forgotten II” – The Expectation of Increased Cooperation with the Concurrent Need to Maintain Independence

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.

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