The unexpectedly talkative ‘dumb son’: the Italian Constitutional Court’s dialogue with the European Court of Justice in protecting temporary workers’ rights in the public education sector

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-524
Author(s):  
Barbara Guastaferro
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Italian Legislation

Judicial cooperation – Italian Constitutional Court – National Constitutional Courts’ attitude towards preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice – First and second preliminary reference of the Italian Constitutional Court inindirectproceedings – Constitutional review of national legislation inconsistent with EU law – Relationship between EU law and constitutional concerns – Added value of Constitutional Courts in protecting constitutional identity – Multilevel protection of fundamental rights – EU Framework agreement on fixed-term work and European Court of Justice case law – Italian legislation on fixed-term work – Italian legislation on recruitment in State schools – Abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts – Judicial defence of workers’ rights – Cooperation between judges and legislators – Balancing between social rights and budgetary constraints –Mascolocase –Tariccocase

Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Law

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.

scholarly journals The Principle of Proportionality Reflected in the Case-law of the Constitutional Court of Romania

2015 ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
MONA-MARIA PIVNICERU ◽  
KAROLY BENKE
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Complex Image ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
Proportionality Test

This study aims at presenting a more complex image of the principle of proportionality through an analysis that combines the theoretical and the jurisprudential perspectives. The precondition of this analysis is the classic opinion of this originally German principle which requires a distinction between the objective and subjective conditions of limitation/restriction of fundamental rights/freedoms, each of which shall be subject to a separate test in order to determine whether limitations/restrictions thus established are justified. However, we reveal the way in which such principle has been accepted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, of the European Court of Justice and of the Constitutional Court of Romania, indicating the variations achieved in their case-law. As concerns the acceptance manner of the principle of proportionality in the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Romania, we analyze the fundamental differences between the classic principle of proportionality, which intrinsically characterizes the relative fundamental rights/freedoms, and the principle of proportionality covered by Article 53 of the Constitution. Likewise, the focus is on the analysis of subjective conditions of limitation of fundamental rights/freedoms in the light of the proportionality test conducted by the Constitutional Court of Romania and on the need for a precise constitutional review in order to avoid the development of distorted forms of implementation of this principle

scholarly journals ¿Es real el diálogo entre tribunales? Cuestión prejudicial y control de constitucionalidad por vulneración de derechos y libertades fundamentales

2017 ◽  
pp. 529
Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Constitution

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.

scholarly journals The Federal Constitutional Court Decisions: „The Right to be Forgotten I” and „The Right to be Forgotten II” – The Expectation of Increased Cooperation with the Concurrent Need to Maintain Independence

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jaś-Nowopolska ◽  
Daniel Mengeler
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Right To Be Forgotten ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Eu Fundamental Rights

The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU fundamental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the precedence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system. Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described in greater detail. The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

scholarly journals La tutela judicial de los derechos fundamentales en el ámbito de aplicación nacional del derecho de la Unión Europea : recientes acotaciones del Tribunal de Justicia y del Tribunal ConstitucionalEspañol = The judicial protection of fundamental rights in the sphere of the national application of EU law : recent remarks by the Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court

2013 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Standards ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
The Eu

Este artículo es un estudio relativo a la tutela judicial de los Derechos Fundamentales cuando se aplica Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito interno, y a cuáles son los principales problemas con los que se topa el Juez nacional que aplica el Derecho de la Unión al llevar a cabo dicha función protectora. El trabajo, dicho de forma más concreta, se centra en el examen de una serie de recientes y decisivas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, dictadas tanto por parte del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como por parte del Tribunal Constitucional Español, que analizan problemas y señalan soluciones relativas a esas cuestiones, además de mostrar cuál es la evolución y el estado de la situación al respecto. Se trata de resoluciones que abordan cuestiones de fondo, como, por ejemplo: ¿hasta qué punto es posible utilizar estándares nacionales de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales en situaciones conectadas con el Derecho de la Unión o con su aplicación, en lugar de utilizar el sistema de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea? Y asimismo, resoluciones que atienden a cuestiones de dimensión más procesal como la de dirimir hasta qué punto tiene autonomía el Juez nacional a la hora de plantear una petición prejudicial (se entiende a la hora de tutelar derechos reconocidos por normas de la Unión) en relación a las normas procesales nacionales.This article deals with the judicial protection of fundamental rights when EU Law is applied at national level and the main problems national judges have to deal with when applying EU Law as protectors of rights. More precisely, the work is focused on the examination of some recent and decisive judicial decisions, both by the European Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court which analyze the problems and address the solutions to those questions besides showing the evolution and current situation in that regard. They are decisions that deal with the merits as for example to which extent it might be possible to use national standards of protection of fundamental rights in situations connected to EU Law or to its application instead of using the system of protection of EU human rights. Likewise, they are decisions which handle with more procedural questions as for example to what extent national judges are autonomous to file a preliminary question (it is understood that when it comes time to protect rights acknowledged by the EU) relative to national procedural rules.

Effectiveness of EU law and protection of fundamental rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosaria Sicurella
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Critical View ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Significant Step ◽  
Principle Of Legality

The decision of the Court of Justice in the M.A.S. and M.B. case marks a very significant step forward in the Taricco saga. It clearly shows the intention of the European Court to tone down the confrontation with the Italian Constitutional Court, while at the same time maintaining the most relevant achievement of the decision in the Taricco case, that is to say the fact to consider Article 325 TFEU as having direct effect. The author expresses quite a critical view on the solution adopted by the ECJ which finally results in a sort of “flexibilization” of the principle of legality at EU level in order to meet some of the claims by the Italian Constitutional Court. In the author's opinion, such a solution risks to undermine the overall coherence and soundness of the protection of fundamental rights at EU level, although it can appear at a first glance to boost the legality principle. A better solution could have been to develop a different reasoning relying on rights in the Charter other that the nullum crimen principle, and avoid to touch at the well-established scope of this principle as established in Article 49 Charter and also in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

scholarly journals The Randstad Case: Melki Reloaded? The Fundamental Right to Effective Judicial Protection as Battleground for Judicial Supremacy in European Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
Orlando Scarcello
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
The Eu

This paper will examine the recent preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice issued by the Italian Court of Cassation in the Randstad case, aimed at rearranging the internal constitutional separation between ordinary and administrative courts (article 111(8) of the Constitution). I will first provide some context on both the relations between Italian and EU courts (2.1) and on the confrontation between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in interpreting article 111 (2.2). I will then specifically examine the referring order to the Court of Justice of the EU (3), focusing on the role of general clauses of EU law as articles 4(3) and 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter in it. Finally, I will consider the instrumental use of EU law made by the Cassation to overcome an unpleasant constitutional arrangement. This aligns Randstad with previous cases such as Melki or A v. B and may foster constitutional conflict in the future. 

scholarly journals The Principle of Mutual Trust in EU Law and Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 106 (6) ◽  
pp. 144-154
Author(s):  
Vadim Voynikov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

Mutual trust is one of the central principles of the area of freedom, security and justice and the whole EU. Despite the fact, that mutual trust is not stipulated in founding treaties, this principle has been widely developed by the European Court of Justice. The purpose of this article is to identify the legal and political components of mutual trust in the EU, as well as the approaches to its implementation. The author comes to the conclusion that the principle of mutual trust originated from the internal market, however its development is mostly associated with the area of freedom, security and justice. Mutual trust in the EU presupposes that a member state does not need additional verification that another member state respects Union law and fundamental rights. Initially, the principle of mutual trust was given the absolute character, but in the post-Lisbon period, “blind trust” was replaced by the “earned trust”, which implies the possibility, in exceptional cases, to refuse mutual trust to another member state if the latter violates fundamental rights. Despite the development of the concept of mutual trust by the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions, recently there has been a serious deficit of interstate trust within the Union. In this regard, the principle of mutual trust is becoming declarative.

Data Protection in EU Law

2011 ◽  
pp. 273-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Data Protection Directive ◽  
Data Flows ◽  
Court Of First Instance

This chapter aims to discuss the possibilities and limitations of the EU to provide for an effective and comprehensive data protection regime. In this respect, it presents an analysis of the data protection rules in EU law by examining the relevant constitutional and secondary law framework. It analyzes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on data protection issues, and argues that the European Court of Justice has interpreted an internal market measure (the Data Protection Directive) in such a way so as to foster the protection of fundamental rights. However, when it comes to the balancing between fundamental rights the Court leaves the question to be resolved by national courts. Finally, the contribution assesses the transborder data flows regime established by the Data Protection Directive and attempts to draw some conclusions on whether the ‘adequate protection’ test ensures a high protection in such flows.

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