Double Jeopardy: Prematurity and Congenital Heart Disease—What's Known and Why It's Important

This article is based on a composite of talks presented during the Double Jeopardy: Prematurity and Congenital Heart Disease Plenary Session at NeoHeart 2020, a global virtual conference. Prematurity and low weight remain significant risk factors for mortality after neonatal cardiac surgery despite a steady increase in survival. Newer and lower weight thresholds for operability are constantly generated as surgeons gather proficiency, technical mastery, and experience in performing complex procedures on extremely small infants. The relationship between birth weight and survival after cardiac surgery is nonlinear with 2 kilograms (kg) being an inflection point below which marked decline in survival occurs. The prevalence of congenital heart disease (CHD) in premature infants is more than twice that in term born infants. Increased risk of preterm birth in infants with CHD is most commonly due to spontaneous preterm birth and remains poorly understood. Advances in Neonatal-Perinatal medicine have led to a marked improvement in survival of neonates born prematurely over the last several decades. However, the risk of severe morbidities including retinopathy of prematurity, intraventricular hemorrhage, bronchopulmonary dysplasia and necrotizing enterocolitis remains significant in extremely low birth weight infants. Premature infants with CHD are at a greater risk of prematurity related morbidities than premature infants without CHD. Interventions that have been successful in decreasing the risk of these morbidities are addressed.

Africans Had No Business Fighting in Either the 1914–1918 War or the 1939–1945 War

The wars of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945 are without parallel in the expansive stretch of decades of the pan-European conquest and occupation of Africa in creating such profound opportunity to study the very entrenched desire by the European conqueror-states in Africa to perpetuate their control on the continent and its peoples indefinitely. The two principal protagonists in each conflict, Britain and Germany, were the lead powers of these conqueror-states that had formally occupied Africa since 1885. Against this cataclysmic background of history, Africans found themselves conscripted by both sides of the confrontation line in 1914–1918 to at once fight wars for and against their aggressors during which 1 million Africans were killed. Clearly, this was a case of double-jeopardy of conquered and occupied peoples fighting for their enemy-occupiers. In the follow-up 1939–1945 war, when Germany indeed no longer occupied any African land (having been defeated in the 1914–1918 encounter), Britain and allies France and Belgium (all continuing occupying powers in Africa) conscripted Africans, yet again, to fight for these powers in their new confrontation against Germany, and Japan, a country that was in no way an aggressor force in Africa. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were killed in this second war. In neither of these conflicts, as this study demonstrates, do the leaders of these warring countries who occupied (or hitherto occupied) Africa ever view their enforced presence in Africa as precisely the scenario or outcome they wished their own homeland was not subjected to by their enemies. On the contrary, just as it was their position in the aftermath of the 1914–1918 war, Britain, France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal in 1945 each envisaged the continuing occupation of the states and peoples of Africa they had seized by force prior to these conflicts. Winston Churchill, the British prime minster at the time, was adamant: ‘I had not become the king’s first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the anti-German ‘free French forces’, was no less categorical on this score: ‘Self-government [in French-occupied Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, South America, the Pacific and elsewhere in the world] must be rejected – even in the more distant future’.

Ageism from a cross-cultural perspective: results from a national survey of Israelis over the age of 50

ABSTRACT Objectives: We examined differences across three groups in Israel to test the double jeopardy versus the intersection escape hypotheses-which evaluate whether being older and belonging to an underrepresented group serves as a double burden, exposing older minorities to higher levels of perceived ageism or on the contrary, older age serves as a protective factor, especially for underrepresented groups. Design: A cross-sectional, nationally representative sample, consisting of three groups: Veteran Israelis, Israeli Arabs and immigrants from the Former Soviet Union. The latter two groups represent underrepresented (minority) populations in Israel. Setting: Community-dwelling Israelis over the age of 50. Participants: The sample was composed of 1570 participants. Measurement: To examine the double jeopardy versus the intersectional escape hypothesis, self-perceptions of aging (SPA) and perceived age-based discrimination in the healthcare system were examined as outcome variables. Results: Among Israeli Arabs, being older was related to better SPA, whereas among the immigrants being older was related to worse SPA. As immigrants became older, they were more likely to report ageist experiences. Israeli Arabs reported higher levels of ageist experiences, regardless of their age. Conclusions: The findings point to certain groups that require education about ageism and the aging processes and might require further protection from the experiences of ageism. The findings also point to the relevance of different theoretical paradigms that advocate for the consideration of culture and group membership in the understanding of the experiences of ageism.

Vicarious Justifications for Prejudice in the Application of Democratic Values

Democratic values are widely endorsed principles including commitments to protect individual freedoms. Paradoxically, the widespread normativity of these ideas can be used to justify prejudice. With two nationally representative U.S. samples, we find that prejudiced respondents defend another’s prejudiced speech, using democratic values as justification. This vicarious defense occurs primarily among those who share the prejudice and only when the relevant prejudice is expressed. Several different democratic values (e.g., due process, double jeopardy) can serve as justifications—the issue is more about when something can be used as a justification for prejudice and less about what can be used as one. Endorsing democratic values can be a common rhetorical device to expand what is acceptable and protect what is otherwise unacceptable to express in public.

A PLEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY ACCUSED EMPLOYERS: ARE THERE LIMITS?

The rule against double jeopardy entails that, generally, a person cannot be charged more than once for the same, or substantially the same, offence or misconduct in respect of which he or she has been convicted or acquitted. Under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, this rule is part of an accused’s right to a fair trial. This article shows that every employer prosecuted for allegedly not complying with either employees’ tax obligations in the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, or for an offence at common law, is entitled to raise the procedural defence of double jeopardy. This article argues that the recent judgment in Grayston Technology Investment (Pty) Ltd v S is authority for the proposition that, in any such prosecution, an accused employer may invoke double jeopardy, even if the prior punishment or acquittal stems from non-criminal proceedings under the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 before the Tax Court or the Tax Board. A key hypothesis of this article is the argument that double jeopardy ought not to be applied as an inflexible procedural rule in every instance. This is because such an approach would lead to the undesirable result of undermining the Legislature’s objective in catering for criminal and civil sanctions in respect of certain violations of fiscal legislation. No hard-and-fast rules can be laid down in advance as to when double jeopardy may be successfully invoked. Each case needs to be decided on its own facts. It is contended that when a court decides whether to uphold a double-jeopardy defence, it must strike an equitable balance between, on the one hand, the accused employer’s fundamental right to a fair trial and, on the other, society’s legitimate interest in ensuring that taxpayers comply with their tax obligations on pain of adequate punishment for non-compliance.