scholarly journals Erratum to : MODELS OF CHOICE BEHAVIOR IN TWO PERSON NON-ZERO SUM GAMES WITH RESPONSE-DEPENDENT PAYOFF MATRICES

1972 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 166b-166b
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Payoff Matrices ◽  
Zero Sum

Learning in Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games

1974 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 503-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Pate ◽  
Elizabeth D. Broughton ◽  
Lorraine K. Hallman ◽  
N. Lynn Letterman
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
External Control ◽  
Personality Variables ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Value Of The Game ◽  
Computer Confidence ◽  
Zero Sum

In a series of three studies, Ss were required to play a two-person zero-sum game. Ss low in dogmatism tended to approach the optimum or exploiting strategy more closely than highly dogmatic Ss, but two other personality variables (internal-external control and computer confidence, a measure of willingness to have decisions made by a computer) were unrelated to gaming strategies. The value of the game and the required strategy affected significantly Ss' choice behavior.

Analysis of the Individualistic, Competitive and Cooperative Motives in Non-Zero-Sum Games

1976 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-61
Author(s):  
Shaul Fox
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Conflict Situation ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Strategy Games ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Sole Criterion ◽  
Zero Sum

According to Messick and McClintock (1968), differences in choice behavior of strategy games of the non-zero-sum type may be explained mainly by three motives: the individualistic, the competitive, and the cooperative. The researchers' operational definitions of the motives are based on the payoffs in the game matrices. This article critically examines Messick and Mc-Clintock's expositions and demonstrates that the payoff consideration cannot be the sole criterion for the identification of motivational goals. Disregarding the opponent's choice may lead to mistaken conclusions concerning the participant's motive as inferred from his decision. In the wake of this oversight, the proposal for measuring the three motives, stated in this article, is based on the following principles: (1) A pre-programmed plan for one participant in the game in order to standardize the situation the subjects face. (2) A large number of trials in order to ensure the subject's awareness of the opponent's fixed strategy. (3) The combination of 1 and 2 with appropriate payoff values enables the construction of the conflict situation confronting the subject.

scholarly journals The 3P Challenge: A Serious Game for Reflecting on Partnership in Public-Private Concessions

2020 ◽  
pp. 1087724X2098158
Author(s):  
Camilo Benitez-Avila ◽  
Andreas Hartmann ◽  
Geert Dewulf
Keyword(s):  
Process Management ◽  
Project Managers ◽  
Serious Game ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Mixed Group ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Zero Sum

Process management literature is skeptical about creating legitimacy and a sense of partnership when implementing concessional Public-Private Partnerships. Within such organizational arrangements, managerial interaction often resembles zero-sum games. To explore the possibility to (re)create a sense of partnership in concessional PPPs, we developed the “3P challenge” serious game. Two gaming sessions with a mixed group of practitioners and a team of public project managers showed that the game cycle recreates adversarial situations where players can enact contractual obligations with higher or lower levels of subjectivity. When reflecting on the gaming experience, practitioners point out that PPP contracts can be creatively enacted by managers who act as brokers of diverse interests. While becoming aware of each other stakes they can blend contractual dispositions or place brackets around some contractual clauses for reaching agreement. By doing so, they can (re)create a sense of partnership, clarity, and fairness of the PPP contract.

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