Deontology and the moral agent problem

Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 175-201
Author(s):  
Hoayoung Youn
Keyword(s):  

In a tradition inspired by the Delphic injunction to ‘know thyself’, ancient philosophical works contain a variety of treatments of self-knowledge—of knowing the content of certain kinds of one’s own thought, or knowing one’s own status as a knower or moral agent. This book draws together contributions from an international collection of scholars working in ancient philosophy, and explores self-knowledge in ancient thought in Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thinkers, and Plotinus, noting continuities and discontinuities with its contemporary counterpart. The nature and structure of ancient self-knowledge is investigated in different thinkers—whether it is higher-order or a kind of self-presence, consists in a synoptic view or is diachronic, is arrived at directly via self-perception or some other kind of grasp, or mediated by dialogue or friendship with others. So too the book enquires into the relation of self-knowledge to virtue or tranquillity, either as a condition on attaining that state, or a result of the agent’s development, resulting from a process of effortful reflection.


Author(s):  
Gillis J. Harp

Protestant beliefs have made several significant contributions to conservatism, both in the more abstract realm of ideas and in the arena of political positions or practical policies. First, they have sacralized the established social order, valued and defended customary hierarchies; they have discouraged revolt or rebellion; they have prompted Protestants to view the state as an active moral agent of divine origin; and they have stressed the importance of community life and mediating institutions such as the family and the church and occasionally provided a modest check on an individualistic and competitive impulse. Second, certain shared tenets facilitated this conjunction of Protestantism and conservatism, most often when substantial change loomed. For example, common concerns of the two dovetailed when revivals challenged the religious status quo during the colonial Great Awakening, when secession and rebellion threatened federal authority during the Civil War, when a new type of conservatism emerged, and dismissed the older sort as paternalistic, when the Great Depression opened the door to a more intrusive state, when atheist communism challenged American individualism, and, finally, when the cultural changes of the 1960s undermined traditional notions of the family and gender roles. Third, certain Christian ideas and assumptions have, at their best, served to heighten or ennoble conservative discourse, sometimes raising it above merely partisan or pragmatic concerns. Protestantism added a moral and religious weight to conservative beliefs and helped soften the harshness of an acquisitive, sometimes cutthroat, economic order.


1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace

AbstractThis paper explores the question whether utilitarianism is compatible with the autonomy of the moral agent. The paper begins by considering Bernard Williams' famous complaint that utilitarianism cannot do justice to the personal projects and commitments constitutive of character. Recent work (by Peter Railton among others) has established that a utilitarian agent need not be free of such personal projects and commitments, and could even affirm them morally at the level of second"order reflection. But a different and more subtle problem confronts this approach: the use of utilitarian principles to justify the cultivation of personal projects and attachments undermines the autonomy to support this objection, according to which autonomy is a matter of acting in a way one can reflectively endorse.


Human Affairs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Dmytro Mykhailov

Abstract Contemporary medical diagnostics has a dynamic moral landscape, which includes a variety of agents, factors, and components. A significant part of this landscape is composed of information technologies that play a vital role in doctors’ decision-making. This paper focuses on the so-called Intelligent Decision-Support System that is widely implemented in the domain of contemporary medical diagnosis. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I will show that the IDSS may be considered a moral agent in the practice of medicine today. To develop this idea I will introduce the approach to artificial agency provided by Luciano Floridi. Simultaneously, I will situate this approach in the context of contemporary discussions regarding the nature of artificial agency. It is argued here that the IDSS possesses a specific sort of agency, includes several agent features (e.g. autonomy, interactivity, adaptability), and hence, performs an autonomous behavior, which may have a substantial moral impact on the patient’s well-being. It follows that, through the technology of artificial neural networks combined with ‘deep learning’ mechanisms, the IDSS tool achieves a specific sort of independence (autonomy) and may possess a certain type of moral agency. Second, I will provide a conceptual framework for the ethical evaluation of the moral impact that the IDSS may have on the doctor’s decision-making and, consequently, on the patient’s wellbeing. This framework is the Object-Oriented Model of Moral Action developed by Luciano Floridi. Although this model appears in many contemporary discussions in the field of information and computer ethics, it has not yet been applied to the medical domain. This paper addresses this gap and seeks to reveal the hidden potentialities of the OOP model for the field of medical diagnosis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Foster ◽  
Jonathan Herring
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Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
John Bishop

Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) draws attention to the importance of ethical assumptions in ‘logical’ arguments from evil (LAfEs) to the effect that the existence of (certain types) of evil is incompatible with the existence of a God who is all-powerful and morally perfect. I argue, first, that such arguments are likely to succeed only when ‘normatively relativized’—that is, when based on assumptions about divine goodness that may be subject to deep disagreement. I then argue that these arguments for atheism are also, and more fundamentally, conditioned by assumptions about the ontology of the divine. I criticise Sterba’s consideration of the implications for his own novel LAfE of the possibility that God is not a moral agent, arguing that Sterba fails to recognize the radical nature of this claim. I argue that, if we accept the ‘classical theist’ account that Brian Davies provides (interpreting Aquinas), then God does not count as ‘an’ agent at all, and the usual contemporary formulation of ‘the problem of evil’ falls away. I conclude by noting that the question of the logical compatibility of evil’s existence with divine goodness is settled in the affirmative by classical theism by appeal to its doctrine that evil is always the privation in something that exists of the good that ought to be.


1985 ◽  
Vol 82 (8) ◽  
pp. 391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conrad D. Johnson
Keyword(s):  

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