scholarly journals On the Significance of Assumptions about Divine Goodness and Divine Ontology for ‘Logical’ Arguments from Evil

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
John Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agent ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Radical Nature ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Goodness

Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) draws attention to the importance of ethical assumptions in ‘logical’ arguments from evil (LAfEs) to the effect that the existence of (certain types) of evil is incompatible with the existence of a God who is all-powerful and morally perfect. I argue, first, that such arguments are likely to succeed only when ‘normatively relativized’—that is, when based on assumptions about divine goodness that may be subject to deep disagreement. I then argue that these arguments for atheism are also, and more fundamentally, conditioned by assumptions about the ontology of the divine. I criticise Sterba’s consideration of the implications for his own novel LAfE of the possibility that God is not a moral agent, arguing that Sterba fails to recognize the radical nature of this claim. I argue that, if we accept the ‘classical theist’ account that Brian Davies provides (interpreting Aquinas), then God does not count as ‘an’ agent at all, and the usual contemporary formulation of ‘the problem of evil’ falls away. I conclude by noting that the question of the logical compatibility of evil’s existence with divine goodness is settled in the affirmative by classical theism by appeal to its doctrine that evil is always the privation in something that exists of the good that ought to be.

scholarly journals Panentheisms, Creation and Evil

Open Theology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-181
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Close Relation ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Abstract Can panentheism cope with the problem of evil? This problem is often understood as one for classical theists, who maintain that the cosmos, together with its evils, was created by an all-powerful and benevolent God. For classical theists need to reconcile the world’s evils with divine creation. But corresponding problems re-emerge for theologies of both pantheistic and panentheistic kinds. Thus a problem arises for panentheists, with their teachings about a close relation between God and the cosmos. The closer the relation, the more intense the problem. Thus panentheists who regard the world as necessary to or part of God must hold that its evils are likewise necessary to or part of God. I explore in this paper whether panentheism can overcome the corresponding problem. This exploration involves sifting different varieties of panentheism. While for some varieties the problem is insoluble, this turns out to be less so for others, which retain central features of classical theism, while stressing interaction between God and the created world. In particular, grounds will be offered for holding that the version of panentheism put forward by Jürgen Moltmann and by Arthur Peacocke is defensible and can overcome this problem.

scholarly journals Libertarianism and Classical Theism: Historical and Conceptual Interrelations

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Sergeyevich Mishura ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Process Theology ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Libertarian Freedom ◽  
Divine Perfections ◽  
Libertarian Free Will ◽  
Divine Goodness

This paper aims to highlight the historical and conceptual interrelations between libertarianism and classical theism (CT). In the first part of the paper, I show that the concept of CT was introduced in the contemporary philosophy of religion by the proponent of process theology Ch. H. Hartshorne to criticize European philosophical and theological tradition. Hartshorne himself thought that classical theism contradicts the libertarian understanding of free will. I further propose two hypotheses to explain the existing association between libertarianism and classical theism in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In the second part, I explore conceptual dependencies and contradictions between libertarianism and CT. I argue that although libertarianism is more suited to address the problem of evil and the doctrine of eternal damnation than theological compatibilism, it nevertheless faces serious problems on the way of reconciliation with CT. To explain evil and eternal damnation libertarian free will have to be understood as having a great value. However, the value of libertarian freedom might be challenged by exploring its contradictions with such divine perfections as divine goodness and divine foreknowledge and the doctrine of divine conservation. I further argue that to solve theological puzzles one needs to develop explicitly theological libertarian understanding of free will that depends on theological values and does not pretend to be compatible with naturalism and atheism.

scholarly journals Necessary Suffering and Lewisian Theism

Sophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew James Collier
Keyword(s):  
Related Problem ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

AbstractOne can readily conceive of worlds of horrendous, gratuitous suffering. Moreover, such worlds seem possible. For classical theists, however, God, amongst other things, is perfectly good. So, the question arises: for classical theists are such evil worlds possible? Many classical theists have said no. This is the modal problem of evil. Herein, I discuss a related problem: the problem of evil worlds for Lewisian theism. Lewisian theism is the conjunction of Lewis’s modal realism and classical theism, and a leading Lewisian theist, Almeida, thinks that Lewisian theists should admit the existence of on-balance evil worlds. I do not. Herein, I present a dilemma for Almeida: either give up God’s sovereignty and the reductionist account of modality or make God blameworthy for evil.

Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil

1966 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Penelhum
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Divine Goodness

The purpose of this paper is not to offer any solution to the problem of evil, or to declare it insoluble. It is rather the more modest one of deciding on its nature. Many writers assume that the problem of evil is one that poses a logical challenge to the theist, rather than a challenge of a moral or scientific sort. If this assumption is correct, and the challenge cannot be met, Christian theism can be shown to be untenable on grounds of inconsistency. This in turn means that it is refutable by philosophers, even if their task is interpreted in the most narrowly analytical fashion. It has recently been argued that the challenge of the problem of evil can be met on logical grounds, and that if the existence of evil is damaging to theism it is not because the recognition of its existence is inconsistent with some essential part of it. I take two examples of this position. The first is in the paper ‘Hume on Evil’ by Nelson Pike; the second I owe to Professor R. M. Chisholm.

Non-human animals and process theodicy

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
GARY CHARTIER
Keyword(s):  
General Problem ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Process Thought ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Divine Goodness

I argue that that the suffering of non-human animals poses some potentially knotty difficulties for process theodicy. To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism or make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims. I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I explain how process thought can respond with reasonable effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives.

The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil

1975 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Stanley kane
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sharp Distinction ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
Human Goodness ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Divine Goodness

Traditional theism maintains the view that the world is created by a God who is at once omnipotent and perfectly good. One of the most persistent challenges to this view is that known as the problem of evil. The challenge consists in the allegation that the manifest imperfections of the world are incompatible with its having been created by a God who is both perfectly good and has the power to carry out his will. In the face of this challenge some theists have sought to defend theism by drawing a sharp distinction between human goodness and divine goodness and claiming that the goodness of God is different from human goodness not merely in degree but in kind, and that God's goodness cannot be understood by men. As a consequence of this, they contend, the created world can be judged to be imperfect only if it is measured against the inferior standards of human goodness, which because they are inferior are inappropriate for judging the works of the almighty and infinitely perfect God. The sharp distinction between God's goodness and man's thus allows the theist to maintain that God is perfectly good even while recognising that there is (according to human standards of goodness and evil) a great deal of evil in the world. Hence, if the distinction can be successfully defended, it provides a neat way of getting out of the problem of evil.

Psychology and the problem of evil

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

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