The Liberal Ideal : A Speech at the National Liberal Club, London, at the Unveiling of the Prime Minister’s Portrait which had Been Restored After Being Damaged by a Bomb

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1971 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-183
Author(s):  
M. H. Stannus
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2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefaan E. Cuypers ◽  
Ishtiyaque Haji

Liberals champion the view that promoting autonomy — seeing to it that our children develop into individuals who are self-governing in the conduct of their lives — is a vital aim of education, though one generally accredited as being subsidiary to well-being. Our prime goal in this article is to provide a partial validation of this liberal ideal against the backdrop of a freedom-sensitive attitudinal hedonism — our favored life-ranking axiology.We propose that there is a pivotal connection between the concept of maximizing well-being and another concept central in the philosophy of education and in the literature on free agency: the concept of our springs of action, such as our desires or beliefs, being `truly our own' or, alternatively, autonomous. We suggest that it is the freedom that moral responsibility requires that bridges the overarching aim of securing well-being, on the one hand, and the subsidiary aim of promoting autonomy, on the other.


2006 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-166
Author(s):  
Sukanya Banerjee

This essay argues that the experience of diaspora compels a constitutive reckoning with the conceptual category of the universal. Refl ecting on Sunil Bhatia’s American Karma and Radika Mohanram’s Imperial White (which respectively deal with the contemporary Indian diaspora and the nineteenth-century “British diaspora”), the essay explores the extent to which the formulation of “white Britishness” in the colonies, as well as the self-representation of diasporic Indians both in Gandhi’s time and in suburban Connecticut today, have variously hinged on the liberal ideal of the abstract universal subject and its role in positioning diasporic subjects. The essay explores how the reciprocal self-defi nitions that emerge in these different diasporas render the “universal” a more weighted term.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096701062110278
Author(s):  
Coralie Pison Hindawi

Many postcolonial or critical scholars are rather sceptical of the Responsibility to Protect principle. In most of the critical literature, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is presented as a product from the West, whose liberal ideal relies on a perception of Southern states being potentially dysfunctional, which in turn justifies an interventionist discourse with neocolonial overtones. The problem with this interpretation of R2P is that it essentially ignores non-Western, particularly Southern, inputs on the concept, falling precisely into the trap that, many authors claim, vitiates Responsibility to Protect: its West-centrism. Building upon a mix of critical, decolonial, postcolonial and Third World Approaches to International Law scholarship, this article proposes a number of additional steps to decolonize R2P in an effort to avoid what Pinar Bilgin describes as ‘conflating the critiques of the particularity of universals with critiques of the idea of having universals’. What successive decolonizing layers expose is a negotiation process in which the agency of states from the global South in shaping the – still controversial – principle has proved particularly obvious. Decolonizing Responsibility to Protect, this article argues, requires critical scholars to engage in a contrapuntal analysis in order to acknowledge the concept’s mutual constitution by the West and the ‘rest’ and the deeper struggles over universals hiding underneath.


Author(s):  
Paul Warren

I argue that we can find in Marx two objections to exploitation: (i) an entitlement objection according to which it is wrongful because of the unjust distribution of benefits and burdens it generates; and (ii) an expressivist objection according to which it is objectionable because of the kind of social relation it is. The expressivist objection is predicated on a communitarian strand in Marx's thought, whereas the entitlement objection is grounded in a more liberal account of the wrongfulness of capitalist exploitation. I conclude by connecting my analysis to the current debate between proponents and critics of market socialism. While market socialism could be a vehicle for realizing the values associated with the entitlement objection, this is not true for the expressivist objection. Furthermore, because the entitlement objection does not depend on a thick conception of the human good, it is in accord with the liberal ideal of political neutrality whereas the expressivist objection is not.


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