What is Good? A Study of Educational Insights in Nicomachean Ethics (Book I, II and III)

This work is a study of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book I, II and III) to characterize the good: the good that features in education and good life. Nicomachean Ethics teaches us that human good is neither in thought/theory, nor in action/practice alone, it is neither an exclusively individual prerogative, nor an outright social preserve. And, human good is impossible without education. The practice of education can neither be isolated nor conceptualized apart from the demands of human life. If education is for human well-being—for human good—the good then is not in action alone, but action in accordance with the excellence (or virtue) 1 of the actor. What unifies reason and action, knowing and doing is learning to be an excellent (or virtuous) person—a person who is well-disposed in her affections and action, whose judgements are true, and decisions correct; and whose intellect and character are in harmony with the human nature.

The Command of God as a Morally Binding Norm

As a version of divine command ethics, Barth’s theological ethics answers the two fundamental questions posed to every divine command ethics, namely, how is it that God’s command determines the good of human action, and why is it that human beings must accept what God determines as good? Barth’s answer to both question is that in Jesus Christ, God both poses the question of the good to human beings and answers it in their place. In him, God’s goodness both confronts other human beings as the norm of their goodness and fulfills that norm in their place. It therefore determines the good of human action insofar as Jesus Christ is the human being who takes the place of other human beings. And other human beings must accept what God thereby determines as their good because—again, insofar as Jesus Christ has taken their place—their good is already a reality in him, in whom they exist as the human beings they are. The problem is that while the grace of God in Jesus Christ is the genuinely human good of other human beings insofar as they exist in Jesus Christ, it is, precisely as grace, a good that constitutes them from outside and not a good that fulfills them as the kind of creature they are.

Al-Ajru dalam Perspektif Ra’yu Zamakhsyariy (Studi Tematis Kitab Tafsir al-Kasyaf)

The discussion of reward is often the object of aqidah study for theologians and scholars of kalam. Therefore, in this study the author makes the interpretation of Al-Kasyaf by al-Zamakhsyari (467-538 H) as an object of study that leads to a more complete and deeper study of the science of kalam. In the interpretation of Al-Kasyaf, al-Zamakhsyari uses logic more and this is what is used as a material for criticism by some scholars as material for defending the muktazilah understanding that he believes in. Sometimes he berates the leading priests astray, especially if they have an opinion that contradicts him. This paper tries to describe Zamakhsyari's interpretation of the reward in the perspective of the Koran from Tafsir Al-Kasyaf from the word al-ajr. This paper uses the maudhu'i method through an approach to understanding the characters in his work. The results of the study show that the term ajr that appears in the Koran is always related to human actions in good things or about goodness. The existence of ajr from Allah Swt cannot be separated from the role of human good deeds. Various virtues that are present with Ajr, besides the goodness mentioned earlier, there are other virtues, such as piety and patience, striving in the way of Allah, and always remembering Allah. Although ajr is closely related to the good deeds that have been done, the source of ajr itself is essentially from Allah Swt.

O Bem Humano em Epicteto

In this paper we will focus on the following points in Epictetus. First, we will concentrate our attention on the celebrated distinction between things up to us (eph’ hemin) and things not up to us (ouk eph’ hemin). Second, we will survey the distinction between the material (hyle) and its use. According to this distinction, all external things are not up to us and consequently have no intrinsic value, although, as materials for the capacity of choice, their use has value, since humans can use things well or badly. Third, we will demonstrate that the use of the materials corresponds to the use of presentations. Finally, we will present the three topics of Epictetus’ philosophy: the topic relative to desire, the topic relative to impulse and the topic relative to assent, being the first concerned with judgments about things and our desires; the second, about impulses and adequate actions; and the third, about assent and persuasiveness of presentations. The knowledge contained in these three topics constitute, for Epictetus, what we should know to make good use of presentations and, consequently, to achieve the human good, which is a capacity of choice according to nature that has at its disposal a comprehensive set of correct opinions about reality.

Ethics of Friendship: Ancient and Modern Philosophical Approaches to the Good

The purpose of the paper is to investigate into the ethical significance of friendship, beginning with its origins in ancient Greek philosophy. The first part is dedicated to an interpretation of Plato’s understanding of friendship as a way towards the good. The second part focuses on how Aristotle takes up the thread after Plato and elaborates on the potential of friendship to enhance the good between virtuous people. In the final parts, the paper uncovers Friedrich Nietzsche’s posthumous thoughts on “an ethics of friendship”, which he traces back to ancient Greek philosophy, and it offers a concluding critical commentary on three modern thinkers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt and Alasdair MacIntyre, who reflect, each in their own way, on the human good in an on-going dialogue with the ancient Greek philosophy of friendship.

4. Islamic and Confucian accounts of the virtues

This chapter evaluates how two different cultural traditions understand virtue, specifically Islam and Confucianism. The work of Al-Ghazzali provides insight into the central role of virtue for Islam. In living out the five pillars of Islam—the shahadah, salat, zakat, sawm, and the hajj—one becomes a person properly related to Allah and to others. In this context, adab (the manner in which people acquire good character) provides an entrée into Islamic accounts of the virtues. Meanwhile, while there are important differences between the thinkers in the Confucian tradition, they all emphasized the dao (the ‘way’) as providing the highest human good and the proper cosmic ordering of the universe.

Critics of Modern Politics

This chapter sets up the central question of the project by examining three recent critics of modern politics. For historian Brad Gregory, the ills of modern society are traceable to the Protestant Reformation, which destroyed the unified society that Catholicism once provided in Europe. For Alasdair MacIntyre, modern society lacks an account of the human good and thus of the virtues that help human beings achieve this good. Stanley Hauerwas agrees with MacIntyre about the hopelessness of liberal modernity, and suggests that the Church can provide an alternative to the barbarity of the wider society, bedeviled as it is by disagreement, distrust, and violence. For these critics it is the marginalization of religion that is the source of modernity’s ills. The remainder of the book will examine the works of prominent religious thinkers who reflected on the ethical life of modern society at a time when that viability was even more questionable than it is today.