Macroeconomic and Operational Challenges in Countries in Fragile Situations

Policy Papers ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (43) ◽  
Author(s):  

There is broad recognition that countries in fragile situations face unique challenges. While fragility may afflict countries at different levels of income and capacity, common features of fragile states are institutions that are seen to be weak and lack legitimacy, as well as a fractious political setting, which in turn elevates the risk of violence. Fragilities impose large costs and hardships on local populations that can spill over to neighboring countries—directly through conflict, crime, and disease, but also through economic linkages. Considering these unique challenges, the international community is developing forms of engagement that stress peacebuilding, social cohesion, and statebuilding. They incorporate recognition of the need for sustained engagement, a willingness to take calculated risks in uncertain environments, fuller attention to the political economy of reforms and capacity constraints, and coordination of donor efforts.

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (S1) ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Oleg Ananyin ◽  
Denis Melnik

The article traces trends in Soviet economic discourse from the 1920s until perestroika. We examine the works of leading political economists of this period through the lens of debates on market exchanges under socialism—the central theoretical issue of the political economy of socialism. The discursive structure underlying the debates can be traced back to the writing of the first Soviet textbook on political economy, personally supervised by Joseph Stalin. Our purpose is to assess the impact of this textbook on subsequent discussions of the role of commodity production and market exchanges in a socialist economy. The story suggests that Soviet economic discourse was neither homogeneous nor stable. Rather, it consisted of several subdiscourses of different levels of authoritativeness allowing for a certain stable core as an attribute of any authoritative discourse, as well as for more flexible elements that adjusted the structure to new political and ideological challenges.


2020 ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Henning Tamm

Military invasions are typically considered illegitimate both by local populations and by the international community. How do invaders mitigate this legitimacy deficit? This chapter argues that invading states enlist local rebel groups not only for the expertise and operational capacity they provide but also to gain some degree of legitimacy vis-à-vis local and international audiences. Gaining legitimacy in this way, however, comes at a cost: to avoid the perception that rebel intermediaries are mere puppets, the invading state must refrain from exercising hard controls over them. The chapter illustrates this legitimacy–control tradeoff by contrasting the Rwandan and Ugandan invasions during the Second Congo War (1998–2003). Drawing on interviews with key protagonists, the chapter shows that the different levels of control exerted by Rwanda and Uganda help account for the vast difference in the popularity of their rebel intermediaries. While Rwanda continuously maintained hard controls, eroding its intermediary’s local legitimacy, Uganda initially limited itself to soft inducements, thereby enabling its intermediary to garner legitimacy. In developing these arguments, this chapter engages with the literatures on rebel governance, intervention in civil war, state-building, and military occupation.


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