The Invader’s Dilemma

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Henning Tamm
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
State Building ◽  
International Community ◽  
Military Occupation ◽  
Local Populations ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Operational Capacity ◽  
Levels Of Control

Military invasions are typically considered illegitimate both by local populations and by the international community. How do invaders mitigate this legitimacy deficit? This chapter argues that invading states enlist local rebel groups not only for the expertise and operational capacity they provide but also to gain some degree of legitimacy vis-à-vis local and international audiences. Gaining legitimacy in this way, however, comes at a cost: to avoid the perception that rebel intermediaries are mere puppets, the invading state must refrain from exercising hard controls over them. The chapter illustrates this legitimacy–control tradeoff by contrasting the Rwandan and Ugandan invasions during the Second Congo War (1998–2003). Drawing on interviews with key protagonists, the chapter shows that the different levels of control exerted by Rwanda and Uganda help account for the vast difference in the popularity of their rebel intermediaries. While Rwanda continuously maintained hard controls, eroding its intermediary’s local legitimacy, Uganda initially limited itself to soft inducements, thereby enabling its intermediary to garner legitimacy. In developing these arguments, this chapter engages with the literatures on rebel governance, intervention in civil war, state-building, and military occupation.

International Recognition, Compliance Costs, and the Formalities of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 38-71
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter develops the main arguments of the book, focusing on how belligerents in interstate and civil war have reacted to the development of the laws of war detailed in Chapter 2. States involved in interstate war are perversely incentivized to evade the laws of war as these laws have proliferated. Thus, they are decreasingly likely to engage the formalities of war, specifically declarations of war and peace treaties. Secessionist rebel groups fighting civil wars aim to please the international community, and therefore are decreasingly likely to declare independence formally, generally likely to avoid targeting civilians, and increasingly likely to conclude peace treaties.

Macroeconomic and Operational Challenges in Countries in Fragile Situations

Policy Papers ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (43) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
International Community ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
The Political ◽  
Fragile States ◽  
Uncertain Environments ◽  
Common Features ◽  
Local Populations ◽  
Different Levels

There is broad recognition that countries in fragile situations face unique challenges. While fragility may afflict countries at different levels of income and capacity, common features of fragile states are institutions that are seen to be weak and lack legitimacy, as well as a fractious political setting, which in turn elevates the risk of violence. Fragilities impose large costs and hardships on local populations that can spill over to neighboring countries—directly through conflict, crime, and disease, but also through economic linkages. Considering these unique challenges, the international community is developing forms of engagement that stress peacebuilding, social cohesion, and statebuilding. They incorporate recognition of the need for sustained engagement, a willingness to take calculated risks in uncertain environments, fuller attention to the political economy of reforms and capacity constraints, and coordination of donor efforts.

The Rebel Economy in Civil War: Informality, Civil Networks, and Regulation Strategies

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-440
Author(s):  
Yuichi Kubota
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Postwar Reconstruction ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Regulation Strategies ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In civil war, rebel groups play a central role as a regulator in the management of civilian economic activities in their territory of control. While previous studies have intensively researched the impact of economic conditions on the war process and dynamics, little attention has been paid to the variation in economic policies adopted by the rebels. This paper conceptualizes the types of regulation policies imposed by the rebels against civilian economic activities and theorizes patterns and particular measures of (non)regulation taken by the rebel groups: formal regulation, deliberate connivance, and laissez-faire. The degree of economic intervention by the rebels is contingent on the extent of economic informalization within the territory and the relative capability of the economic sector. When the sector involves a large portion of the population and is densely networked, its economic potential comes to be perceived by the rebels as a threat to their incumbency. Such a threat compels them to undertake measures of regulation. In contrast, if the level of informalization is low or civilian activities are poorly backed by their network, the threat perceived by the rebels is less, in addition to which, formal regulation against such a loosely organized sector to effectively control civilian activities would be too costly. This paper proposes a number of research agendas on wartime rebel economies and their broader relevance to international relations and political science: mechanisms of rebel economies, rent and the resource curse, the process of civil-rebel relations, and rebel governance. It concludes by advancing implications for policy development; policymakers need to be scrupulous about the effectiveness of (neo)liberal economic policies in conflict-affected societies and to design postwar reconstruction by taking into consideration the legacy of rebel economies.

Peace Treaties in Civil War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 217-242
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Do So ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter asks: why has the use of peace treaties to conclude civil wars increased in recent years? The main argument of the chapter is that the international community – which often provides critical support to both states and rebels fighting civil wars – has developed a taste for peace treaties. Rebel groups are likely to be willing to sign peace treaties because having a seat at the table accords them some legitimacy. States, while less interested in concluding peace treaties in civil wars, do so under pressure from the international community. But peace treaties are not always an inherent good in that they are not always associated with peace.

scholarly journals Stifling stateness: The Assad regime’s campaign against rebel governance

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 235-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ciro Martínez ◽  
Brent Eng
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
The State ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
Healthcare Provision ◽  
Welfare Services ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

This article assesses the impact of the Assad regime’s aerial bombardment campaign on a frequently neglected component of Syria’s ongoing civil war: rebel governance. While analysis of the military and humanitarian ramifications of such attacks has been extensive, these perspectives fail to consider how the Assad regime’s counter insurgency efforts subvert governance practices by Syria’s diverse rebel groups. Drawing on performative approaches to the ‘state’, we argue that opposition groups’ daily enactments of ‘stateness’ via two key welfare services – bread and healthcare provision – constitute a historically inflected and locally grounded critique of the incumbent. When executed successfully, such enactments can stabilize relations between rulers and ruled while offering a vision of an alternative polity. They can also attract the attention of rivals. The Assad regime’s aerial bombing campaign of rebel-held areas is thus neither a haphazard military strategy nor simply the product of long-standing sectarian hatreds, but a deliberate tactic through which it seeks to destroy a key threat to its authority.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Austin C Doctor
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Proportional Hazards ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazards ◽  
Stage I ◽  
Logistic Regression Models ◽  
Structure And Agency ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazards Models ◽  
War Experiences

Abstract Why do rebel organizations splinter into competing factions during civil war? To explain this outcome, I leverage variation in rebel leadership. I argue that rebel leaders draw on their pre-war experiences—i.e., their military and political experiences—to manage their organizations during conflict. These experiences bear unique patterns of rebel management and, thus, corresponding risks of fragmentation. Empirical evidence comes from a two-stage research design and original data featuring over 200 rebel leaders from 1989 to 2014. In the first stage, I estimate the probability of group fragmentation with a series of logistic regression models. In the second stage, I use Cox proportional-hazards models to estimate leadership effects on the rate of group fragmentation. Results indicate that variation in rebel leadership corresponds with unique risks of fragmentation. In particular, the results suggest that leaders with real military experience are best equipped to maintain group cohesion. This study offers insight into the processes by which rebel groups splinter into armed factions. In addition, it makes an important contribution to the broader discussion on the roles of structure and agency in shaping the dynamics of civil war.

Concealing Conflict Markets: How Rebels and Firms Use State Institutions to Launder Wartime Trade

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Rachel Sweet
Keyword(s):  
State Agencies ◽  
Informal Networks ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
State Recognition ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Border Trade ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Trade Deals

Abstract Although rebel groups are players on the international stage, little is known about their financial strategies at this scale. Existing research suggests that rebels succeed in cross-border trade by using informal networks that evade state authority. Yet rebels face a critical challenge: they operate in a normative environment that values state recognition and penalizes their illegitimate status. New evidence reveals that rebels can overcome this barrier and better connect to global economies not by evading the state but by infiltrating its institutions. Drawing on unprecedented data—the internal records of armed groups and their trading partners—I examine how rebels use state agencies in conflict zones to manufacture a legal cover for wartime trade. By using state agencies to provide false certification, rebels can place the stamp of state on their trade deals. This strategy of legal appropriation is a fundamentally different model of how conflict markets skirt sanctions and connect to global buyers. I develop a framework for how this strategy works that traces how international sovereignty norms and sanctions regimes create incentives for rebels, firms, and bureaucrats to coordinate around this legal veneer across the supply chain. The framework and evidence contribute theoretical and policy understandings for rebel governance, state building and fragmentation, and illicit global markets.

scholarly journals Kurdish Regional Self-rule Administration in Syria: A new Model of Statehood and its Status in International Law Compared to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 468-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
LOQMAN RADPEY
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Community ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Autonomous Region ◽  
New Model ◽  
Northern Iraq ◽  
Syrian Population ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Self Rule

AbstractHaving been supressed and denied their rights by successive Syrian governments over the years, Syrian Kurds are now asserting ade factoautonomy. Since the withdrawal of the Syrian President's forces from the ethnically Kurdish areas in the early months of the current civil war, the inhabitants have declared a self-rule government along the lines of the Kurdistan regional government in northern Iraq. For Syrian Kurds, the creation of a small autonomous region is a dream fulfilled, albeit one unrecognized by the international community. Some 15% to 17% of the Syrian population is Kurdish. Whether they can achieve statehood will depend on a reading of international law and on how the international community reacts. There are certain aspects which differentiate Kurdish self-rule in Syria from its counterpart in Iraq.

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