Scenario design and analysis tasks of the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise (NPE) 2019

National Data Centre (NDC) Preparedness Exercises (NPE) base on partially simulated scenarios of CTBT relevant events distributed to all NDC. They provide an opportunity to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The NPE 2019 scenario was developed in close cooperation between the Italian NDC-RN (ENEA) and the German NDC (BGR). The fictitious state RAETIA announced a reactor incident with release of unspecified radionuclides into the atmosphere. Simulated concentrations of particulate and noble gas isotopes at IMS stations were given to the participants. The task was to check the consistency with the announcement and to search for waveform events in the potential source region of the radioisotopes. During NPE2019 an Exercise Expert Technical Analysis was requested from the IDC for the first time. A fictitious state party provided within the scenario (simulated) national measurements of radionuclides and asked for assisistance in analysing the additional samples. Especially backward ATM and the search for seismic events in the possible source region was requested. In addition the overall consistency to potential emissions of the reactor incident declared by the ficititious state RAETIA was questioned. In the third and last stage of the exercise, national regional seismic data were distributed among the particpants which contained an (synthetically manipulated) anomaly pointing on a explosive event.

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The National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise NPE 2019 - Scenario design and expert technical analyses

10.5194/egusphere-egu2020-16106 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

J. Ole Ross ◽

Nicolai Gestermann ◽

Peter Gaebler ◽

Lars Ceranna

Keyword(s):

Noble Gas ◽

Source Region ◽

National Data ◽

Transport Modelling ◽

Nuclear Explosions ◽

Data Centre ◽

Scenario Design ◽

Ctbt Verification ◽

Fictitious State ◽

Test Ban

For detection of non-compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) the global International Monitoring System (IMS) is being built up and nearly complete. The IMS is designed to detect and identify nuclear explosions through their seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide signature. The IMS data are collected, processed to analysis products, and distributed to the signatory states by the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. The member states themselves may operate National Data Centers (NDC) giving technical advice concerning CTBT verification to their government. NDC Preparedness Exercises (NPE) are regularly performed to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The NPE 2019 scenario was developed in close cooperation between the Italian NDC-RN (ENEA) and the German NDC (BGR). The fictitious state RAETIA announced a reactor incident with release of unspecified radionuclides into the atmosphere. Simulated concentrations of particulate and noble gas isotopes at IMS stations were given to the participants. The task was to check the consistency with the announcement and to serach for waveform events in the potential source region of the radioisotopes. In a next step, the fictitious neighbour state EASTRIA provided further national (synthetic) measurements and requested assistance from IDC with so called Expert Technical Analysis (ETA) about the origin of those traces. The presentation shows aspects of scenario design, event selection, and forward amospheric transport modelling as well as radionuclide and seismological analyses. &#160;&#160;

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Global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014

10.5194/egusphere-egu2020-2442 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Martin Kalinowski

Keyword(s):

Emission Inventory ◽

Noble Gas ◽

Nuclear Test ◽

Anthropogenic Source ◽

Nuclear Explosions ◽

Radioactivity Monitoring ◽

Ambient Concentrations ◽

And Performance ◽

Ctbt Monitoring ◽

Test Ban

Global radioactivity monitoring for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes the four xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe and 135Xe. These four isotopes are serving as important indicators of nuclear explosions. The state-of-the-art radioxenon emission inventory uses generic release estimates for each known nuclear facility. However, the release amount can vary by several orders of magnitude from year to year. The year 2014 was selected for a single-year radioxenon emission inventory that avoids this uncertainty. Whenever 2014 emissions reported by the facility operator are available these are incorporated into the 2014 emission inventory. This presentation summarizes this new emission inventory. The overall emissions by facility type are compared with previous studies. The global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014 can be used for studies to estimate the contribution of this anthropogenic source to the observed ambient concentrations at IMS noble gas sensors to support CTBT monitoring activities, including calibration and performance assessment of the verification system as described in the Treaty as well as developing and validating methods for enhanced detection capabilities of signals that may indicate a nuclear test. One specific application will be the third ATM Challenge that was announced in December 2019.

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