The National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise NPE 2019 - Scenario design and expert technical analyses

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ole Ross ◽  
Nicolai Gestermann ◽  
Peter Gaebler ◽  
Lars Ceranna
Keyword(s):  
Noble Gas ◽  
Source Region ◽  
National Data ◽  
Transport Modelling ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Data Centre ◽  
Scenario Design ◽  
Ctbt Verification ◽  
Fictitious State ◽  
Test Ban

<p>For detection of non-compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) the global International Monitoring System (IMS) is being built up and nearly complete. The IMS is designed to detect and identify nuclear explosions through their seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide signature. The IMS data are collected, processed to analysis products, and distributed to the signatory states by the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. The member states themselves may operate National Data Centers (NDC) giving technical advice concerning CTBT verification to their government. NDC Preparedness Exercises (NPE) are regularly performed to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The NPE 2019 scenario was developed in close cooperation between the Italian NDC-RN (ENEA) and the German NDC (BGR). The fictitious state RAETIA announced a reactor incident with release of unspecified radionuclides into the atmosphere. Simulated concentrations of particulate and noble gas isotopes at IMS stations were given to the participants. The task was to check the consistency with the announcement and to serach for waveform events in the potential source region of the radioisotopes. In a next step, the fictitious neighbour state EASTRIA provided further national (synthetic) measurements and requested assistance from IDC with so called Expert Technical Analysis (ETA) about the origin of those traces. The presentation shows aspects of scenario design, event selection, and forward amospheric transport modelling as well as radionuclide and seismological analyses.   </p>

Scenario design and analysis tasks of the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise (NPE) 2019

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ole Ross ◽  
Nicolai Gesternann ◽  
Peter Gaebler ◽  
Lars Ceranna ◽  
Antonietta Rizzo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Noble Gas ◽  
Source Region ◽  
National Data ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Data Centre ◽  
Scenario Design ◽  
Fictitious State ◽  
Noble Gas Isotopes ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
Ctbt Monitoring

<p>National Data Centre (NDC) Preparedness Exercises (NPE) base on partially simulated scenarios of CTBT relevant events distributed to all NDC. They provide an opportunity to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The NPE 2019 scenario was developed in close cooperation between the Italian NDC-RN (ENEA) and the German NDC (BGR). The fictitious state RAETIA announced a reactor incident with release of unspecified radionuclides into the atmosphere. Simulated concentrations of particulate and noble gas isotopes at IMS stations were given to the participants. The task was to check the consistency with the announcement and to search for waveform events in the potential source region of the radioisotopes. <br>During NPE2019 an Exercise Expert Technical Analysis was requested from the IDC for the first time. A fictitious state party provided within the scenario (simulated) national measurements of radionuclides and asked for assisistance in analysing the additional samples. Especially backward ATM and the search for seismic events in the possible source region was requested. In addition the overall consistency to potential emissions of the reactor incident declared by the ficititious state RAETIA was questioned. In the third and last stage of the exercise, national regional seismic data were distributed among the particpants which contained an (synthetically manipulated) anomaly pointing on a explosive event.</p>

Global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Kalinowski
Keyword(s):  
Emission Inventory ◽  
Noble Gas ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Anthropogenic Source ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Radioactivity Monitoring ◽  
Ambient Concentrations ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Ctbt Monitoring ◽  
Test Ban

<p>Global radioactivity monitoring for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes the four xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe and 135Xe. These four isotopes are serving as important indicators of nuclear explosions. The state-of-the-art radioxenon emission inventory uses generic release estimates for each known nuclear facility. However, the release amount can vary by several orders of magnitude from year to year. The year 2014 was selected for a single-year radioxenon emission inventory that avoids this uncertainty. Whenever 2014 emissions reported by the facility operator are available these are incorporated into the 2014 emission inventory. This presentation summarizes this new emission inventory. The overall emissions by facility type are compared with previous studies. The global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014 can be used for studies to estimate the contribution of this anthropogenic source to the observed ambient concentrations at IMS noble gas sensors to support CTBT monitoring activities, including calibration and performance assessment of the verification system as described in the Treaty as well as developing and validating methods for enhanced detection capabilities of signals that may indicate a nuclear test. One specific application will be the third ATM Challenge that was announced in December 2019.</p>

scholarly journals On site inspection for nuclear test ban verirication

1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. D. Marschall
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
The Political ◽  
Chemical Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Chemical Weapon Convention ◽  
On Site Inspection ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Nuclear Test Ban ◽  
Test Ban Treaty

The problem of verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty is mainly a technical one. However the problem of detecting, locating and identifying nuclear explosions has, since the late 1950s, been intimately involved with the political problems associated with negotiating a treaty. In fact there are few other areas in which policy, diplomacy and science have been so interwoven. This paper attempts to illustrate how technology can. be applied to solve some of the political problems which arise when considering the role of an On Site Inspection (OSI) to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion, in violation of a treaty, has occurred or not. It is hoped that the reader, with a scientific background, but with little or no experience of treaty negotiations, will gain an. insight as to how technical matters can interact with political requirements. The demands made on scientists to provide technical support for negotiating and rnonitoring compliance of a treaty have increased significanfly over the last 40 years. This is a period in which a number of major treaties have contained a significant technical component e.g. the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Treaty) and the Chemical Weapon Convention. This paper gives an indication of some of the political decisions which will have to be made and suggests some of the technical methods which are of value in the identification of a clandestine nuclear explosion.

The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example

Complexity ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin B. Kalinowski ◽  
Andreas Becker ◽  
Paul R. J. Saey ◽  
Matthias P. Tuma ◽  
Gerhard Wotawa
Keyword(s):  
Noble Gas ◽  
Gas Monitoring ◽  
Ctbt Verification

The 2010 Haiti Earthquake Disaster: The ShakeMap that could have been...

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahar Shani-Kadmiel ◽  
Gil Averbuch ◽  
Pieter Smets ◽  
Jelle Assink ◽  
Läslo Evers
Keyword(s):  
Acoustic Waves ◽  
Seismic Waves ◽  
Source Region ◽  
Low Frequency ◽  
Processing Technique ◽  
Disaster Mitigation ◽  
Haiti Earthquake ◽  
Earthquake Disaster ◽  
Global Coverage ◽  
Test Ban

<p>When an earthquake occurs, it is important to rapidly assess the severity of the consequences. The distribution of shaking intensity around the epicenter, known as the ShakeMap, is a key component in this process and is crucial for guiding first responders to the region. Whereas earthquake source characteristics, e.g., location and magnitude, can be rapidly determined using distant seismic stations, ground motion measurements from stations in the near-source region are needed to generate an adequate ShakeMap. When few or no seismometers exist in the region, ground motions are only estimated and the ShakeMap can be grossly inaccurate.</p><p>Besides seismic waves, earthquakes generate infrasound, i.e., inaudible acoustic waves in the atmosphere. Due to the low frequency nature of infrasound, and facilitated by waveguides in the atmosphere, signals propagate over long ranges with limited attenuation and are detected at ground-based stations. Here we show, that acousto-ShakeMaps, indicating the relative shaking intensity, can be rapidly generated using remotely detected infrasound. We illustrate this with infrasound from the 2010 Mw 7.0 Port-au-Prince, Haiti earthquake, detected in Bermuda, over 1700 km away from Haiti.</p><p>Such observations are made possible by: (1) An advanced array processing technique that enables the detection of coherent wavefronts, even when amplitudes are below the noise level, and (2) A backprojection technique that maps infrasound detections in time to their origin on the Earth's surface.</p><p>Infrasound measurements are conducted globally for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and together with regional infrasound networks allow for an unprecedented global coverage. This makes infrasound as an earthquake disaster mitigation technique feasible for the first time.</p>

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