The EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Lack of Fundamental Rights, Mutual Trust and Democracy?

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 53-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott

AbstractThe EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ is a hugely important area covering criminal law, terrorism, immigration, visa control and civil justice, as well as the massive area of free movement of persons. What is clear, however, is that measures which fall within its scope have the capacity to alienate EU citizens rather than making them feel aware of their European identity in a positive sense. This chapter examines some of the measures taken by the EU in this broad field which cause particular concern, namely a lack of democratic and legal accountability as well as inadequate regard to human rights. It focuses in particular on two areas in which human rights protection in the EU has been undermined. The first is in the field of data protection. The second is in the field of suspects’ rights, particularly in the context of the European arrest warrant. The chapter concludes by considering why so many restrictions on freedom have been allowed to come about and suggests some possible solutions.

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 53-85
Author(s):  
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott

Abstract The EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ is a hugely important area covering criminal law, terrorism, immigration, visa control and civil justice, as well as the massive area of free movement of persons. What is clear, however, is that measures which fall within its scope have the capacity to alienate EU citizens rather than making them feel aware of their European identity in a positive sense. This chapter examines some of the measures taken by the EU in this broad field which cause particular concern, namely a lack of democratic and legal accountability as well as inadequate regard to human rights. It focuses in particular on two areas in which human rights protection in the EU has been undermined. The first is in the field of data protection. The second is in the field of suspects’ rights, particularly in the context of the European arrest warrant. The chapter concludes by considering why so many restrictions on freedom have been allowed to come about and suggests some possible solutions.


Author(s):  
Elspeth Berry ◽  
Matthew J. Homewood ◽  
Barbara Bogusz

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter begins with a brief history of human rights protection in Europe, including the separate role of the Council of Europe and the ECHR, as well as that of the EU and EU law. It then discusses the development of human rights protection by the EU; the need for human rights protection against the EU and its Member States; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; the enforcement of human rights in EU law; and the possibility of EU accession to the ECHR.


2019 ◽  
pp. 396-457
Author(s):  
Elspeth Berry ◽  
Matthew J. Homewood ◽  
Barbara Bogusz

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter begins with a brief history of human rights protection in Europe, including the separate role of the Council of Europe and the ECHR, as well as that of the EU and EU law. It then discusses the development of human rights protection by the EU; the need for human rights protection against the EU and its Member States; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; the enforcement of human rights in EU law; and the possibility of EU accession to the ECHR.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-107
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Abstract The question of the application and impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘Charter’) in quotidian practice of human rights protection and review is a strategic one. Given the predominantly decentralised effects of EU law and with the due account to the wide interpretation of the scope of the Charter’s application (Art. 51(1)) presented by the CJEU (C-617/10 Fransson), the national dimension of the application of the Charter forms the crucial issue for the functioning of the EU system of fundamental rights protection. The Charter itself has a big potential to influence the content, nature and mechanisms of the fundamental rights protection at the national level. The present paper focuses on this phenomena in connection to the case-law, opinions and workload of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (‘TK’). It analyses the approach of TK towards the Charter in abstract manner as well as the (non)appearance of the Charter in the reasoning of the court in concrete cases. The article reports on the main cases and analyses the reasons of the aloof approach of the TK towards the EU human rights catalogue.


2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442199593
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Schomburg ◽  
Anna Oehmichen ◽  
Katrin Kayß

As human rights have increasingly gained importance at the European Union level, this article examines the remaining scope of human rights protection under the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. While some international human rights instruments remain applicable, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union did not become part of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The consequences, especially the inapplicability of the internationalised ne bis in idem principle, are analysed. Furthermore, the conditionality of the TCA in general as well as the specific conditionality for judicial cooperation in criminal matters are discussed. In this context, the risk that cooperation may cease at any moment if any Member State or the UK leave the European Convention of Human Rights is highlighted. Lastly, the authors raise the problem of the lack of judicial review, as the Court of Justice of the European Union is no longer competent.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-245
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko

AbstractInternational constitutionalism relates to processes of limiting traditionally unrestricted powers of states as ultimate subjects, law-makers and law-enforcers of international law. Human rights occupy a central, but very confusing and confused role in the theorisation of international constitutionalism. If feminist scholars have criticised the inadequacies, shortcomings and gaps of international law of human rights at least since 1991, the doctrine of international law theorising constitutionalisation of international law until now has remained blind to these critiques idealising human rights and often using them as the ultimate legitimating factor. Thus, legitimacy and legality become confused and the distinction between them blurred in the doctrine of international constitutionalism. This in turn creates a danger of failure of the constitutionalists project itself, as it will serve to reinforce existing inadequacies and gaps in human rights protection. To illustrate this argument, I discuss some examples related to the protection of women's and migrants' rights. In order to avoid this dangerous development, I argue that international lawyers theorising international constitutionalism shall adopt an adequate, inclusive notion of legitimacy. In order to develop this adequate understanding of legitimacy, they should first take seriously feminist and other critiques of international human rights law and international law more generally. In the final parts of this article I develop my own more detailed proposals on the future of legitimacy and international constitutionalism. In doing so, I draw on the 'self-correcting learning process' developed in the writings of Jürgen Habermas, 'democracy to come' and more general views on the nature of sovereignty and human rights expressed by Jacques Derrida, as well as Levinasian 'responsibility-to-and-for-the-Other'.


Author(s):  
Francisca Costa Reis ◽  
Weiyuan Gao ◽  
Vineet Hegde

With a mandate under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union (EU) has been engaging with foreign powers like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) nations on human rights issues. Despite the common and shared goals, the BRICS set-up is not institutionalised, which prompts the EU to engage with each country on a bilateral basis. Such collaborations have occurred in bilateral dialogues, multilateral fora, through developmental assistance, and negotiations in economic partnership agreements. The scope and content of the discussions and cooperation vary due to the difference in the political structures of the countries. While the EU and the BRICS may share some common goals politically and economically, pursuing shared objectives related to democracy and human rights promotion remains challenging. These countries may believe in human rights protection, but the understandings and the approaches vary drastically, as visible when issues of sovereignty and non-intervention are raised to resist comprehensive discussions. Although the BRICS are emerging as an interconnected group and have begun to cooperate more closely in multilateral fora, the EU may also have to consider dealing with it in its institutional capacity. It could be more challenging to fulfill the mandate of the Lisbon Treaty for the EU while dealing with this cohesive group that has different understandings on human rights protection within their own states.


Author(s):  
Chiara Altafin ◽  
Karin Lukas ◽  
Manfred Nowak

The chapter presents and assesses the various normative layers—domestic, European, regional, international—on which the European Union’s (EU’s) commitment to human rights is built. It analyses the interaction of EU primary law, general principles of law derived from constitutional traditions of Member States, and international human rights law, including relevant regional instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, and the Istanbul Convention. It is contended that, despite an impressive and pioneering normative framework on human rights, the EU currently faces a number of challenges that call for a strong stance on human rights realisation in all areas of its competence and influence. Enduring deficiencies in the relevant normative framework include the absence of a fully fledged EU competence to legislate in the area of human rights protection and the application of ‘double standards’ in the EU’s approach to human rights internally and externally, leading to a deep divide between internal and external policies guided by starkly different logics. Further areas of concern include the difficulties of the Charter of Fundamental Rights implementation in view of EU institutions and Member States’ competencies, which have become particularly apparent in the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis and the arising tensions between EU and Member States’ austerity measures, as well as the uneven nature of the EU and Member States’ human rights obligations with regard to the international legal framework, leading to gaps and overlaps.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 884-903
Author(s):  
Kathleen Gutman

AbstractThis contribution examines the developing contours of the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in the light of salient case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is divided into three main parts. The first part provides an overview of the meaning of the essence of fundamental rights in EU law and the scope of the inquiry in relation to Article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”). The second part evaluates the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in connection with justified limitations that may be placed on its exercise as provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter within the framework of the EU system of fundamental rights protection, which in turn implicates the relationship with the Court’s case-law on national procedural autonomy, equivalence, and effectiveness. The third part delves into the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial within the framework of the EU system of judicial protection, as illustrated by the Court’s case-law in several areas, including standing for individuals in direct actions before the EU courts, judicial independence, and restrictive measures in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Through this analysis, the author argues that, while much awaits further refinement, certain recent developments in the Court’s case–law indicate that the essence of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial can play a meaningful role in the EU system of fundamental rights protection and the EU system of judicial protection more broadly, and thus the best may be yet to come as that case-law progresses in the future.


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