Impact of Institutional Overlap on Family Firm Governance: An Institutionalist-Agency Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 12389
Author(s):  
Stone Han ◽  
Hsi Mei Chung
Keyword(s):  
2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 1193-1199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaume Villanueva ◽  
Harry J. Sapienza
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1) ◽  
pp. 11168
Author(s):  
Danny Miller ◽  
Isabelle Le Breton-Miller ◽  
Mario Daniele Amore ◽  
Alessandro Minichilli ◽  
Guido Corbetta

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 674-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Miller ◽  
Isabelle Le Breton-Miller ◽  
Mario Daniele Amore ◽  
Alessandro Minichilli ◽  
Guido Corbetta

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (6) ◽  
pp. 1051-1066 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Chrisman

Stewardship theory is a popular alternative to agency theory for studying family firm governance. Despite its contributions to management and family business studies, stewardship theory’s assumptions limit its realism and relevance. Using agency theory as a standard of comparison, I discuss stewardship theory’s model of man and its assumptions concerning goal alignment and control systems. I also discuss stewardship theory’s lack of assumptions about bounded rationality and pre-employment situations since the neglect of those issues reduce its realism and relevance. Based on this discussion, I argue that to increase its realism and relevance, stewardship theory’s assumptions should be revised.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 497-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Bodolica ◽  
Martin Spraggon

In this paper we argue that substantial weaknesses in corporate governance structures may be responsible for the pervasive failure of family firms to survive into the next generation. Aiming to improve extant knowledge on governance of family-owned enterprises that might boost their prosperity and longevity, we advance an integrative conceptual model which builds on boundary theory premises and accounts for the interdependencies among multiple governance arrangements. In particular, we suggest that the choice of an optimal governance configuration is dependent upon the way family firms manage the boundaries between their family and business identities. By combining contractual and relational devices of family firm governance into a single study, our model seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature regarding the existence of substitution effects and complementarity between alternative governance mechanisms.


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