Chapter 4: Medical Error and the Law of Delict

2019 ◽  
pp. 111-138
Author(s):  
Colm Peter McGrath
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.


1994 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-188
Author(s):  
Lovemore Madhuku

The doctrine of vicarious liability is easy to define but difficult to apply. In the recent Zimbabwean case of Fawcett Security Operations (Pot) Lid. v. Omar Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd., the Supreme Court held that a security company (the employer) who provided a security guard (the servant) to detect and prevent theft from the respondent's supermarket was not vicariously liable for the servant's subsequent theft of the very goods he was meant to guard. It is difficult to support this decision and its indirect effect is to call for a re-examination of this part of the law. Accordingly this article seeks to revisit the doctrine of vicarious liability under the Zimbabwean law of delict and to argue that (i) the decision in Fawcett Security was based on a wrong reading of the authorities; (ii) that the decision is inconsistent with the classical Roman-Dutch Law (as distinct from South African authorities); and (iii) that the decision fails to give effect to the real basis of vicarious liability under Zimbabwean law.


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