Protecting fundamental rights in the European Union: Competing approaches by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 99-112
Author(s):  
Christian Kohler
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-84
Author(s):  
Max Vetzo

The cases of Menci (C-524/15), Garlsson (C-537/16) and Di Puma (C-596/16 and C-597/16) deal with the duplication of criminal and punitive administrative proceedings for the same conduct in the area of VAT and market abuse. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that this duplication of proceedings constitutes a limitation of the ne bis in idem principle of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). This infringement is only justified if the requirements of the limitation clause of Article 52(1) of the Charter are met. The judgments were highly anticipated as they constitute the response of the CJEU to the judgment in A and B v Norway delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in which the ECtHR lowered the level of protection afforded by the ne bis in idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention of Human Rights (A4P7 ECHR). While there are differences between the approaches taken by both courts, it appears that the reasoning of the CJEU in the judgments largely mirrors that of the ECtHR in A and B v Norway. This article frames the judgments in terms of the dialogue between the CJEU and ECtHR on the ne bis in idem principle. It does so chronologically, by focusing on the past, present and future of the ne bis in idem dialogue between both European courts.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 383-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McCrudden

AbstractThis chapter examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.


1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1992, calls have gradually been increasing for a greater recognition of, and firmer foundation for, fundamental (social) rights within the European Union. These calls naturally became louder following the Opinion of the European Court of Justice excluding the possibility of EC accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and during the lead up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Academics, independent EU Advisory Committees, groups representing the interests of EU citizens and residents and the European Parliament lamented the almost complete absence of fundamental social rights in the Treaty, and called for an ambitious revision of the Treaty. To a large extent these calls went unheard in Amsterdam, and the new Treaty does not incorporate a comprehensive list of social fundamental rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-250
Author(s):  
Anna Francesca Masiero

The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights is an issue frequently addressed by (not only internationalist) legal scholars, who stress that it would allow for an optimisation of the level of protection of fundamental rights in the European legal area. After reviewing the historical stages of accession, this paper focuses on the second opinion of the Court of Justice regarding it (Opinion 2/13 of 2014). Therein, accession is presented as an unattainable goal, probably because of the refusal of the Court of Justice to submit to the other European court, the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights. Subsequently, the paper reviews the possible effects of accession on the current legal scenario with special attention to the Italian legal system. Finally, it aims at figuring out how accession could affect criminal matters: in particular, by means of an example concerning the principle of legality, the purpose is to demonstrate how accession could lead to an improvement of the criminal guarantees of the European legal area.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-511
Author(s):  
Stephen Brittain

European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: relationship – Teleological method of interpretation of the European Court of Justice: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Originalist method of interpretation: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Original meaning of Article 52(3) of the Charter: text, drafting history, case law – Conclusion: case law of European Court of Human Rights not strictly binding on the Court of Justice of the European Union.


2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-85
Author(s):  
Bruno De Witte

The concept of the autonomy of European Union law plays an important role in the fundamental rights domain. Autonomy has been expressly invoked by the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) when reviewing international legal norms on human rights grounds, and when denying the possibility for the eu to accede to the European Court of Human Rights (echr). The article also describes other constellations in which the cjeu has sought to preserve the distinctiveness of the eu’s approach to the protection of rights but without resorting to the use of autonomy language. The article concludes by advocating a positive rather than merely defensive use of autonomy, namely to describe the distinctive role that eu human rights policies can play in ensuring the effective enjoyment of human rights in the world.


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas de Sadeleer

So far, EU treaty law does not encapsulate any individually justiciable rights to a clean environment or to health. The article explores whether individuals can rely on the environmental duties embodied in the European Union Charter of Human Rights (EUCHR), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in cases falling within the scope of EU environmental law. Moreover, it takes a close examination of the case law of both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the standing of individuals whose environment is impaired.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 383-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McCrudden

Abstract This chapter examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.


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