THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE PROTECTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL ORDER

2004 ◽  
pp. 053-081
Author(s):  
Yaşar DOĞAN
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1992, calls have gradually been increasing for a greater recognition of, and firmer foundation for, fundamental (social) rights within the European Union. These calls naturally became louder following the Opinion of the European Court of Justice excluding the possibility of EC accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and during the lead up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Academics, independent EU Advisory Committees, groups representing the interests of EU citizens and residents and the European Parliament lamented the almost complete absence of fundamental social rights in the Treaty, and called for an ambitious revision of the Treaty. To a large extent these calls went unheard in Amsterdam, and the new Treaty does not incorporate a comprehensive list of social fundamental rights.


2003 ◽  
Vol 45 (5/6) ◽  
pp. 145-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane Ryland

Aims to trace the legal bases for the protection of fundamental rights in the European Community and the European Union, but looks here at internal policy only. Though there was no basis in the Treaty of Rome (1957) for human rights, the European Court of Justice has declared that fundamental human rights are enshrined in the general principles of Community law and thereby protected by the Court. Investigates the Charter, in full, herein


1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1992, calls have gradually been increasing for a greater recognition of, and firmer foundation for, fundamental (social) rights within the European Union. These calls naturally became louder following the Opinion of the European Court of Justice excluding the possibility of EC accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and during the lead up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Academics, independent EU Advisory Committees, groups representing the interests of EU citizens and residents and the European Parliament lamented the almost complete absence of fundamental social rights in the Treaty, and called for an ambitious revision of the Treaty. To a large extent these calls went unheard in Amsterdam, and the new Treaty does not incorporate a comprehensive list of social fundamental rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Rosanò

The meaning ofidemin thene bis in idemprinciple is controversial in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In interpreting the provision of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, the court has emphasized the necessary requirement in the identity of the material acts while in antitrust law three requirements have been deemed necessary: (1) Identity of the facts, (2) unity of offender, and (3) unity of the legal interest protected. Despite the opinions of some Advocates General, the court has confirmed different interpretations of the same principle, depending on differences of the legal scope in question. A few years ago, however, the European Court of Human Rights proclaimed the criterion based on the identity of the material acts as the most suitable. This might push the Court of Justice of the European Union to correct its position in the antitrust field. Should this happen, this adjustment might serve as grounds to recognize the existence of a regional custom concerning thene bis in idemprinciple.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-84
Author(s):  
Max Vetzo

The cases of Menci (C-524/15), Garlsson (C-537/16) and Di Puma (C-596/16 and C-597/16) deal with the duplication of criminal and punitive administrative proceedings for the same conduct in the area of VAT and market abuse. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that this duplication of proceedings constitutes a limitation of the ne bis in idem principle of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). This infringement is only justified if the requirements of the limitation clause of Article 52(1) of the Charter are met. The judgments were highly anticipated as they constitute the response of the CJEU to the judgment in A and B v Norway delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in which the ECtHR lowered the level of protection afforded by the ne bis in idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention of Human Rights (A4P7 ECHR). While there are differences between the approaches taken by both courts, it appears that the reasoning of the CJEU in the judgments largely mirrors that of the ECtHR in A and B v Norway. This article frames the judgments in terms of the dialogue between the CJEU and ECtHR on the ne bis in idem principle. It does so chronologically, by focusing on the past, present and future of the ne bis in idem dialogue between both European courts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-106
Author(s):  
Catarina Vieira Peres

In March this year, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “CJ”) answered the first preliminary question regarding the Private Enforcement Directive (“Directive”).1 One might expect this decision2 to remain relevant for the next few years, as it sheds some light on the rather intricate issue of the Directive’s temporal application. The CJ explains what rules are applicable to actions for damages regarding infringements which occurred prior either to the Directive’s adoption or to its implementation in the respective Member States. The case is also of major interest since it illustrates the role that the principle of effectiveness can play when applied alongside Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).3 Finally, albeit not expressly addressed, the case is also of interest regarding the controversial issue of parent company liability in private enforcement, where it represents a novelty in the Portuguese legal order.


Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn

Chapter 3 shows that the confluence of the law of the European Union and of the European Convention on Human Rights is a European legal order worthy of the name. It outlines the law of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, setting out its principles and the ways in which competences are shared in the EU post Lisbon, between the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter further sets out the outline of the system of rules of the European Union. Then the chapter turns to the characteristics of what has been termed a Europe of human rights, and how the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in conjunction with domestic courts, police the law of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, the chapter brings together the law of the European Union and the ECHR.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 383-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McCrudden

AbstractThis chapter examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.


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