Die Institutionalisierung des Nichtinstitutionellen

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Hartwig
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Legal Argumentation

The volume examines the relation between law, reason, and discourse in Robert Alexy’s legal philosophy. The examination follows Alexy’s own description of his greater project. In his “Theorie der juristischen Argumentation” [Theory of Legal Argumentation] of 1978, Alexy speaks of the Kantian idea of designing a “Code of Practical Reason”. Today, Alexy is prepared to rest his entire case on the idea of an “Institutionalization of Reason”. The work undertakes the reconstruction of the concept of practical reason underlying this idea. To this end, it examines both the roots that go back to Kant’s practical philosophy, as well as the system represented by Alexys’s legal philosophy, which has grown over a period of more than 40 years. At its center is the thesis of the necessity of a realization of reason through rational practical discourse in law – in short, Alexy’s attempt to institutionalize the non-institutional.

scholarly journals Rooting Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation in Jung, and Its Extension to Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-421
Author(s):  
Marko Novak
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Legal Argumentation ◽  
Psychological Types

This paper discusses how an understanding of Jung's psychological types is important for the relevance of Gilbert's multi-modal argumentation theory. Moreover, it highlights how the types have been confirmed by contemporary neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Based on Gilbert's approach, I extend multi-modal argumentation to the area of legal argumentation. It seems that when we leave behind the traditional fortress of “logical” legal argumentation, we "discover" alternate modes (such as the intuitive, emotional, and sensory) that have always been present, concealed in the theoretically underestimated rhetorical skills of arguers.

Delusions of Virtue: Kant on Self-Conceit

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Moran
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Philosophy

AbstractLittle extended attention has been given to Kant’s notion of self-conceit (Eigendünkel), though it appears throughout his theoretical and practical philosophy. Authors who discuss self-conceit often describe it as a kind of imperiousness or arrogance in which the conceited agent seeks to impose selfish principles upon others, or sees others as worthless. I argue that these features of self-conceit are symptoms of a deeper and more thoroughgoing failure. Self-conceit is best described as the tendency to insist upon one’s own theoretical or practical conclusions at any cost, while still wanting to appear – to oneself or to others – as though one is abiding by the constraints of theoretical or practical reason. Self-conceit is thus less centrally the tendency to impose one’s will or inclinations upon others, and more centrally the tendency to reconstruct evidence and rationalize so that one may be convinced of one’s own virtue. While the conceited agent may ultimately impose her judgement upon others, she does so in order to preserve her delusion of virtue.

scholarly journals Practical Reason

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-148
Author(s):  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Andrey Breus
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Practical Experience ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Analytical Theory ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Interpretative Sociology

Paul Ricœur’s essay “Practical Reason” was initially published in 1979, and later became part of the book Du texte à l’action: essais d’herméneutique II (1986), marking Ricœur’s transition from the general problems of the justification of hermeneutics as a legitimate philosophical discipline to the problems of practical philosophy in a broad sense. Relying on the analytical theory of action, the interpretative sociology of M. Weber, and the Hegelian critique of Kantian ethics, Ricœur seeks to restore the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or “practical wisdom” in the context of modern philosophizing. This turns out to be unexpectedly relevant where neither Kant’s deontology nor the Hegelian Sittlichkeit can adequately express the entirety of human practical experience in a world where ideology and alienation have become inevitable components of social life.

Welche Freiheit macht glücklich?

2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-29
Author(s):  
Ludwig Siep
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
The Core

Practical philosophy in the classical German tradition from Kant to Hegel seems to be moralistic and even ascetic. The core of its moral and legal philosophy is a concept of freedom as independence from any longing for pleasure and happiness. Tracing the development of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective, objective and absolute spirit, however, exhibits a deep systematic connection between the forms of freedom and happiness in all their traditional and modern meanings. Many of them can be compared with modern conceptions, but others have to be saved from oblivion and defended against reductive conceptions of freedom and happiness in modern philosophy.

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