Dispute about the Nature of Law

The article analyzes the conditions for a dialogue between Western and post-Soviet philosophy and theory of law on the nature of law (in terms of the first), or understanding of law (in terms of the second), which would create an opportunity for the organic inclusion of the “dispute about the nature of law” elements in the context of the discussion and solving issues relevant to the post-Soviet philosophy of law, including the shift of emphasis from the theoretical to the practical aspect of the problem of the nature of law. The research begins with a general description of the peculiarities of the “discourse of legal thinking (understanding of law)” inherent in post-Soviet jurisprudence and the identification of ontological and analytical criteria for classifying the types of understanding of law (natural law, positivist, sociological) as the basis for further convergence of post-Soviet and Western experience of understanding of law. Further, the meaning of the concept of validity of law in its social, moral and legal varieties for understanding the nature of law in general and the corresponding types of such understanding are revealed. In the final part, attention is drawn to the practical aspects of the study of the nature of law, carried out in the context of “extraordinary cases” existing on the verge of law and un-law. Further analysis reveals the methodological possibilities of comprehending the concept of law through the correlation with the counter-concept of “un-law” using examples: post-Soviet discussions about the relationship between law and statute, legal and non-legal law; Hegel’s concept of right and non-right; contemporary non-positivist approach by Robert Alexy in accordance with the criterion of the “limiting border” of law according to the Radbruch formula. The conclusions summarize the provisions on the general and distinctive features of the “discourse of the nature of law” and “discourse of understanding of law”, determine the prospects for their rapprochement.

Development of English Legal Positivism from Bentham to Salmond and Brown: Leading Ideas in the Context of the Common Law Tradition

This article examines the peculiarities of the evolution of English legal positivism, which was the only direction of understanding law formed by professional lawyers, expressing the specifics of their legal consciousness, focused on understanding positive law and the practice of its implementation. The authors examine the key concepts that define the historical trajectory and problem field of legal positivism in the Anglo-American tradition, analyzing the legal teachings of T. Hobbes, D. Hume, J. Bentham, J. Austin, M. Hale, W. Blackstone, J. W. Salmond and W. J. Brown. The attention is drawn to the fact that Salmond lays down objections to the concept of law as a rule of the state and considers its main shortcomings. In his work “Jurisprudence or the Theory of Law”, Salmond presents the flaws and omissions of the “imperative theory of law”, among the proponents of which he names T. Hobbes, S. von Pufendorf, J. Bentham and J. Austin. Brown believes that the essence of law can be expressed by a set of three concepts: “will”, “command” and “reason”, and the just conception of law implies recognition of the elements of unity, growth and growth that is consciously directed towards the realization and achievement of the goal.

Revitalization of Radbruch's formula in the theory of Robert Alexy

In trying to unravel the quandary of the concept of law, Robert Alexy stipulated some sort of an eclectic non-postivistic theory of law which consists of three arguments: from Correctness, Injustice and Principles. He believes in the possibility of a rational justification of objective morality, which he incorporates into the aforementioned three arguments, claiming that law and morality are conceptually connected. This paper will question the limitations of such an approach. The Argument from Correctness states that no system can be considered to have a legal nature if it does not claim correctness, while it will be seen as defective if it does claim, but does not fulfill correctness. On the other hand, the Argument from Injustice is an addition to the previous thesis, through the revitalization of the Radbruch Intolerability and Disavowal Formula – subtracting legal nature from extremely unjust norms. The paper evaluates main objections pointed towards such a conception of law, as well as general problems which may occur within the Arguments from Correctness and Injustice.

Practice and Theory in The Concept of Law

This chapter challenges the widely held assumption that H.L.A. Hart endorsed a fatally flawed theory of rules known as ‘the practice theory’. In the first section I lay out the practice theory. The second section marshals evidence of the theory’s inconsistency with central aspects of Hart’s understanding of law, in particular his insistence on the distinction between the validity and efficacy of legal rules. In Section 3 I revisit the passages of The Concept of Law from which the practice theory is ostensibly culled and suggest an alternative. Finally, in Section 4, I consider some of the methodological implications of Hart’s style of argument and what it says about the importance or not of conceptual analysis in legal philosophy.

IS AUSTIN'S THEORY INCONGRUENT WITH EXISTING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGN AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN TREATIES AND INDIAN LEGISLATION?

For his bold declaration that international law is not "true law" since there is no sovereign, John Austin has been extensively attacked and praised in equal measure. According to Austin, the concept of law is, “Law is a command of the sovereign backed by a sanction.” This study investigates Austin's viewpoint and evaluates it in light of current legal systems, present international law, modern Indian laws, and the analysis of legal issues in the treaty law. While Austin's viewpoint was correct in terms of the legal systems of his day, it cannot be applied to the current international, and Indian legal system

LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETENCE OF A FUTURE LAWYER: CONCEPT, STRUCTURE, AND COMPOSITION

Statement of the problem. The current stage of the development of higher education in the Russian Federation is inextricably linked with the systematic renewal of all elements of the education system, which is based on innovative pedagogical technologies that reflect the changes taking place in the fields of culture, economics, law, science, and technology. Innovative processes in the life of the state and society impose new requirements on the legal community as one of the foundations of a democratic rule of law state, as well as on educational institutions implementing professional educational programs of higher legal education. Therefore, there is a need to update the content of the professional competence of a lawyer, which should be formed among students as a result of mastering the educational program. A graduate of a law institute at the beginning of his professional activity should be ready to solve various legal situations, usually related to the application and implementation of legal norms. However, often in the process of studying at a university with a significant amount of professional knowledge taught, due attention is not paid to the development and consolidation of professional skills, primary experience of professional activity, including the field of law enforcement. The lack of research in pedagogical science, the object of which would be the law enforcement competence of a future lawyer as an integral part of professional competence, determined the relevance of this study. The purpose of the article is to determine the essence and structure of law enforcement competence, as well as its place in the professional activity of a lawyer. The article analyzes the correlation of the concepts of “professional” and “law enforcement” competence of a lawyer from the positions of various approaches, justifies the expediency of allocating the law enforcement competence of a future lawyer as an integral part of professional competence according to the Federal Educational Standard 40.03.01 Jurisprudence. Methodology (materials and methods). Analysis of the works of Russian and foreign researchers on the problem of training specialists in the field of jurisprudence; analysis of normative legal acts regulating the field of education, analysis and synthesis of the authors’ experience in training students of the appropriate specialization, as well as a survey of employers as representatives of the labor market made it possible to determine the special place of law enforcement as a type of activity in the structure of professional competence of a lawyer, as well as the component composition of law enforcement competence. Research results. The article provides an analysis of educational standards in the field of jurisprudence, substantiates the expediency of distinguishing law enforcement competence as an integral part of the professional competence of a lawyer, suggests the authors’ formulation of the concept of “law enforcement competence of a future lawyer”, and also defines its component composition. Law enforcement competence is characterized as a necessary type of activity aimed at forming the professional competence of a lawyer. Based on the general characteristics of modern professional tasks and related labor functions, which a future lawyer should be ready to perform, it is concluded that it is necessary to create special conditions aimed at forming the law enforcement competence of a future lawyer. Conclusion. At present, there is statistical processing of data obtained during a pedagogical experiment on the implementation of organizational and pedagogical conditions for the formation of law enforcement competence among future lawyers studying at a university. This experiment was conducted in the Law Institute of the Krasnoyarsk State Agrarian University.

Komu służy prawo? Libertariańska koncepcja Alberta Jaya Nocka

<p>Albert Jay Nock (1870–1945) was a prominent opinion journalist of the first half of the 20^th century, considered a representative of the first generation of libertarianism. The article is aimed at finding an answer to the question: Whom – according to Nock – does law serve? A key element of the problem is the internal dichotomy of the concept of law, which not only can be seen through the prism of the positivist-legal paradigm, but also constitutes the pillar of the jusnaturalistic concept. To properly arrange the object of study, the thesis was used according to which in Nock’s doctrine the existence of radically different assessment of the nature of man and his individual goals from the nature of the functioning of the State allows us to demonstrate the dichotomy of two opposing legal orders that serve the welfare of different entities (the individual and the State). To systematize the argument, the concept of the individual and his relations with the State was first presented, and then the dichotomy of the government and the State was discussed, which ultimately finally allowed to analyze the relationship between natural law and positive law.</p>

The Concept of Positive Law and Its Relationship to Religion and Morality

Can the concept of law be extended to other times and places in which the concept as understood in most countries and societies today—as a system of norms centred on a nation state, based on a constitution, formulated through codified legislation and judicial precedents, administered by lawmakers for its inception and judges for its implementation—simply did not exist? My contention is that such an extension is, at best, useless and, at worst, misleading. Producing an intelligible jurisprudence of the concept of law means keeping it within the reasonable boundaries of what is ordinarily understood by both lay and professional people when practising ‘the’ law. Developing a socio-historical jurisprudence of law, as distinct from other normativities, entails a threefold analysis: conceptual, historical, and praxiological. Following the ground broken by analytical philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, conceptual analysis engages in the exposition of the grammar through which concepts acquire their signification and are meaningfully used. In a manner inspired by philosopher of science Ian Hacking and by historian Reinhart Koselleck, historical analysis emphasizes the description of the birth, development, and use of concepts. Drawing on the work of sociologist Harold Garfinkel, praxiological analysis describes the practical methods used by people to make sense of their environment, to produce their local order, and to act accordingly. The three approaches converge in their insistence on adopting the endogenous/indigenous perspective towards social life and its production.

FRAGMENTOS SOBRE A OBRA THE FORCE OF LAW DE FREDERICK SCHAUER

Em 2015 o jurista norte-americano Frederick Schauer publicou a obra The Force of Law, cujo teor não omite, desde o princípio de seu texto, que seu anseio ao escrevê-lo era opor-se à concepção proposta pelo estudioso inglês Herbert L. A. Hart no livro The Concept of Law, lançado em 2012, de que a natureza do Direito não abrange o componente coercitivo. Em The Force of Law é exposto que a coerção é o único componente do Direito usado até mesmo pelas democracias mais desenvolvidas a fim de que se garanta o cumprimento de seus próprios atos normativos. Entretanto, de acordo com o raciocínio perpetrado na obra, é um fato empírico que os indivíduos muito raramente obedecem à lei meramente por deferência à sua autoridade. O presente artigo se propõe a apresentar considerações sobre o livro, tomando como referência não apenas seu texto, mas publicações científicas relacionadas.