Delusions of Virtue: Kant on Self-Conceit

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Moran
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Philosophy

AbstractLittle extended attention has been given to Kant’s notion of self-conceit (Eigendünkel), though it appears throughout his theoretical and practical philosophy. Authors who discuss self-conceit often describe it as a kind of imperiousness or arrogance in which the conceited agent seeks to impose selfish principles upon others, or sees others as worthless. I argue that these features of self-conceit are symptoms of a deeper and more thoroughgoing failure. Self-conceit is best described as the tendency to insist upon one’s own theoretical or practical conclusions at any cost, while still wanting to appear – to oneself or to others – as though one is abiding by the constraints of theoretical or practical reason. Self-conceit is thus less centrally the tendency to impose one’s will or inclinations upon others, and more centrally the tendency to reconstruct evidence and rationalize so that one may be convinced of one’s own virtue. While the conceited agent may ultimately impose her judgement upon others, she does so in order to preserve her delusion of virtue.

Die Institutionalisierung des Nichtinstitutionellen

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Hartwig
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Legal Argumentation

The volume examines the relation between law, reason, and discourse in Robert Alexy’s legal philosophy. The examination follows Alexy’s own description of his greater project. In his “Theorie der juristischen Argumentation” [Theory of Legal Argumentation] of 1978, Alexy speaks of the Kantian idea of designing a “Code of Practical Reason”. Today, Alexy is prepared to rest his entire case on the idea of an “Institutionalization of Reason”. The work undertakes the reconstruction of the concept of practical reason underlying this idea. To this end, it examines both the roots that go back to Kant’s practical philosophy, as well as the system represented by Alexys’s legal philosophy, which has grown over a period of more than 40 years. At its center is the thesis of the necessity of a realization of reason through rational practical discourse in law – in short, Alexy’s attempt to institutionalize the non-institutional.

scholarly journals Practical Reason

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-148
Author(s):  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Andrey Breus
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Practical Experience ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Analytical Theory ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Interpretative Sociology

Paul Ricœur’s essay “Practical Reason” was initially published in 1979, and later became part of the book Du texte à l’action: essais d’herméneutique II (1986), marking Ricœur’s transition from the general problems of the justification of hermeneutics as a legitimate philosophical discipline to the problems of practical philosophy in a broad sense. Relying on the analytical theory of action, the interpretative sociology of M. Weber, and the Hegelian critique of Kantian ethics, Ricœur seeks to restore the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or “practical wisdom” in the context of modern philosophizing. This turns out to be unexpectedly relevant where neither Kant’s deontology nor the Hegelian Sittlichkeit can adequately express the entirety of human practical experience in a world where ideology and alienation have become inevitable components of social life.

The Internality of Moral Faith in Kant’s Religion

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Addison Ellis
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Potential Solution ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Initial Analysis ◽  
The Face ◽  
Moral Faith

AbstractWood (1970) convincingly argues that Kant’s notion of moral faith is a response to a “dialectical perplexity” or antinomy. Specifically, moral faith is a response to the threat of moral despair. In line with this suggestion, I make the case that moral faith is the resolution of a crisis about how to go on with one’s life in the face of the threat of moral despair. If this is right, then we have a potential solution to two related anxieties: (1) why the matter of our moral faith or despair deserves to be a topic of practical philosophy instead of empirical psychology, and (2) how despair could be a real threat even though Kant holds that rational beings could never truly lack faith. But, to fully see how these concerns can be answered, we must go beyond Wood’s initial analysis. I first argue that Kant’s philosophy suggests two kinds of moral faith: external and internal. I then argue that internal moral faith is analogous to self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit) in the second Critique’s practical antinomy. Together, these arguments suggest that moral faith is a response to a real threat of moral despair, and that both dialectically require one another within practical reason.

Kant's Account of Motivation: A Sartrean Response to Some Hegelian Objections

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (01) ◽  
pp. 86-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sorin Baiasu
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Rational Person ◽  
Good Will ◽  
Habitual Responses ◽  
Acting From Duty

Ethical motivation represents an important aspect of Kant's practical philosophy, one without which much of Kant's distinctive position would be lost. Not surprisingly, it is also one of those aspects of Kantianism to which Hegelian criticism directs its focus with predilection. Central to Kant's account of moral motivation is the distinction between acting merely in accordance with duty and acting from duty. When he introduces this distinction, in the Groundwork, Kant also points to the epistemic difficulties of properly drawing the distinction. A key concept here is, without any doubt, that of duty, and Kant begins with a preliminary definition: the notion of duty is a notion ‘which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances’ (G: 4: 397). What this definition tells us is that, although beings which are only governed by practical reason without any admixture of inclinations and sensuous drives, that is, purely rational beings, will also have a good will, such beings do not have duties precisely because they lack the ‘subjective limitations and hindrances’ of sensuous motivating forces, such as desires, passions, habitual responses. If a person spontaneously and necessarily acts as duty requires, then it does not make sense to talk about an obligation for this person to act as duty requires. Such a person must be a purely rational person, since only she can always and necessarily act as (practical) reason requires. By contrast, beings with limitations and hindrances, like us, act spontaneously and necessarily as natural laws require and, hence, it does not make sense to talk about our obligation or duty to observe the laws of nature.

scholarly journals Aristotle and Ricœur on Practical Reason

Humanitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 151-167
Author(s):  
Gonçalo Marcelo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Nichomachean Ethics ◽  
Life Worth Living

This paper analyzes the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, such as it appears in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics, detailing what sort of model to grasp practical reason it entails: a practical wisdom. Setting it against the backdrop of a reflection on the prevalent uses and meanings of reason today, and the consequence these views have for a depiction of selfhood and human action, the paper shows how, amid the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practical philosophy, Paul Ricœur updates this phronetic model in Oneself as Another. The paper discusses the implications of such a thick account of selfhood and human action, such as it being a potential key to overcome some difficulties caused by Kantian moral philosophy, while it also calls, with and beyond Ricœur, for a refinement of the phronetic model by taking into account not only its thick intersubjective grounding but also the limits to rationality and the need to take the plurality of life forms that can count as being examples of a ‘life worth living’ (a good life).

scholarly journals Who Needs Translations: the Difficulties of Assimilating a Foreign-Language Tradition (On the Example of the Ukrainian Translation of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason)

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-154
Author(s):  
Victor Chorny
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Language ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Language Use ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Teaching Material ◽  
German Language ◽  
Original Language

This article offers a critical review of the Ukrainian translation of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Translations of classical works should serve a twofold function. They do not only facilitate the adoption of the terminology within the academic community but should first and foremost allow those unacquainted with the language of the original to engage with a foreign philosophical tradition meaningfully. The translation of a philosophical text has to preserve terminological rigidity and strictly follow the letter of the original while simultaneously being a product of interpretation and, to a certain extent, a paraphrase, the result of cooperation between the author and the translator. Decent knowledge of the original language does not suffice to successfully deal with the outdated vocabulary and the peculiarities of authorial language use, as many of the crucial translation decisions cannot be justified without understanding the inner logic of the argument. However, my detailed analysis of terminological patterns and Ukrainian renderings of complex and ambiguous syntactic constructions proves that none of these tasks were achieved here. Unfortunately, despite the efforts, the quality of this translation does not correspond to the standards of consistency and does not reflect the letter and spirit of Kant’s original due to numerous mistakes, misreadings, and distortions. Neither the impressive list of translator’s notes nor the occasional practice of giving German equivalents in the brackets is of any help to the reader in understanding Kane’s practical philosophy unless they already possess sufficient knowledge of the German language. This translation, therefore, cannot be used as teaching material at universities and stands in the way of a wider reception of Kant’s philosophy and productive public discussions.

scholarly journals Razão Prática e a questão da Técnica/Practical Reason and the Technical Question

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Gustavo Silvano Batista
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Hermeneutics ◽  
Scientific Reason ◽  
Essential Aspect ◽  
Hans Georg Gadamer ◽  
Technical Question ◽  
Philosophical Task

A reflexão de Hans-Georg Gadamer sobre a hermenêutica filosófica como filosofia prática pretende afirmar um aspecto essencial de seu pensamento, a saber, o traço eminentemente prático. Tal esfera prática encontra-se fundamentalmente ligada a uma tarefa,  a defesa da razão prática em detrimento ao domínio da razão técnico-científica, assumida por Gadamer a partir da publicação da obra “A Razão na Época da Ciência” (1976). Assim, neste presente artigo pretendemos discutir a relação entre a noção de razão que, na perspectiva de Gadamer, deve ser compatível com as demandas atuais frente ao domínio da tecno-ciência.Abstract: Gadamer’s reflection on philosophical hermeneutics as practical philosophy intends to claim an essential aspect of his thought: the trace eminently practical. Such practical sphere is fundamentally linked to a philosophical task: the defense of practical reason against to technical-scientific reason, question assumed by Gadamer from the publication of “Reason in the Age of Science” (1976). Thus, in this present article we seek to discuss the relation between a notion of reason that, for Gadamer, must be compatible with the current demands opposite to the domination of techno-science. Keywords: Gadamer, practical reason, hermeneutics, technics

The Relevance of the Logical Method for Hegel’s Practical Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelica Nuzzo
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Absolute Method ◽  
Logic Of Action ◽  
Logical Method ◽  
The Absolute

This chapter examines the relevance of the “absolute method” developed in Hegel’s Science of Logic for his practical philosophy or philosophy of objective spirit. It argues, first, that the fruitfulness and vitality of Hegel’s practical philosophy as a whole depends in a fundamental way on two conditions, namely, (i) on its being conceived as part of a system of philosophy, and (ii) on its being based on the logic as the first part of the system. It argues, second, that the “absolute method” with which Hegel concludes the Logic presents the structure of a “logic of action.” It follows that since the Science of Logic itself is developed on the basis of the method, the logic is the foundational part of Hegel’s practical philosophy. Ultimately, the chapter contends that this is Hegel’s transformation and radicalization of Kant’s claim of the primacy of practical reason.

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