Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

2020 ◽  
pp. 136-169
Author(s):  
Larry Ceplair

Personality wise, these two were the furthest apart, and one is amazed that Zhou managed to maintain his role in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary processes. The mercurial Mao needed the steady Zhou. Mao was the great thinker and catalyst of the Chinese revolution, while Zhou was the great administrator. Zhou always knew when to defer and even prostrate himself.

NAN Nü ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-96
Author(s):  
Xiaofei Kang

This article seeks to bridge the hitherto disconnected studies of the “woman question” and “religious question” in the twentieth-century Chinese revolution. It focuses on the issues of women’s liberation and anti-superstition in Communist propaganda through Xiao Erhei jiehun (Young Blackie gets married), a popular novel by the Communist writer Zhao Shuli (1906-70) published in 1943, and examines its impact in comparative context in wartime Communist base areas. Drawing on the religious culture of the author’s native southern Shanxi, this revolutionary classic promoted freedom of marriage through attacking “feudal superstition.” The article compares wartime religious and revolutionary culture in Zhao’s rural Shanxi with the CCP’s cultural and political agendas in its headquarters of Yan’an. Despite its immense success, the novel’s original messages of women’s liberation and anti-superstition gradually became marginal in the early PRC years – both discourses gave way to the party-state’s higher ideological goal of class struggle, and were subsumed into the metanarrative celebrating the absolute leadership of the Communist Party and Mao Zedong.



2005 ◽  
Vol 184 ◽  
pp. 914-933 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-tai Hung

The establishment of the Museum of the Chinese Revolution, which opened its doors in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on 1 July 1961, the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, was a complicated political and cultural decision on the part of the Chinese government. The museum was never intended to be an artistic enterprise. Rather, it was conceived as a political institution to serve the interest of the Party. This article argues that the Party was ubiquitous in the building of the museum, exercising tight control through strict institutional means, especially through its Propaganda Department. Museum staff, under the close supervision of senior Party officials, sought to pursue an indigenous path different from the Soviet model. Staff members collected artifacts related to the Chinese Communist Revolution, commissioned historical paintings, arranged displays according to the historical framework stipulated by Mao Zedong, and, most important, struggled to instil in the museum the correct “Red Line,” that is, the policy of the CCP under Mao's leadership. The article concludes that the museum was an intricate amalgam of political supervision from the top, official historical interpretations, strategic displays and a reflection of the internal Party struggle. The construction of the museum reflects the attempt by the CCP to control the collective memory of the nation and to monopolize the writing of history.


1994 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 1000-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Saich

The new materials on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history that have become available from the late 1970s onwards, the opportunity to inter-view key participants in the Chinese revolution and changing intellectual agendas in the West have led to a major reassessment of the reasons for the CCP's rise to power. Recent research has contributed significantly to understanding of the process of change in China in the century or so before the Communists came to power and has even moved the Party out of the immediate spotlight while explaining long-term socio-economic changes and their structural consequences. Similarly, the focus has moved away from Mao Zedong and a few senior leaders operating out of the key geographic centres of the revolution (Jiangxi in the early 1930s, Yan'an in the late 1930s and early 1940s). This latter research has retrieved those forgotten in the revolutionary histories or those who have been deliberately ignored in the writings of the victors.


1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Saich

The current stress of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party on the necessity of “seeking truth from facts” and the accompanying more liberal attitude to research have led to a re-vitalisation, as in other areas, of the study of party history. The portrayal of Mao Zedong in a more fallible light and the ending of the overemphasis on his role in the Chinese Revolution have led to the study, or re-study, of aspects of Chinese communist history in which Mao was not directly, or only marginally, involved, and to evaluations, or re-evaluations, of the contribution of other communist leaders. The contemporary view that the concept of “two-line struggle” has been overstressed in past historiography, particularly during the Cultural Revolution decade, has also helped historians in China to provide a more “objective” account of the role of other key figures. Differences of opinion no longer have to be castigated as outright opposition nor do later “failings” by individuals necessarily lead to a search by historians to expose a “counter-revolutionary” past throughout.


1971 ◽  
Vol 4 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 5-37
Author(s):  
Tsutomu Nakanishi
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