Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and the Anti-Japanese War Base Areas

1994 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 1000-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Saich

The new materials on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history that have become available from the late 1970s onwards, the opportunity to inter-view key participants in the Chinese revolution and changing intellectual agendas in the West have led to a major reassessment of the reasons for the CCP's rise to power. Recent research has contributed significantly to understanding of the process of change in China in the century or so before the Communists came to power and has even moved the Party out of the immediate spotlight while explaining long-term socio-economic changes and their structural consequences. Similarly, the focus has moved away from Mao Zedong and a few senior leaders operating out of the key geographic centres of the revolution (Jiangxi in the early 1930s, Yan'an in the late 1930s and early 1940s). This latter research has retrieved those forgotten in the revolutionary histories or those who have been deliberately ignored in the writings of the victors.

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Saich

The current stress of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party on the necessity of “seeking truth from facts” and the accompanying more liberal attitude to research have led to a re-vitalisation, as in other areas, of the study of party history. The portrayal of Mao Zedong in a more fallible light and the ending of the overemphasis on his role in the Chinese Revolution have led to the study, or re-study, of aspects of Chinese communist history in which Mao was not directly, or only marginally, involved, and to evaluations, or re-evaluations, of the contribution of other communist leaders. The contemporary view that the concept of “two-line struggle” has been overstressed in past historiography, particularly during the Cultural Revolution decade, has also helped historians in China to provide a more “objective” account of the role of other key figures. Differences of opinion no longer have to be castigated as outright opposition nor do later “failings” by individuals necessarily lead to a search by historians to expose a “counter-revolutionary” past throughout.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
Li Xing

This article proposes a framework for understanding the way the Chinese Revolution emerged, developed and achieved power (1921-49), then further consolidated in the period of socialist 'uninterrupted revolution' (1949-77) and was finally abandoned by the post-Mao regime (1977 to the present). This analysis is based on a perspective of discourse theories framed in historically new forms of political, social and ideological relations. In other words, it attempts to conceptualize the transformation of China and the Chinese Communist Party by analysing the role of ideological discourses (arguments and interpretations) and the cognitive elements (beliefs, goals, desires, expertise, knowledge) as the driving-force behind societal transformations. The discourse theory applied here – logocentrism and econocentrism – also serves both as a political arena of struggle to confer legitimacy on a specific socio-political project and as a distinctive cog ni tive and evaluative framework for understanding societal transformations. The conceptualization of the paper is informed by the work of David Apter and Tony Saich on discourse theory.


2020 ◽  
pp. 253-270
Author(s):  
Neil Macmaster

The chapter examines how the Communist Party, following the decision of June 1955 to organize the paramilitary Combattants de la libération (CDL), established a short-lived guerrilla, the so-called ‘Red Maquis’, in the Chelif region. The clandestine structure had begun to take root as a consequence of the massive earthquake of September 1954, centred on Orleansville, that exposed the long-term failure of the colonial state to develop the rural economy. The communists rapidly created the Fédération des sinistrés that established a network of peasant cells that soon became the base of the Red Maquis. While the communists were successful in creating a guerrilla base centred on Medjadja, the main group inserted by Laban and Maillot in the Beni Boudouane was rapidly located and destroyed by the army, assisted by the bachaga Boualam. The catastrophic failure of the Red Maquis highlighted the failure of the Algiers-based central committee to prepare the ground for a guerrilla movement. However, several key participants escaped the military encirclement and were soon absorbed into the FLN on the dissolution of the CDL in July 1956.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-179
Author(s):  
Neil J. Diamant ◽  
Feng Xiaocai

This article uses comments, questions, and conversations about the PRC's draft constitution of 1954 to assess state legitimacy and how people felt more generally about the Communist regime. Taking advantage of untapped archival sources in Hong Kong and the mainland—including classified intraparty reports and transcripts from meetings in factories, police stations, universities, and villages—this article challenges the conventional view that the constitution bolstered support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Instead, the document generated a great deal of anxiety among ordinary citizens, as well as among CCP officials and the regime's favored classes. This “text-based” cause of emotional turmoil was a supplement to the classic forms of political terror that dominate the literature on Communist dictatorships. Despite widespread confusion, people's identification of problematic sections of the constitution turned out to be remarkably prescient in light of political disasters in the 1950s and 1960s and ongoing constitutional controversies in the era after Mao Zedong.


Author(s):  
Tony Saich ◽  
Nancy Hearst

There is a vast array of materials available to assist in the study of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) before 1949. In China this is aided by the presence of a large number of officially employed researchers at party research centers and related archives. To earn their keep, these researchers have to put out publications. Availability of materials was boosted by the start of reforms in 1978 and preparations for the 1981 official party history. Given that, especially in the early years of reform, when expression of personal opinions could be dangerous, many of the released publications were documentary collections or chronologies. These came in several different varieties, based on either historical periods, particular events, or the lives of key individuals. These materials were complemented by memoirs of key figures who wanted to ensure that their version of history was in the public eye. This makes selection very difficult. Some of the works that follow are a must for students and scholars; others are personal favorites of the compilers and should be treated as exemplary of the types and varieties of sources that are available for the study of the CCP before 1949. More recently, materials from China have allowed researchers to conduct more detailed research on the social and economic transformations wrought by CCP presence and the difficulties the party had in maintaining local support. This has meant that, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, we have seen fewer monographs that attempt to paint the broader picture of the sweep of the CCP revolution. Instead, there are many fine-grained analyses of particular events or CCP activities in specific locales that reveal the extremely complex and multifaceted nature of the Chinese revolution.


1981 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 407-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart R. Schram

On 1 July 1981 the Chinese Communist Party celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of its foundation. To mark this occasion, the Party itself issued a statement summing up the experience of recent decades. It seems an appropriate time for outsiders as well to look back over the history of the past 60 years, in the hope of grasping long-term tendencies which may continue to influence events in the future.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-372
Author(s):  
Peter Berton

This article depicts a painful period in the relations between the Chinese and Japanese communist parties. Using a case study of relations between a ruling Chinese communist party and a non-ruling Japanese communist party, the article covers negotiations and communique ´ between the JCP leader Miyamoto and CCP leadershipin 1966 that was overruled by Mao Zedong on the issue of Soviet ‘‘revisionism’’ and revolutionary line for the JCP. It discusses the resulting breakdown of negotiations and CCP’s efforts to splinter the Japanese party by setting up a pro-Beijing Japanese communist group. The article analyzes the obstacles to normalization, and the reasons why the leadershipof the two parties decided to compromise and reach normalization in 1998 after 30 years of acrimony.


1989 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 300-323
Author(s):  
Hu Kuo–tai

Between 1937 and 1945 higher education was one of the main arenas of struggle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both sides regarded it as an important area to be controlled. The Bureau of Investigation's 1951 report suggested that KMT support from youth in schools was “the key to success or failure.” The Chinese Communist Party also regarded the work of winning over intellectuals as vital for the Party's future. In 1939 Mao Zedong said that “without the participation of intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.” Thus, the two parties competed both overtly and covertly in colleges and universities to win the support of both staff and students.


1994 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 1052-1079 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph W. Esherick

It used to be a truism that 20th-century China witnessed one of the great peasant revolutions of world history. The Chinese Communist Party built a popular base in the countryside, and eventually a massive army of peasant soldiers surrounded the cities and drove the urban-based Kuomintang from the Mainland. In the comparative literature, the Chinese revolution was classified as a peasant revolution, and a number of important studies sought to explain the social origins of that phenomenon.


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