Linguistic Evidence and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism

Ron Wilburn;

doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20211213

Linguistic Evidence and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism

Logos & Episteme ◽

10.5840/logos-episteme20211213 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (1) ◽

pp. 53-76

Author(s):

Ron Wilburn ◽

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Epistemic Contextualism ◽

Linguistic Evidence ◽

Knowledge Claims

Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the thesis that the standards that must be met by a knowledge claimant vary with (especially conversational) contexts of utterance. Thus construed, EC may concern only knowledge claims (“Semantic EC”), or else the knowledge relation itself (“Substantive EC”). Herein, my concern is with “Substantive EC.” Let’s call the claim that the sorts of linguistic evidence commonly cited in support of Semantic EC also imply or support Substantive EC the “Implication Thesis” (IP). IP is a view about which some epistemologists have equivocated. Keith DeRose is a case in point. Herein I argue that IP is false, and that it is false for interesting reasons. To this end, I consider two other terms which DeRose investigates, “free will” and “potency” in his efforts to demonstrate the alleged inability of distinctly philosophical or skeptical doubts to infect ordinary epistemic discourse. I describe how and why these two examples speak against, rather than for, DeRose’s recommendation of Substantive EC.

Download Full-text

The Variability of Know(s)-that Judgments

Attributing Knowledge ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0004 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 97-130

Author(s):

Jody Azzouni

Keyword(s):

Knowledge Claim ◽

The Other ◽

Epistemic Reasons ◽

Epistemic Contextualism ◽

Subject Sensitive Invariantism ◽

Knowledge Claims ◽

Usage Data

The usage evidence—various scenarios that realistically depict where and when we attribute knowledge to ourselves and others—shows that all the alternatives (epistemic contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, knowledge relativism) to intellectual invariantism fail. They fail for several reasons: When cases are compared, speaker-hearers tend to retract one or the other conflicting knowledge claim; the intuitions elicited by various cases don’t consistently satisfy any particular position; the situations under which speaker-hearers retract knowledge claims under pressure seem to support an invariantist position. Nevertheless, no standard invariantist position seems supported by the usage data because speaker-hearers do seem to shift because of differences either in the interests of the agents to whom knowledge is attributed, for example, oneself, or because of other apparently non-epistemic reasons. Attempts to use pragmatic tools, such as implicatures, to handle the apparent shifts in knowledge standards are shown to fail as well.

Download Full-text

What is the Relation between Semantic and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism?

Logos & Episteme ◽

10.5840/logos-episteme202112325 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (3) ◽

pp. 344-366

Author(s):

Ron Wilburn ◽

Keyword(s):

The Self ◽

Epistemic Contextualism ◽

Knowledge Claims

Epistemic Contextualism is generally treated as a semantic thesis that may or may not have epistemological consequences. It is sometimes taken to concern only knowledge claims (as the assertion that the word “know” means different things in different contexts of use). Still, at other times it is taken to regard the knowledge relation itself (as the assertion that knowledge itself has no single univocal nature). Call the former view Semantic EC, the latter view Substantive EC, and the idea that the plausibility of Semantic EC presupposes that of Substantive EC, the “Presupposition Thesis.” Numerous authors argue against the Presupposition Thesis on the grounds that an understanding of the nature of knowledge is no more required to understand the meaning of knowledge assertions than an understanding of the self, for instance, is needed to understand the meaning of sentences containing “I.” These authors then offer additional arguments for the same conclusion, using further comparisons between “know” and other indexicals, as well as between “know” and quantifiers, gradable and modal adjectives. Herein, I defend the Presupposition Thesis by arguing against these authors’ claims (based as they are on these types of comparisons) that Semantic EC is plausible without the supposition of Substantive EC.

Download Full-text

How (not) to be a fallibilist: Lottery paradox and two types of epistemic contextualism

Theoria Beograd ◽

10.2298/theo1403093f ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 57 (3) ◽

pp. 93-120

Author(s):

Nenad Filipovic

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

Epistemic Contextualism ◽

Lottery Paradox ◽

The World ◽

Conversational Contextualism ◽

Inferential Contextualism ◽

Knowledge Claims ◽

Michael Williams ◽

The Lottery Paradox

There is one common thing among lotteries from all over the world: there is small number of winning tickets and considerably bigger number of losing tickets. Therefore, the probability that a ticket wins a lottery is quite low, usually so low that we think that it is almost sure the ticket loses. But, we would never say that we know that a ticket will lose, until we see results of the lottery in, for example, some newspapers. And the probability of newspapers making a mistake does not seem to affect our knowledge claims. But why is that, since newspapers could make a mistake more often than a ticket wins? This question presents trouble for fallibilism, which claim that S could know that p, even when the probability that p is less than 1. Contextualist theories give their typical brand of solution: we have a change of context between the two cases, and in one case standard for knowledge claims are higher than the standard in the other case. Because of that, one can know that S lost the lottery when she reads it in newspapers. In this paper, I will present analysis of the lottery paradox, and two types of epistemic contexutalism: simple conversational contextualism and inferential contextualism. I will also present two of the most popular solution based on simple conversational contextualism, made by Lewis and Cohen. Finally, I will introduce some problems for such solutions, and show that the problems could solved if we apply strategy and explanation of inferential contextualism, type of contextualism proposed by Michael Williams.

Download Full-text

When Mother Earth Rises Up

Social Psychology ◽

10.1027/1864-9335/a000112 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 44 (4) ◽

pp. 271-277 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Simona Sacchi ◽

Paolo Riva ◽

Marco Brambilla

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Natural Disasters ◽

Natural Disaster ◽

Mental States ◽

Disaster Victims ◽

Willingness To Help ◽

Mother Earth

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.

Download Full-text