The Variability of Know(s)-that Judgments

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Claim ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Subject Sensitive Invariantism ◽  
Knowledge Claims ◽  
Usage Data

The usage evidence—various scenarios that realistically depict where and when we attribute knowledge to ourselves and others—shows that all the alternatives (epistemic contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, knowledge relativism) to intellectual invariantism fail. They fail for several reasons: When cases are compared, speaker-hearers tend to retract one or the other conflicting knowledge claim; the intuitions elicited by various cases don’t consistently satisfy any particular position; the situations under which speaker-hearers retract knowledge claims under pressure seem to support an invariantist position. Nevertheless, no standard invariantist position seems supported by the usage data because speaker-hearers do seem to shift because of differences either in the interests of the agents to whom knowledge is attributed, for example, oneself, or because of other apparently non-epistemic reasons. Attempts to use pragmatic tools, such as implicatures, to handle the apparent shifts in knowledge standards are shown to fail as well.

Intuition and Coherence in the Keystone Loop

2018 ◽  
pp. 108-130
Author(s):  
Keith Lehrer
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
Knowledge Claim ◽  
The Other ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Knowledge Claims

Is knowledge and justification a matter of isolated intuition or coherence with a background system? One intuitionist, Thomas Reid, failed to acknowledge the controversy. He argued that knowledge was a matter of first principles, which drive intuition, but also claimed that the first principles depended on each other like links in a chain, as a coherentist might. Wilfrid Sellars, a famous coherentist, argued that all knowledge was explained by coherence with a background system, but, on the other hand, conceded that some knowledge claims were justified noninferentially, as an intuitionist might. This book suggests a resolution to the conflict in terms of a kind of knowledge requiring the knower be able to defend the target knowledge claim. The defense rests on exemplar representation of experience, yielding intuition, tied together in a keystone loop within a system to defend that representation, yielding coherence.

scholarly journals How (not) to be a fallibilist: Lottery paradox and two types of epistemic contextualism

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-120
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
The World ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Inferential Contextualism ◽  
Knowledge Claims ◽  
Michael Williams ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

There is one common thing among lotteries from all over the world: there is small number of winning tickets and considerably bigger number of losing tickets. Therefore, the probability that a ticket wins a lottery is quite low, usually so low that we think that it is almost sure the ticket loses. But, we would never say that we know that a ticket will lose, until we see results of the lottery in, for example, some newspapers. And the probability of newspapers making a mistake does not seem to affect our knowledge claims. But why is that, since newspapers could make a mistake more often than a ticket wins? This question presents trouble for fallibilism, which claim that S could know that p, even when the probability that p is less than 1. Contextualist theories give their typical brand of solution: we have a change of context between the two cases, and in one case standard for knowledge claims are higher than the standard in the other case. Because of that, one can know that S lost the lottery when she reads it in newspapers. In this paper, I will present analysis of the lottery paradox, and two types of epistemic contexutalism: simple conversational contextualism and inferential contextualism. I will also present two of the most popular solution based on simple conversational contextualism, made by Lewis and Cohen. Finally, I will introduce some problems for such solutions, and show that the problems could solved if we apply strategy and explanation of inferential contextualism, type of contextualism proposed by Michael Williams.

Knowledge Claims and Landscape: Alternative Views of the Fuelwood—Degradation Nexus in Northern Nigeria

1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reginald Cline-Cole
Keyword(s):  
Social Groups ◽  
Research Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
State Agencies ◽  
Northern Nigeria ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Virtual Realities ◽  
Technologies Of Representation ◽  
The One ◽  
Knowledge Claims

The existence of competing or contradictory orthodoxies in Nigerian forestry is a long recognised, if little explored research problem. Far from being the product of a monolithic culture, regional forestry, or, more inclusively agrosilvipastoral landscapes and fuelscapes, are social products which have been described as often construed in a plurality of ways and invested with diverse if not antithetical meanings by different individuals and social groups. They represent sites of contestation and cooperation for human agents and state agencies engaged in constructing, maintaining and modifying woodfuel and other forestry-related discourses. The author juxtaposes several such contests, their meanings, and the discourses of which they are a part. He does so with particular reference to perceived linkages between fuelwood use and production, on the one hand, and vegetation and degradation and other environmental change, on the other. The geographical focus is dryland Nigeria, in particular its regional forestry spaces and landscapes. In the conceptual framework empirical theorisation is combined with discourse and landscape analyses. The author concludes that the juxtaposition of forestry discourses, which he attempts, creates spaces for different landscape visions to be seen as virtual realities, which are shaped and sustained by social forces and (technologies of) representation.

Religious Trust, Anti-Trust, and Reasons for Religious Belief

2020 ◽  
pp. 245-260
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
The Other ◽  
Religious Communities ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reason ◽  
Basic Reason ◽  
Third Person

This chapter begins by distinguishing two kinds of epistemic reasons, one irreducibly first personal, and the other third personal. Here the kinds of reasons that are irreducibly first personal are called “deliberative reasons,” and the kinds of reasons that are third personal are called “theoretical reasons.” The use of the terms “deliberative” and “theoretical” is not essential to the distinction being made, but these terms draw attention to the different functions of the two kinds of reasons in psychology. Epistemic self-trust is an irreducibly first personal epistemic reason, and it is the most basic reason of either kind. Attacks on religious belief are sometimes third personal, but sometimes they are first personal attacks on self-trust or trust in religious communities. Attacks on self-trust require a different kind of response than attacks on third person reasons.

Knowledge Attributions to Minimal Epistemic Agents

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-82
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Two Agents ◽  
Driverless Cars ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Usage Data

Widespread usage data for “know,” “learn,” “see,” “remember,” and other epistemic words are given. Such words are routinely and literally applied to animals ranging from sophisticated elephants and orcas to insects like ants and honeybees to nonconscious mechanisms like driverless cars, drones, and thermostats. Further, “S knows p” places no constraints on the agent S vis-à-vis the concepts exhibited in p: Rover need not have the concept of “cat” to know that a cat is trapped above him in a tree. How this data shows that a knowing agent need not know much, need not be self-conscious of what she knows, and need not be conscious or capable of metacognition is described. The modularity of agential knowledge is characterized: two agents may have the same sensory evidence for p, and yet one can know p while the other doesn’t because of other aspects of their methods for establishing p.

scholarly journals First Person and Third Person Reasons in Religious Epistemology

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Religious Conversion ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Religious Authority ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Religious Disagreement

In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal – what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal – what I call theoretical reasons. I argue that attending to this distinction illuminates a host of problems in epistemology in general and in religious epistemology in particular. These problems include (a) the way religious experience operates as a reason for religious belief, (b) how we ought to understand religious testimony, (c) how religious authority can be justified, (d) the problem of religious disagreement, and (e) the reasonableness of religious conversion.

Chiasmatic crossings: A reflexive revisit of a research encounter in European security

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xymena Kurowska ◽  
Benjamin C. Tallis
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Knowledge Production ◽  
Participant Observation ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Security ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Security Research ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Knowledge Claims

This article makes an argument about chiasmatic knowledge production that seeks to cut across the entrenched division between the subject and object of inquiry, on the one hand, and the narrative and normative authority of the scholar, on the other, that is inherent in most writing in international relations. We revisit our own research encounter in the field of European security to explore the premises and implications of fieldwork relationships between researchers and practitioners and show their potentially transformative effects. Classifying such engagements as acts of professional transgression by both sets of parties overlooks their promise to facilitate the understanding of security practice ‘from within’ and to provide for tangible scholarly and political criticality. It is argued that, in the restricted realm of security, extensive interaction with practitioners could be a proxy for participant observation. Yet, we look further than that. We develop a concept of ‘chiasmatic crossings’ that reflects and helps theorize the ideational give-and-take and conceptual ruptures in the process of co-authorship that are indicative of distinct trajectories in European security research. This challenges the knowledge claims and static positions of both ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ scholars in the field.

scholarly journals Epistemic injustice and epistemic positioning: towards an intersectional political economy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Bacevic
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Knowledge Production ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
Knowledge Claim ◽  
Access To Higher Education ◽  
Participation Of Women ◽  
Academic Employment ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Knowledge Claims

While access to higher education continues to expand, the participation of women and ethnic minority scholars in the academic profession remains low. This paper theorizes the relationship between identity- based epistemic judgments and the reproduction of social inequalities in the academia. It conceptualizes these judgments as acts of epistemic positioning, which entail the evaluation of knowledge claims based on the speaker’s stated or inferred identity. These judgments serve to limit the scope of the knowledge claim, making it more likely speakers will be denied recognition or credit. The paper introduces four kinds of epistemic positioning: bounding, domaining, non-attribution, and appropriation. Given the growing importance of visibility and recognition in the context of increasing competition and insecurity in academic employment, these practices play a role in the ability of underrepresented groups to remain in the academia. The paper discusses the implications of these findings for conceptualizing and addressing the relationship between social inequalities and recognition, to build towards an intersectional political economy of knowledge production.

To Engage or Not to Engage with AI for Critical Judgments: How Professionals Deal with Opacity When Using AI for Medical Diagnosis

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lebovitz ◽  
Hila Lifshitz-Assaf ◽  
Natalia Levina
Keyword(s):  
Breast Cancer ◽  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Medical Diagnosis ◽  
Knowledge Work ◽  
Bone Age ◽  
The Other ◽  
Professional Judgment ◽  
Knowledge Claims ◽  
Professional Judgments ◽  
Age Determinations

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies promise to transform how professionals conduct knowledge work by augmenting their capabilities for making professional judgments. We know little, however, about how human-AI augmentation takes place in practice. Yet, gaining this understanding is particularly important when professionals use AI tools to form judgments on critical decisions. We conducted an in-depth field study in a major U.S. hospital where AI tools were used in three departments by diagnostic radiologists making breast cancer, lung cancer, and bone age determinations. The study illustrates the hindering effects of opacity that professionals experienced when using AI tools and explores how these professionals grappled with it in practice. In all three departments, this opacity resulted in professionals experiencing increased uncertainty because AI tool results often diverged from their initial judgment without providing underlying reasoning. Only in one department (of the three) did professionals consistently incorporate AI results into their final judgments, achieving what we call engaged augmentation. These professionals invested in AI interrogation practices—practices enacted by human experts to relate their own knowledge claims to AI knowledge claims. Professionals in the other two departments did not enact such practices and did not incorporate AI inputs into their final decisions, which we call unengaged “augmentation.” Our study unpacks the challenges involved in augmenting professional judgment with powerful, yet opaque, technologies and contributes to literature on AI adoption in knowledge work.

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