Wilsonian statecraft: theory and practice of liberal internationalism during World War I

1992 ◽  
Vol 29 (07) ◽  
pp. 29-4082-29-4082
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 320-344
Author(s):  
Matthew Wilson

Sybella Gurney (1870–1926) made important and largely unrecognized contributions to British community design theory and practice. This essay begins with an exploration of her youthful social reform activities and academic influences including Leonard Hobhouse, John Ruskin, Auguste Comte, Frederic Le Play, John Stuart Mill, and Ebenezer Howard. These foundational pursuits inspired her to become an ardent cooperator affiliated with the Garden Cities movement and to serve as a sociologist seeking to kindle a “new civic spirit” for post -World War I reconstruction. Gurney, as part of an idealistic circle of thinkers which included Patrick Geddes, considered sociology as a means to realize complete Garden City-states based upon scientific, ethical, and participatory principles.


Author(s):  
Thomas P. Cavanna

In its most general sense, grand strategy can be defined as the overarching vision that shapes a state’s foreign policy and approach to national security. Like any strategy, it requires the coherent articulation of the state’s ends and means, which necessitates prioritizing vital interests, identifying key threats and opportunities, and (within certain limits) adapting to circumstances. What makes it truly “grand” is that it encompasses both wartime and peacetime, harnesses immediate realities to long-term objectives, and requires the coordination of all instruments of power (military, economic, etc.). Although American leaders have practiced grand strategic thinking since the early days of the Republic, the concept of grand strategy itself only started to emerge during World War I due to the expansion and diversification of the state’s resources and prerogatives, the advent of industrial warfare, and the growing role of populations in domestic politics and international conflicts. Moreover, it was only during World War II that it detached itself from military strategy and gained real currency among decision-makers. The contours, desirability, and very feasibility of grand strategy have inspired lively debates. However, many scholars and leaders consider it a worthy (albeit complex) endeavor that can reduce the risk of resource-squandering, signal intentions to both allies and enemies, facilitate adjustments to international upheavals, and establish a baseline for accountability. America’s grand strategy evolved from relative isolationism to full-blown liberal internationalism after 1945. Yet its conceptualization and implementation are inherently contentious processes because of political/bureaucratic infighting and recurrent dilemmas such as the uncertain geographic delimitation of US interests, the clash of ideals and Realpolitik, and the tension between unilateralism and multilateralism. The end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, China’s rise, and other challenges have further compounded those lines of fracture.


Author(s):  
Michael Matheny

The art of warfare is practiced in three levels: the strategic, operational, and tactical. Operational art refers to the military commander’s employment of force in a theater of operations to achieve strategic objectives. Operational art is inextricably linked to the planning and conduct of military campaigns in specific theaters of war, which distinguishes it from tactics and strategy. Strategy and tactics have long been studied and described, but the third level of war, the operational level, began to emerge only in the 19th century as nations began to field ever-larger armies. The maneuver of large armies or multiple armies required commanders to orchestrate large-scale maneuvers in the theater of war. During the Napoleonic Wars the aim of this maneuver was the pursuit of the decisive battle, such as Austerlitz and Waterloo. By World War I, it was clear that single battles could not yield strategic results. The armies were simply too large for single decisive battles to provide political results, and so campaigns designed to arrange a series of battles became necessary. During the interwar years, practitioners and theorists from several countries began to formalize theories of operational art. The roots of modern operational art can be traced back to World War I in which the conduct of operations in three dimensions became necessary. Historians have largely overlooked the operational level of war, but to the extent it has been studied, there is a good deal of debate on when, how, and why operational art developed. Scholarship on operational art generally falls into several categories that include current military theorists, schools of thought on the development of operational art, and campaign studies. Some historians assert that the roots of operational art lay with the development of the Prusso-German school in the 19th century. Other historians emphasize the Soviet interwar theorists as the preeminent authors of the concept. A much smaller number of scholars point to the United States contribution to operational art. In general, the study of operational art may be divided into the various schools of thought on the development of operational art, theory, and practice. Although the origins and practice of operational art have long been linked to large-scale conventional military operations, the advent of irregular warfare since 1945 has sparked a debate about the role of operational art in irregular warfare. Theorists, practitioners, and historians have wrestled with the concept of operational art in small wars and counterinsurgency. This recent interest peaked due to US counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1213-1234
Author(s):  
Rohit De

Abstract India became independent on August 15, 1947, and became a democratic republic on January 26, 1950. For the three years in between it functioned as a British dominion, where unelected Indian nationalist leaders were administered oaths in the name of the King-Emperor by a British Viceroy. While this was a critical period for establishing the Indian state, as borders were fixed, populations exchanged, industries set up, electoral lists created, and the constitution written, the legal infrastructure of dominionhood has been ignored both in scholarly literature and in political writings. Central to the article is the problem that Dominion status creates for legal temporality, a gray zone between colony and a republic. This article excavates this neglected period, arguing that it is critical to understanding both the endurance of India’s postcolonial constitution and democracy and the legal processes of decolonization within the British Empire. The article examines the peculiarities of the debate over dominion status for India after World War I. Within the British Empire, India had a legal status somewhat less than dominion but higher than a colony, due to the failure to accommodate racial difference within imperial federalism. It then investigates the reasons behind the British government and Indian nationalists both accepting Dominion status in 1947 despite having opposed it for almost two decades. Finally, it examines how the “dominion period” is both a problem and a resource for the judicial construction of time and constitutional legitimacy in republican India.


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