scholarly journals The right to refuse medical treatment and passive euthanasia

2020 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-365
Author(s):  
Tijana Đurđević
Author(s):  
Carl H. Coleman

Abstract One of the central tenets of contemporary bioethics is that mentally competent persons have a right to refuse medical treatment, even if the refusal might lead to the individual’s death. Despite this principle, laws in some jurisdictions authorize the nonconsensual treatment of persons with tuberculosis (TB) or other serious infectious diseases, on the grounds that doing so is necessary to protect the safety of others. This chapter argues that, in the vast majority of situations, overriding a refusal of treatment for infectious disease is not justifiable, as the risk to third parties can be avoided by the less restrictive alternative of isolating the patient. At the same time, it rejects the extreme position that the nonconsensual treatment of infectious disease is never appropriate. Instead, it concludes that compelling an individual to undergo treatment for infectious diseases may be ethically justifiable in exceptional situations if a refusal of treatment poses a grave risk to third parties, the treatment is not overly burdensome and has been established to be safe and effective, and less restrictive alternatives, including humanely isolating the patient, are not feasible under the circumstances. The burden should be on those seeking to compel unwanted treatment to demonstrate that these requirements have been met.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rose Louise Goss

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>


Author(s):  
Robert C. Macauley

Formerly referred to as “passive euthanasia,” forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment came to be accepted in the 1970s based on a patient’s right to privacy. In order to achieve this societal shift, the practice was clearly distinguished from active euthanasia, which was universally rejected. Over the ensuing decades, other permutations of “the right to die”—including receiving intensive pain medication at the end of life and palliative sedation—were considered and accepted to varying degrees. Modern advocates of euthanasia now argue that it is not, in fact, so different from forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment, which endangers the critical consensus that lies at the heart of the patient rights movement. Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking is also discussed, as well as the ethical equivalence of withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment.


1993 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-8
Author(s):  
Klaus M. Leisinger

There has been a tremendous increase in interest in bioethics, which has come in direct response to the substantial advances in biomedical research and medical technology over the past 30 years. The more sophisticated medical science and technology becomes, the more sophisticated are questions that are raised: Who has the right to decide whether a medical treatment should be initiated, continued, or stopped? How much information are healthcare professionals required to give to patients? When should a patient's right to confidentiality be violated? When, if ever, is active or passive euthanasia or abortion justified, and who has the right to decide on these issues?


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rose Louise Goss

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>


2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Rose Louise Goss

The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of s 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This article analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of the reasoning exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.


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