Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board

2005 ◽  
pp. 235-250
Author(s):  
Jonathan R. Strand ◽  
David P. Rapkin
Keyword(s):  
Majority Voting ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Voting Power

What Is Shareholder-Driven Corporate Governance?

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Anita Indira Anand
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Managerial Entrenchment ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Governance Reforms

This introductory chapter provides an overview of shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG). SCG is a broad-based analytical concept that refers to the trend in corporate governance whereby shareholders participate in the governance reforms that public corporations adopt. Participation is defined broadly: it does not merely refer to increases in shareholders’ direct voting power; rather, it encompasses reforms that reduce opportunities for managerial entrenchment (boards and management alike) that generally increase the ability of shareholders to become involved in the day-to-day operation of the business. After setting forth the framework for analyzing shareholders’ role in today’s corporation, the chapter outlines the distinctive features of SCG, such as majority voting and proxy access. It also looks at differences in governance regimes across a number of countries and the impact of these differences on shareholders’ interests.

Proposed Amendment of the Articles of Agreement Regarding Basic Votes - Preliminary Considerations

Policy Papers ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (68) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Low Income Countries ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
Board Of Governors ◽  
Reform Program ◽  
Specific Proposal ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Paragraph 4 of the Board of Governors Resolution on Quota and Voice Reform in the International Monetary Fund, which was adopted effective September 18, 2006 (Resolution 61-5), addresses issues relating to the reform of basic votes in the Fund. Specifically, it provides as follows: “As an integral part of the reform program, and together with its recommendations for increases in quotas under paragraph 3, the Executive Board is requested to propose to the Board of Governors an amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement that would: (a) provide for at least a doubling of the “basic” votes that each member possesses pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a) of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, and thereby at a minimum protect the existing voting share of low income countries as a group and (b) ensure that the ratio of the sum of the “basic” votes of all members to the sum of members’ total voting power remains constant following the increase under (a) above in the event of any subsequent changes in the total voting power of members. The Executive Board is requested to put forward a specific proposal by the Annual Meetings in 2007, and no later than the Annual Meetings in 2008.” This paper is intended as a first step in facilitating the Executive Board’s response to the above request of the Board of Governors. Specifically, it discusses the design of an amendment of the Articles that would ensure that the ratio of the sum of the basic votes of all members to the sum of members’ total voting power remains constant, as called for in paragraph 4(b) of Resolution 61-5, and identifies implications of such an amendment.

Proposed Amendment on the Reform of the IMF Executive Board and Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Status of Acceptances and Consents

Policy Papers ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Status Report ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
General Review ◽  
Board Of Governors ◽  
The Status ◽  
Board Reform ◽  
The Imf

This status report reviews progress toward implementation of the 2010 Governance and Quota Reforms. It updates the status of consents to the proposed quota increases under the 14th General Review of Quotas and of acceptances of the Proposed Seventh Amendment on the Reform of the Executive Board (“Board Reform Amendment” or “Seventh Amendment”) as set out in the Board of Governors Resolution No. 66-2. For the proposed quota increases under the 14th General Review of Quotas to become effective, members having not less than 70 percent of the total of quotas on November 5, 2010 must consent to the increases in their quotas and the proposed Board Reform Amendment must have entered into force. The proposed Board Reform Amendment enters into force once the Fund certifies that three-fifths of the members (i.e., currently 113 members) representing 85 percent of the total voting power have accepted the proposed amendment.

Collective Action and Governance Activism*

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 893-933 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Doidge ◽  
Alexander Dyck ◽  
Hamed Mahmudi ◽  
Aazam Virani
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Event Study ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
New Form

Abstract We examine how an investor collective action organization (ICAO) enhances activism by institutional investors. The ICAO initiated a new form of engagement—private meetings with independent directors to discuss governance proposals. Compared with a single investor acting alone, the ICAO has stronger incentives to engage in activism. Its dollar holdings and voting power are six times larger and predict direct access to the board and the firms it engages. Firms engaged by the ICAO are at least 58% more likely than non-engaged firms to adopt the ICAO’s governance proposals that include adoption of majority voting, say-on-pay, and specific compensation policies. Engaged firms also increase CEO incentive pay. An event study around the announcement of the ICAO’s formation shows a positive impact on value that increases in both dollar holdings and voting power. We conclude that institutional investors improve governance outcomes through collective action.

Proposed Amendment on the Reform of the IMF Executive Board and Fourteenth General Review of Quotas - Status of Acceptances and Consents

Policy Papers ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 (79) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Status Report ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
General Review ◽  
Board Of Governors ◽  
The Status ◽  
Board Reform ◽  
Governance Reforms ◽  
The Imf

This status report reviews progress toward implementation of the 2010 Quota and Governance Reforms. It updates the status of consents to the proposed quota increases under the 14th General Review of Quotas and of acceptances of the Proposed Seventh Amendment on the Reform of the Executive Board (“Board Reform Amendment” or “Seventh Amendment”) as set out in the Board of Governors Resolution No. 66-2. For the proposed quota increases under the 14th General Review of Quotas to become effective, members having not less than 70 percent of the total of quotas on November 5, 2010 must consent to the increases in their quotas and the proposed Board Reform Amendment must have entered into force.1 The proposed Board Reform Amendment enters into force once the Fund certifies that three-fifths of the members (i.e., currently 113 members) representing 85 percent of the total voting power have accepted the proposed amendment.

IMF Governance-Summary of Issues and Reform Options

Policy Papers ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 09 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Institutional Culture ◽  
Political Engagement ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
Governance Challenges ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Fund Governance

This paper summarizes the main governance challenges and reform options facing the IMF, drawing together the analysis and reform proposals in the reports of the Eminent Persons Group (headed by Trevor Manuel), the IEO, and a range of other recent work on Fund governance. Lest the wide scope of these inputs result in a laundry list, judgment has been exercised in selecting key issues and proposals, and in laying out some of the pros and cons. With reform of quotas/voting power on a separate track, the focus here is on the institutional framework through which members express voting power, weaknesses in which are seen by many to have eroded the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness, thereby displacing the debate and initiative to outside entities. While an overall reform package would have to include quota shares, the key proposals discussed here aim to: increase political engagement and oversight; enhance Executive Board effectiveness and representation; modify voting rules; better delineate responsibilities; open up management selection; and tackle problems with mandate and institutional culture that limit the issues and approaches taken. Civil society has expressed a range of concerns related to IMF governance, including with regard to accountability at all levels (IMFC, Executive Board, management, and staff), mechanisms for responding to complaints and feedback from the broader public, and transparency. Given the diversity of their interests, and to provide unfiltered access to CSO views, the supplement: Fourth Pillar Recommendations from Civil Society; Preliminary Summary of Principles, Issues and Recommendations; has been prepared by CSO groups.

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