scholarly journals James Harold, "Dangerous Art: On Moral Criticism of Artwork."

2022 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 236-240
Author(s):  
Panos Paris
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lisa Herzog

The Introduction sets out the problem this book addresses: organizations, in which individuals seem to be nothing but ‘cogs’, have become extremely powerful, while being apparently immune to moral criticism. Organizations—from public bureaucracies to universities, police departments, and private corporations—have specific features that they share qua organizations. They need to be opened up for normative theorizing, rather than treated as ‘black boxes’ or as elements of a ‘system’ in which moral questions have no place. The Introduction describes ‘social philosophy’ as an approach that addresses questions at the meso-level of social life, and situates it in relation to several strands of literature in moral and political philosophy. It concludes by providing a preview of the chapters of the book.


2015 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sascha Münnich

AbstractThis article examines public debates on the legitimacy of banking profits in the 2008 credit crunch. A content analysis of 957 newspaper articles published in Germany and the UK in the early weeks after the Lehman Brothers collapse examines critical statements directed at illegitimate forms of financial profit in order to identify the cultural legitimacy of financial capitalism. The conceptual framework provided by the French sociology of justification points to the role of shared orders of value as a normative reference for public discourses. In both national debates, four important boundaries for legitimate profits were drawn that concerned the problems of ownership, risk-management capacities of traders, fraudulent client relations, and speculative gambling. The meaning of this classical moral criticism of banks was transformed in the context of the 2008 crisis: a line between “normal” and “excessive” financial profits was drawn, defining an area of legitimate profit-seeking that hewed to the basic assumptions of the market model. Economic theory was used as a scheme of public economic morality. The seemingly harsh critical debate effectively reproduced a legitimate image of a functioning financial market, deflecting public attention away from the structural ambivalences of financial profit-seeking and granting legitimacy to the institutional status quo of financial capitalism.


2007 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin DRENTHEN
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
William Clare Roberts

This chapter examines part one of Capital, where Karl Marx views capitalism as a market society. It considers the moralizing discourse to which socialism was heir, according to which the market is a sphere of akrasia—incontinence, weakness, lack of self-mastery or self-control—and anarchy, drawing attention to two sets of intellectual influences. First, there is the moral criticism of the incontinence and slavishness of those who frequent the market. Second, there are the early socialist writers who rallied around the figure of Robert Owen. The chapter also discusses the continuity between Owenism and republicanism, the mystery of money and the fetishism of gold, and Marx's contributions to the socialist discourse about the market. Finally, it analyzes Marx's critique of the role played by the labor theory of value in Owenism and Proudhon.


Author(s):  
Gary Watson

This chapter addresses critical questions about Watson’s distinction between two “faces” of responsibility—responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability—addressing the nature of each and what each has to do with responsibility. Along the way, a distinction is elaborated between first-personal and second-personal forms of answerability, the first of which is implicit in attributability and the second of which is a form of accountability. The chapter bemoans the emphasis in much recent writing on reactive attitudes, narrowly construed; this ignores many of the responses that constitute holding others responsible. It also rejects the prevalent idea that moral criticism is basically a response to agents’ quality of will. This leaves out culpable and other forms of objectionable inadvertence. Finally, the chapter explains the motivation behind Watson’s earlier position on weakness of will, and why he now regards that position as misguided.


1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-51
Author(s):  
Eamonn Callan

What are the virtues that befit citizens of a liberal democracy? What moral constraints should the state respect in its sponsorship of political education? In “Political Liberalism and Political Education” I gave a partial answer to the first question; apart from a solitary footnote, I ignored the second. Yet some of my Rawls-inspired remarks about the connection between the burdens of judgment and toleration blurred the distinction between the two questions. That is unfortunate because the distinction matters.Suppose we answer the first question correctly. We might still be tempted to pursue the ends of political education with Jacobin ferocity, laying waste to all that impedes our righteous cause. That course is subject to overwhelming moral criticism. Liberals must care about freedom of conscience and not just about the freedom of the virtuous liberal conscience. Alternatively, a correct answer to the second question might coincide with a certain blindness to the importance of the first or with a tendency to confound what is properly tolerated in a liberal democracy with what is rightly deemed virtuous. Liberals cannot afford to be indifferent to the virtues that are distinctive of the liberal conscience or to neglect the educational practices that would nourish them. If a self-defeating cultural aggressiveness is the vice of some who are fixated by the first question, an equally destructive cultural complacency is the besetting sin of those who take the second question seriously without having a credible answer to the first.


2011 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

Patriotism is subject to searing moral criticism, but is it necessarily a vice? The article offers a conditional defense of patriotism. It acknowledges that even at its best, patriotism is a dangerous virtue and prone to abuse. Nevertheless, we ought to acknowledge the truth that a just patriotism is possible, and we should seek to specify and bring about its conditions. Just as it is permissible to form deep attachments to imperfect others, so, too, it is not always wrong to feel a special attachment to and responsibility for one’s own country. Even so, addressing patriotism’s manifest dangers requires enacting practical institutional reforms. These include greater protections for rights of political dissent and contestation, insulating the school curriculum from politicization and bringing more attention to the nation’s shortcomings, and greatly expanding the role of international institutions and perspectives which furnish a salutary check on national self-preference.


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