Second Thoughts

This chapter addresses critical questions about Watson’s distinction between two “faces” of responsibility—responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability—addressing the nature of each and what each has to do with responsibility. Along the way, a distinction is elaborated between first-personal and second-personal forms of answerability, the first of which is implicit in attributability and the second of which is a form of accountability. The chapter bemoans the emphasis in much recent writing on reactive attitudes, narrowly construed; this ignores many of the responses that constitute holding others responsible. It also rejects the prevalent idea that moral criticism is basically a response to agents’ quality of will. This leaves out culpable and other forms of objectionable inadvertence. Finally, the chapter explains the motivation behind Watson’s earlier position on weakness of will, and why he now regards that position as misguided.

Moral and Criminal Responsibility

Drawing on Gary Watson’s seminal work on responsibility, this chapter focuses on what he calls accountability. It distinguishes (in section 8.1), answerability from liability, and then concentrates on answerability, which operates, it argues (contra David Shoemaker), analogously in both moral and legal contexts. It discusses (in section 8.2) the way in which answerability requires us to attend to the capacities of the person whom we hold responsible, not just at the time of the conduct for which he is now being held responsible, but at the time of the holding. In section 8.3, it then attends to some implications of the requirement that when we hold someone answerable, we must be ready to listen to their answer. Finally, in section 8.4, it tackles the issue of standing: what gives us the right to call another person to account; and what can undermine that standing—with what implications?

Introduction

In this brief introduction, the editors summarize the motivation for the coming together of these chapters—which is to celebrate the work and philosophical legacy of Gary Watson—as well as the content of each contribution. Michael McKenna builds on and systematizes several key elements of Watson’s views on agency and responsibility. Susan Wolf extends elements of Watson’s oeuvre, notably the relationship between the way agents are responsible for their actions and the kind of response licensed by those actions. Pamela Hieronymi goes on from Watson’s work to offer her own account of what blame’s about. R. Jay Wallace is also concerned with Watson’s overall conception of moral responsibility, understanding blame to be an incipient form of moral address. Michael Smith continues the theme, offering a possible theory of moral responsibility similarly grounded in the reactive emotions. T. M. Scanlon continues a debate that Scanlon and Watson have been having over the moral status of psychopaths. Jeanette Kennett argues that psychopaths are not accountable for their actions in the sense required for moral blameworthiness; and that psychopaths’ actions are not attributable to them so as to make them plausibly criminal. Antony Duff extends Watson’s work on moral responsibility to the domain of criminal responsibility. Gideon Yaffe seeks to better understand the prospects of Watson’s account of addiction. Gary Watson himself offers his current account of the distinction between the two faces of responsibility and thoughts on weakness of will and negligence. Finally, a 2016 interview of Watson by Sarah Buss is a wide-ranging and significant discussion of Gary’s personal history and philosophical development.

I’ll Bet You Think This Blame is About You

In his landmark “Two Faces of Responsibility,” Gary Watson suggested that one face of responsibility evaluates agents and actions against standards of virtue while another concerns holding one another accountable through, e.g., demands and sanctions. This chapter elaborates the idea of a sanction before noting that many responses to moral failing fall between evaluation (a kind of belief) and sanction (a voluntary action). Being responsible also involves being subject to a variety of reactions that are “non-voluntary” in a sense here explained. The non-voluntariness of these reactions has two important upshots: First, questions about their justification are complex, in ways here examined. Second, unlike sanctions, they are not well thought of as burdens voluntarily imposed upon the wrongdoer by the responder. By overlooking the non-voluntariness of many reactions to moral failure, we risk misunderstanding the significance of those reactions. In an important sense, they are not about the wrongdoer, but rather about the one wronged.

Competence, Attributability, and Blame

This chapter takes up the question of whether psychopaths can legitimately be held morally accountable, and the resolution of these issues developed is subtle. First it argues that psychopaths are not accountable for their actions in the sense required for moral blameworthiness. Second, it argues that psychopaths’ actions are not attributable to them in the way that would make them fitting targets of the criminal law. The assertion that attributability is not a face of responsibility is explored and justified. The chapter, while respecting Watson and authors who have followed him in the enquiry into the crucially important attributability ‘face’ of responsibility, also offers a somewhat revisionary account of the ethical significance of attributability and the role of the reactive attitudes in social and moral life.

Learning from Psychopaths

The chapter examines arguments offered by Gary Watson, drawing on the case of psychopaths, for broadening the conditions of moral responsibility that are required for reactive attitudes such as resentment. These broader conditions include what Watson calls accountability as well as attributability. Focusing mainly on ‘negative’ reactive attitudes, of which a few examples are given, there is an examination of associated conditions of responsibility, and in some depth, of Watson’s argument for accountability as a condition for responsibility; the case of psychopaths is the vehicle for this examination.

Watsonian Compatibilism

This chapter provides a compatibilist theory of freedom and responsibility built from key elements of Gary Watson’s important essays on these topics. Its aim is the construction of something like a Watsonian theory of freedom and responsibility, using important elements of Watson’s views— preserving his centrally important proposed mesh theory—but also departing from them at critical points. Three features of Watson’s work are addressed. First, that acting freely is explained in terms of acting in accord with one’s evaluative commitments. Second, that Watson’s view is a version of a reasons-responsive theory. The chapter examines his notion of responsiveness or sensitivity to reasons and looks at how it differs from those of others who have developed a reasons-responsive view? Third, Watson’s deepening of our understanding of moral responsibility, by way of both his critical assessment of Strawson’s views and his own work on the topic. How should we understand morally responsible agency in light of his contributions?

Attributability and the Self

This chapter offers a close reading of Gary Watson’s important article “Two Faces of Responsibility.” It aims to disambiguate and revise the notions of attributability and accountability that Watson’s essay introduced and to clarify the relation between them. It distinguishes mere negative descriptions of an individual from negative attitudes toward that individual, and further distinguishes negative attitudes that constitute criticism from other attitudes that constitute blame. Accepting Watson’s idea that an act or trait is attributable to someone just in case it discloses a feature of an agent’s self, the essay argues that attributability (of a fault) is sufficient to justify criticism of an individual; blame and public sanctions, by contrast, require accountability.

Transcript of an Interview with Gary Watson

This is a transcript of an interview with Gary Watson conducted by Sarah Buss on November 3, 2016. It commences with some autobiographical context: Watson became interested in philosophy after high school upon meeting a philosophy major at an artist’s colony. The study of political philosophy drew him into considering freedom and responsibility, and autonomy. The case of Harris is covered as an investigation of normative competency. Problems with the notion of weak will and self-control are discussed. Asked for any important changes in his thinking, Watson responds that he conflated issues of autonomy and of responsibility; this bears also on responsibility in a weak-willed agent. Finally, Watson asserts that freedom is not just about responsibility; it’s also about having a capacity to direct your life in a certain way. He hopes to investigate this further.

Compromised Addicts

The chapter seeks to better understand the prospects of Watson’s account of addiction. In particular, it is concerned with the question of how addiction can weaken the demand that the addict comply with otherwise legitimate demands. Watson answers this question by pointing to the way in which addictive desires distract attention in a way that makes it unreasonable to expect addicts to comply with legitimate demands with the same alacrity with which we expect non-addicts to comply with such demands. Demurring, the chapter argues instead that the expectation that addicts comply with otherwise legitimate demands is weakened because, for the addict, wholehearted effort to comply is simply not possible.