Salutogenesis and Mental Health Promotion in Military Settings

This chapter centers on salutogenic work in military settings in the context of mental health promotion. The author opens with a personal account of how he found himself engaging in salutogenic research within a military setting, and touches upon some moral questions that this research arena brings up. The author then describes negative consequences of military service, as a background for discussing some salutogenically oriented programs intended to enhance mental fitness of soldiers, accompanied by empirical research findings. Finally, the author suggests some insights and recommendations for further applications of salutogenesis in military settings.

Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers

Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future selves are our epistemic superiors in such cases, moral philosophers are epistemic superiors in moral matters more generally since their epistemic advantages are even more significant. The author concludes by arguing that moral philosophers plausibly even qualify as moral experts.

“As Different . . . as Light Is from Darkness”

This chapter argues that the clergy’s overall perspective on political resistance remained consistent, even as political loyalties shifted with the Declaration of Independence in 1776. John Witherspoon, the leading clergyman to publicly support independence, remained consistent in his rejection of political absolutism and his belief in the doctrine of resistance. He did not agree with the perspective of Thomas Paine and other political radicals but argued for resistance along the lines of his own theological tradition. Support for political independence, it is argued, should not be viewed as signaling a broader shift in Witherspoon’s ethical and philosophical views. He did not embrace a secular understanding of moral virtue held by philosophers like Francis Hutcheson. His moral philosophy and approach to moral questions remained consistent with his own theological tradition, and no major shift needs to be asserted in this regard.

Synthetic Biology: Old and New Dilemmas—The Case of Artificial Life

This article aims to examine some of the ethical questions emerging from the use of already existing biotechnological tools and the issues which might occur by synthetic biology’s potential future possibilities. In the first part, the essence of synthetic biology and its relation to the contemporary biotechnological research is analyzed. In the second part, the article examines whether the new biotechnological inventions pose new or revive old moral questions about the ethics of science, engineering, and technology in general. After briefly addressing some of the various issues which are raised by experts, philosophers, but also the general public, concerning synthetic biology in general, it focuses on the topic of “artificial life creation” and presents moral reasons which may or may not allow it. The topic is approached by referring to consequentialist, deontological, but also, virtue theory arguments for and against it and the possibility of a partial permission of “artificial life” experiments, asking whether the benefits outweigh the risks and moral implications is explored. Finally, it proposes an argument in favor of the future exploration of biological innovation, underlying the need for a more balanced access to its beneficial results.

The ethics of interaction with neurorobotic agents: a case study with BabyX

As AI advances, models of simulated humans are becoming increasingly realistic. A new debate has arisen about the ethics of interacting with these realistic agents—and in particular, whether any harms arise from ‘mistreatment’ of such agents. In this paper, we advance this debate by discussing a model we have developed (‘BabyX’), which simulates a human infant. The model produces realistic behaviours—and it does so using a schematic model of certain human brain mechanisms. We first consider harms that may arise due to effects on the user—in particular effects on the user’s behaviour towards real babies. We then consider whether there’s any need to consider harms from the ‘perspective’ of the simulated baby. The first topic raises practical ethical questions, many of which are empirical in nature. We argue the potential for harm is real enough to warrant restrictions on the use of BabyX. The second topic raises a very different set of questions in the philosophy of mind. Here, we argue that BabyX’s biologically inspired model of emotions raises important moral questions, and places BabyX in a different category from avatars whose emotional behaviours are ‘faked’ by simple rules. This argument counters John Danaher’s recently proposed ‘moral behaviourism’. We conclude that the developers of simulated humans have useful contributions to make to debates about moral patiency—and also have certain new responsibilities in relation to the simulations they build.

Forgiveness

This chapter introduces the notion of forgiveness. It discusses the nature of forgiveness, including foundational issues such as moral wrongdoing, moral blameworthiness, and standing to forgive. It articulates several accounts of the nature of forgiveness, including emotion accounts, revenge and punishment-forbearance accounts, and performative accounts, and discusses the difference between monist and pluralist accounts. Turning to the norms of forgiveness, the chapter discusses several moral questions raised in the philosophical literature on forgiveness. The chapter concludes by summarizing and contextualizing the chapters in this volume.

Combatants, Non-Combatants, and the Question of Innocence

Chapter 4 tackles issues surrounding the concept of combatant/non-combatant and the related notions of guilt/innocence, and the connection of these to the soldier/civilian distinction. The investigation is partly conceptual, but it also inevitably raises moral questions and their significance, since the tactical definition’s reliance upon such concepts relates immediately to the moral assessments enshrined in the just war principle of discrimination, which prohibits the direction of lethal violence at non-combatants and reflects a wider moral principle that prohibits violence against the innocent. Whether one or both of these principles should be rejected, modified, or allow of exceptions are further questions addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. The present chapter requires extended discussion of contemporary debates within the complex just war tradition, particularly between those loosely styled “traditionalist” and “revisionist.” It offers a judgment on the debate and discusses its relation to the author’s account of the nature of terrorist acts.

La fonction créative du stéréotype dans le récit bref en France au XVIe siècle

In premodern literature, stereotype, called locus communis, had to play an important role inherited from Greek and Latin Antiquity’s rhetorics. In particular, it served as source of convincing arguments appropriate to discuss philosophical, theological or moral questions. The concept of common place has also found its use in short stories of 16th century. Firstly, in the realm of invention, when authors adapted narrative plots taken from written tradition; secondly, in the realm of elocution, when they employed topic images and sentences. The aim of this paper is to elucidate those two meanings of stereotype in French nouvelles published in that time.

Religious Affiliation and Conceptions of the Moral Domain

What is the relationship between religious affiliation and conceptions of the moral domain? Putting aside the question of whether people from different religions agree about how to answer moral questions, here we investigate a more fundamental question: How much disagreement is there across religions about which issues count as moral in the first place? That is, do people from different religions conceptualize the scope of morality differently? Using a new methodology to map out how individuals conceive of the moral domain, we find dramatic differences among adherents of different religions. Mormon and Muslim participants moralized their religious norms, while Jewish participants did not. Hindu participants in our sample did not seem to make a moral/non-moral distinction of the same kind. These results suggest a profound relationship between religious affiliation and conceptions of the scope of the moral domain.

Wir müssen abwägen – aber wie sollen wir abwägen?

The global Covid-19 crisis raises at least three moral questions, which my contribution answers as follows: (1) Which patient should get treatment according to triage criteria? The patient whose treatment has the best prospect of success. (2) How should we resolve the conflict between public health measures and economic needs? Public health should have priority, but reaches its limits where the individual right to stay afloat through one’s own work is violated. (3) How should we resolve the conflict between public health measures and civil liberties? Public health should have priority, but reaches its limits where the restriction of freedom violates the integrity of individual health and personal freedom. The answers and the arguments behind these are developed through the discussion of a wide range of current public health policies, concrete measures, and competing approaches to moral questions in the Covid-19 pandemic.