8. Language, Universals, and the Limits of Knowledge

1973 ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

Opponents of Kant suppose he thinks that autonomy gives rational beings a special kind of intrinsic value. Since knowledge of intrinsic values would have to be a kind of metaphysical knowledge, this interpretation is contrary to Kant’s strictures on the limits of knowledge. Rather, Kant thinks that only rational beings can engage in reciprocal lawmaking, which is the source of moral laws. Animals cannot obligate us in the sense of participating in making laws for us. This, however, ignores a second sense in which we can have duties to animals: the laws we make for the treatment of people might also cover the treatment of animals. The chapter ends by explaining why it is hard to get this kind of conclusion using the universalization test.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Aronoff ◽  
Jonathan Rawski ◽  
Wendy Sandler ◽  
Iris Berent

Spoken and signed languages differ because of the affordances of the human body and the limits of each medium. But can commonalities between the two be compared to find abstract language universals?


1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Fetzer

Perhaps no technological innovation has so dominated the second half of the twentieth century as has the introduction of the programmable computer. It is quite difficult if not impossible to imagine how contemporary affairs—in business and science, communications and transportation, governmental and military activities, for example—could be conducted without the use of computing machines, whose principal contribution has been to relieve us of the necessity for certain kinds of mental exertion. The computer revolution has reduced our mental labors by means of these machines, just as the Industrial Revolution reduced our physical labor by means of other machines.


2008 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 455-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian S. Wisnicki

When he sighted the southern end of Lake Victoria on 3 August 1858, John Hanning Speke (1859b:397) realized that he had discovered the “source” of the White Nile, the most important tributary of the Nile proper, and so had “almost, if not entirely, solved a problem which it has been the first geographical desideratum of many thousand years to ascertain, and the ambition of the first monarchs of the world to unravel.” That Speke was an unknown explorer and that he had made his discovery on a solo “flying trip” during the East African Expedition of 1856-59, which, under the command of the renowned explorer Richard Francis Burton, had already also discovered Lake Tanganyika, made Speke's accomplishment all the more remarkable.As contemporaries soon asserted, Speke's discovery culminated a historical series of excursions, real and imagined, into the interior of Africa and placed Speke at the pinnacle of a line of explorers and geographers that ran from Herodotus, Julius Caesar, and Ptolemy to, in more recent times, James Bruce (the Scotsman who “discovered” the source of the Blue Nile, the second most important tributary of the Nile, in 1770), the German missionaries Ludwig Krapf and Johannes Rebmann (who “discovered,” respectively, the snow-capped mountains of Kilimanjaro in 1848 and Kenya in 1849), and noted “armchair geographers” like W.D. Cooley, Charles Beke, and James M'Queen.


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