CENTRAL AUTHORITY COOPERATION UNDER THE BRUSSELS II TER REGULATION

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-200
Author(s):  
Mirela Župan ◽  
Christian Hoehn ◽  
Ulrike Kluth
Keyword(s):  
2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Abid Ullah Jan

The Debate Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.


Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury

This chapter provides an informal rationalist model of state formation as an exchange between a central authority and a population. In the model, the central authority protects the population against external threats and the population disarms and pays taxes. The model specifies the conditions under which the exchange is self-enforcing, meaning that the parties prefer the exchange to alternative courses of action. These conditions—costly but winnable interstate war—are historically rare, and the cost of such wars can rise beyond the population’s willingness to sacrifice. At this point, the population prefers to avoid war rather than fight it and may prefer an alternative institution to the state if that institution can prevent war and reduce the level of extraction. Thus the modern centralized state is self-undermining rather than self-enforcing. A final section addresses alternative explanations for state formation.


Author(s):  
Mathias Schmoeckel

Abstract Leges fundamentals: Laws Higher than Others? Their Development from the Concept to the Term. This article investigates the tradition of laws with a higher, central authority, which can be found in the Christian tradition from the Middle Ages to the 16th century, when the Calvinist party finally coined the term “loi fondamentale”. The contrast to other national discussions shows the different starting points and contents of a notion, which rapidly became a common European heritage and merged with the equally new concept of “constitution”.


1990 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Dean

In his celebrated presidential addresses to the Royal Historical Society between 1974 and 1976 Sir Geoffrey Elton explored three “points of contact” between central authority and local communities: Parliament, the royal council, and the royal court. Parliament, he argued, was “the premier point of contact,” which “fulfilled its functions as a stabilizing mechanism because it was usable and used to satisfy legitimate and potentially powerful aspirations.” Elsewhere Elton, and other parliamentary historians such as Michael Graves, Norman Jones, and Jennifer Loach, have stressed parliament's role as a clearing house for the legislative desires of the governing class. The author of this article has recently drawn attention to the pressures which private legislation placed on the parliamentary agenda and the attempts by the government to control it. All of this supports Elton's contention that parliament, from the perspective of central government, was indeed a vital means of ensuring stability and channelling grievances.However, few studies have viewed parliament from the perspective of the local communities and governing elites who sought parliamentary solutions to their problems or even parliamentary resolutions to their disputes with others. The major exception to this has been London. Helen Miller's seminal study of London and parliament in the reign of Henry VIII and Edwin Green's on the Vintners lobby, have been recently complemented by Ian Archer's on the London lobbies in Elizabeth's reign, Claude Blair's on the Armourers lobby, and my own study of the struggle between the Curriers and Cordwainers. These not only reveal the broader context of such disputes, but emphasize that parliament was only one of many arenas available to participants. This important point has also been stressed by Robert Tittler in his study of parliament as a “point of contact” for English towns.


1922 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-454
Author(s):  
Ben A. Arneson

When a central authority orders a local subordinate government to take a certain course of action under penalty, it is more than likely that the enforcement of the order will lead to difficulties, and it may even result in open defiance on the part of the local government. The effect is very different, however, when the central authority merely establishes a standard and promises to turn over cold cash to the local units which meet the standard. With governmental units as with individuals, rewards for work properly done are more likely to produce desirable results than punishment for failure to obey orders.


T oung Pao ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 107 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 40-94
Author(s):  
Pak-sheung Ng

Abstract The disintegration of Tang central authority and the resultant spawning of local strongmen (tuhao 土豪) shaped the socio-political nature of Yang Xingmi’s 楊行密 (852–905) bloc. Generally speaking, blocs founded by tuhao had generally been characterized by provincialism, but Yang Xingmi managed to avoid excessive reliance on a particular geographical origin. How to handle the challenges posed by recalcitrant meritorious officials was also of major concern to Yang Xingmi, and later Xu Wen 徐溫 (862–927), in the process of consolidating their authority. Thanks to a strong central army, rebellions initiated by ambitious meritorious officials were suppressed. In addition to finding methods for subjugating Yang’s recalcitrant meritorious officials, Xu Wen needed to address challenges posed by local strongmen; this article serves as a case study on the methodology of using genealogical records to examine the dynamics instrumental in shaping local history.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 170-171
Author(s):  
N. E. Anikeeva

Catalonia’s historical fate, the peculiarities of regional history drawn against the background of relations with the Spanish capital and, thus, the Catalan separatism are the issues examined in Ramón Tamames’ book that has appeared in its seventh edition in 2018. Showing both diachronic and comparative perspectives, the work of Prof. Tamames provides fruitful insights into modern traces of centurieslasting complex, complicated, if not to say tense attitudes of the Spanish government to Barcelona and local visions of the central authority. The new edition of the book embraces the nuances of this phenomenon in the period from the rise of the unified Spanish monarchy in 1479 up to the 2017 controversial independence referendum. According to the findings of Prof. Tamames, Catalonia’s independence project lacks legitimacy in many ways and, consequently, is absurd. This issue is growing in importance now, in the wake of the coronavirus crisis shaking the precarious balance of Spain’s center-region relations.


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