On distribution densities of algebraic points under different height functions

In the article we consider the spatial distribution of points, whose coordinates are conjugate algebraic numbers of fixed degree. The distribution is introduced using a height function. We have obtained universal upper and lower bounds of the distribution density of such points using an arbitrary height function. We have shown how from a given joint density function of coefficients of a random polynomial of degree n, one can construct such a height function H that the polynomials q of degree n uniformly chosen under H[q] ≤1 have the same distribution of zeros as the former random polynomial.

On the waiting times to repeated hits of cells by particles for the polynomial allocation scheme

We consider random polynomial allocations of particles over N cells. Let τk, k ≥ 1, be the minimal number of trials when k particles hit the occupied cells. For the case N → ∞ the limit distribution of the random variable $\tau_k/\sqrt{N}$is found. An example of application of τk is given.

Random Perturbations of Matrix Polynomials

A sum of a large-dimensional random matrix polynomial and a fixed low-rank matrix polynomial is considered. The main assumption is that the resolvent of the random polynomial converges to some deterministic limit. A formula for the limit of the resolvent of the sum is derived, and the eigenvalues are localised. Four instances are considered: a low-rank matrix perturbed by the Wigner matrix, a product HX of a fixed diagonal matrix H and the Wigner matrix X and two special matrix polynomials of higher degree. The results are illustrated with various examples and numerical simulations.

On Equilibrium Properties of the Replicator–Mutator Equation in Deterministic and Random Games

In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator–mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Descartes’ rule of signs, we provide a formula to compute the number of equilibria in multi-player games via the number of change of signs in the coefficients of a polynomial. For two-player social dilemmas (namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snow Drift, Stag Hunt and Harmony), we characterize (stable) equilibrium points and analytically calculate the probability of having a certain number of equilibria when the payoff entries are uniformly distributed. For multi-player random games whose pay-offs are independently distributed according to a normal distribution, by employing techniques from random polynomial theory, we compute the expected or average number of internal equilibria. In addition, we perform extensive simulations by sampling and averaging over a large number of possible payoff matrices to compare with and illustrate analytical results. Numerical simulations also suggest several interesting behaviours of the average number of equilibria when the number of players is sufficiently large or when the mutation is sufficiently small. In general, we observe that introducing mutation results in a larger average number of internal equilibria than when mutation is absent, implying that mutation leads to larger behavioural diversity in dynamical systems. Interestingly, this number is largest when mutation is rare rather than when it is frequent.

Persistence probability of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory

We obtain an asymptotic formula for the persistence probability in the positive real line of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory. It corresponds to the probability that a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game has no internal equilibria. The key ingredient is to approximate the sequence of random polynomials indexed by their degrees by an appropriate centered stationary Gaussian process.