Nordic indicators for cooperation on disability – Monitoring the implementation of UNCRPD and Agenda 2030

No person with a disability shall be left behind. This report presents suggested indicators for monitoring the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability and Agenda 2030 in the Nordic region. The vision of the Nordic cooperation is to become the most integrated and sustainable in the world by 2030. The vision mirrors the sustainable development goals of Agenda 2030, according to which no-one shall be left behind. Persons with disabilities have the right to inclusion, and the Nordic countries monitor the developments of living conditions for persons with disabilities. All countries have also ratified the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and have high ambitions with regard to Agenda 2030. Throughout the region we face similar challenges concerning inclusion. Participation is not equal, not in employment, nor in education, economy, or health. But to improve this we need to see it. Even if a set of indicators is not the only way forward, they can help us measure if we are on the right track. In this report, we suggest a set of indicators that could be developed further and used to follow the developments towards inclusion and measure living conditions. By developing such a set of comparable indicators in the Nordic countries, we can see whether the countries separately and collectively follow the intentions of the UNCRPD to improve the living conditions of people with disabilities. The indicators are also an aid in the work to identify whether we are working correctly to achieve the Agenda 2030 targets.

Nordic and European Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters

Judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the Nordic states has traditionally been extensive. This cooperation has included matters of extradition, legal assistance in regard to evidence, transfer of the enforcement of punishments and transfer of criminal proceedings and criminal jurisdiction. Since the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first century, the Nordic cooperation agreements have to a rather significant degree been replaced or complemented by EU legislation. Nevertheless, the Nordic agreements continue to be of relevance in many aspects, which gives rise to a rather complicated system of interwoven legal frameworks. This contribution aims to point out legal similarities and differences as well as overlaps between these frameworks, but also to elaborate on the characteristics of the Nordic cooperation as compared to the EU regulated cooperation system. It is specifically argued that the reason for the success of the Nordic cooperation is the mutual trust that the Nordic states share. However, this trust differs somewhat from the trust that is presumed to exist also between the EU Member States.

The Nordic Council of Ministers: Aspirations for More Political Relevance

Due to changing circumstances and new challenges, the Nordic Council of Ministers underwent an incremental process of change and some modest transformation since the 1990s. However, there has never been a major overhaul of structures and contents owing to considerable inertia. The most recent modernisation process, aiming at more political relevance and flexibility, has been ambitious but whether it has been a success remains unclear thus far. Weaknesses and limits in cooperation in the Nordic Council of Ministers are obvious, i.e., no majority voting or ‘opting-out’ system, a lack in supra-national structures and policies and no common immigration, foreign, security and EU policies. Nonetheless, the organisation has at least some relevance and meaning for the Nordic countries and the potential to promote and facilitate cooperation in policy areas in which common interests exist, such as environment, climate, research and social affairs. Therefore, rather than constituting a common political order of its own, Nordic cooperation, as it is conducted within the Nordic Council of Ministers, is best characterized by differentiated integration, promoting full integration only to a limited extent but respecting integration to different extents and speeds by fostering cooperation and coordination of certain policies where possible and desired.

New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe: Does the New Hanseatic League Revive Nordic Political Cooperation?

As Brexit removes the Nordic countries’ most powerful ally from the EU, what does this imply for their approach to European affairs? The literature on small states within the EU suggests that they can counterbalance limited bargaining capacities by entering two types of alliances: strategic partnerships with bigger member states and institutionalised cooperation on a regional basis. Against this backdrop we ask whether, by significantly raising the costs of non-cooperation for Nordic governments, the Brexit referendum has triggered a revival of Nordic political cooperation. We scrutinise this conjecture by analysing Nordic strategies of coalition-building on EU financial and budgetary policy, specifically looking at attempts to reform Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union and proposals to strengthen the EU’s fiscal powers. We find that Nordic governments have successfully collaborated on these issues in the context of new alliances such as the ‘New Hanseatic League’ or the ‘Frugal Four.’ Yet, their coalition-building strategies rely on relatively loose and issue-specific alliances rather than an institutionalisation of Nordic political cooperation, implying that this revival of Nordic political cooperation hardly involves the institutions of ‘official’ Nordic cooperation. We argue that this reflects lasting differences among the Nordics’ approach to the EU as well as electorates’ scepticism about supranational institution-building, implying that ‘reluctant Europeans’ are often also ‘reluctant Scandinavians.’

The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States

Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.

Public Administration and the Study of Political Order: Towards a Framework for Analysis

The contribution of this study is two-fold: First, it outlines a conceptual framework on political order; and secondly, it offers empirical illustrations on the case of Nordic cooperation. Taken together, the article makes a plea for public administration scholarship in the study of political order. Political order consists of a relatively stable arrangement of institutions that are fairly formalized and institutionalized. A common political order, moreover, entails that relevant institutions: (i) are fairly independent of pre-existing institutions; (ii) are relatively integrated and internally cohesive; and (iii) are reasonably able to influence governance processes within other institutions. The article empirically suggests that Nordic-level institutions are less likely to act relatively integrated and independently of member-state governments as well as being able to wield significant influence on public governance processes within member-state institutions.