Differentiated Integration: Project Competition and Contradictions of the EU Integration Process

Introduction. In 2017 the European Commission proposed five scenarios for the future of the EU, one of which was ‘those who want to do more do more’. However, it was not specific enough and ignored the variability of this way of integration. Methods and materials. Ignoring the characteristics of various types of differentiated integration is a common problem in scientific research, which leads to uncertainty and incorrect conclusions. This is largely due to the fact that researchers miss the analysis of interests and the negotiation process, focusing more on finding a common institutional design for all participants of integration. The intergovernmentalism that sees differentiated integration as a special institutional design that helps overcome the impasse in negotiations caused by the growing heterogeneity of member states is lacking. This approach has the potential for research and planning of integration processes in other regions, especially in the Post-Soviet space. Analysis. The article shows that differentiated integration has a long tradition in the EU, but that has little relation to the projects of the European future discussed in recent years (often with the same name). We have focused on the differences in the positions of European governments and groups of countries, trying to explain their motives and to answer the question of whether an intergovernmental approach is justified. The greatest attention is paid to French-German discussions, analysis of the UK’s role prior to EU secession, and the special stand of Scandinavian and Central-Eastern European countries. Results. The author concludes that the discussions on differentiated integration are not so much a search for unity in diversity, but are aimed at achieving ambitions, redistributing resources and fight against dirigisme. However, EU reform challenges integration leaders to choose between unprecedented concessions and the need to ignore the positions of many countries. In addition to EU heterogeneity, it also helps to exclude alternatives to differentiation in the future. Since the change of leadership in 2019, the EU has entered a new stage in its development, but there is nothing to suggest that its members are able to find common approaches. For the first time it is not possible to formulate a common compromise out of a wide variety of future options, and an attempt to avoid reform could aggravate the crisis of the integration process.

Setting the Scene

· Changing rationales for European integration. The initial rationales for integration seem less cogent and less resonant. Are they still at the core of the ‘project’? Which newer rationales need to be taken into account? Because of their cogency? Because of their resonance? · Facing up to both internal and external challenges: a huge agenda across political, economic, societal, and security concerns. · Differing narratives. Growth of Euroscepticism and Eurocriticism, though in differing manifestations. How far do these phenomena reflect transversal European factors? How far are they the product of different country characteristics and cultures? Is there a space to construct a shared European narrative? How does the new ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’ fit into this set of issues? · Diverse needs and aspirations. From 6 to 27(8) members with a variety of features political, economic, and societal—and geographic. Is differentiated integration the way forward or are other approaches needed to strike an accepted balance between the country level and the European level of practice? The old discussion of subsidiarity seems no longer to offer potential solutions. The capability to absorb yet more member states is contested. · Can political, economic, and societal concerns be aligned? Initial successes of the EC were very much tied to clever ways in which these different concerns were taken into the process. Can a successor version of pluri-dimensional integration be achieved based on diffuse reciprocity—cross-temporal and cross-sectoral? Or will the EU shift towards a more fragmented version of specific reciprocity based on sector by sector cost–benefit analyses?

Opting for opt outs? - Untangling the role of identity in shaping support for differentiated integration

A large literature investigates support for European integration. However, only recently have public opinion scholars turned their focus to public perceptions of differentiated modes of integration. This article contributes to this growing literature by investigating whether exclusively national identities lead to a demand for more differentiated integration at the EU level, regardless of individual views of the question of EU membership. Using survey data from 2020, I show that solely identifying with one’s nation-state does not increase support for temporally or functionally differentiated European integration in any substantive way. However, it appears to be a key motivator of support for differentiation among those opposing EU membership. This suggests that those most concerned with sovereignty are no more likely than others to support a more differentiated EU. It also suggests that a more differentiated future EU may not be enough to stem constraining dissensus at the popular level.

Differentiated integration in the EU: What does Croatia want?

This article presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration (DI) from the perspective of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Considering DI’s relevance for the future of EU integration as well as the fact that DI was de facto adopted by the Croatian governments in order to maintain a healthy relationship with the EU, the main assumption is that DI – as a broad and multifaceted integration phenomenon – appears prominently in the domestic political discourse. By employing text mining and sentiment analysis on a corpus of 376 various governmental documents we answer, do governments talk about DI and specific DI mechanisms at a conceptual level? Which differentiated policy fields do they talk about most often? Our results show that DI has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments over the last 15 years, which is surprising considering that over this period, Croatia consolidated its position in the EU in the shadow of the ‘polycrisis’, also thanks to DI.

The European Semester and Parliamentary Oversight Institutions Inside and Outside of the Euro Area

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute <em>necessary conditions</em> for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.