Minimal physicalism as a scale-free substrate for cognition and consciousness

Theories of consciousness and cognition that assume a neural substrate automatically regard phylogenetically basal, nonneural systems as nonconscious and noncognitive. Here, we advance a scale-free characterization of consciousness and cognition that regards basal systems, including synthetic constructs, as not only informative about the structure and function of experience in more complex systems but also as offering distinct advantages for experimental manipulation. Our “minimal physicalist” approach makes no assumptions beyond those of quantum information theory, and hence is applicable from the molecular scale upwards. We show that standard concepts including integrated information, state broadcasting via small-world networks, and hierarchical Bayesian inference emerge naturally in this setting, and that common phenomena including stigmergic memory, perceptual coarse-graining, and attention switching follow directly from the thermodynamic requirements of classical computation. We show that the self-representation that lies at the heart of human autonoetic awareness can be traced as far back as, and serves the same basic functions as, the stress response in bacteria and other basal systems.

A Threat for Physicalism: a new Gedankenexperiment

We present a new thought experiment that raises a threat for Minimal Physicalism, i.e. the thesis according to which mental properties supervene on physical properties. Our proposal is an example of the so called hard problems in philosophy of mind, in particular the problem of maximal consciousness. We do not however presuppose anything about its very nature apart from the minimal, weak assumption that it is determined by first order mental properties. We argue that (i) either Minimal Physicalism is unable to give an adequate account of the new thought experiment we present or (ii) has to explain the fact that two numerically distinct but physically indistinguishable individuals have different maximal consciousness due to their spatial location. We contend that this last conclusion is strongly at variance with our contemporary scientific image of the world.

Chalmers’ defense of the conceivability argument

Modal rationalism is a view according to which conceivability a priori entails metaphysical possibility. One of the most influential objections against this view is the claim that there are necessary a posteriori statements. For it seems that their falsity is conceivable but nevertheless metaphysically impossible. However, David Chalmers argues that modal rationalism could be compatible with the existence of necessary a posteriori statements because epistemic two-dimensional semantics framework could explain their nature and there are relevant senses of conceivability and possibility which could plausibly be connected. This paper assesses Chalmers? argument and shows that shifting the burden of proof to the skeptics is one of its best features. The zombie argument is a useful example which shows that even without epistemic two-dimensional semantics modal rationalism could be effective in metaphysics (i.e. it could defeat minimal physicalism). It is also argued in this paper that making parody of the zombie argument, in order to turn the table on modal rationalists, could be a better tool for distinguishing two senses of ideal positive primary conceivability. The zombie argument could be expressed in ?non-idealized? sense of ideal positive primary conceivability, while parody is bound to its ?idealized? reading only. This makes parody liable to objections which do not affect the zombie argument. The zombie argument and modal rationalism still stand.

Post-physicalism and Beyond

It is becoming a commonplace in philosophical literature that physicalism need not be reductive. Non-reductive physicalism seems on the face of it to be a contradiction in terms. Some critics have called the idea of a physicalism without reduction “cheap materialism.” It is, of course, possible to quibble about who has the right to be called a physicalist and to play a game of “more physicalist than thou.” However, it would be more fruitful to develop a non-reductive version of physicalism and show that it retains something of the heart of the physicalist tradition while abandoning the reductionist program. John Post's Faces of Existence is just such a project. Post calls his position non-reductive physicalism. It might also be called Post-physicalist, post-dualist, post-relativist, post-everything. After Post, not much remains the same. While in many ways still just a sketch, Faces of Existence does attempt to do justice both to what he takes to be the basic intuitions of physicalism while jettisoning the reductionist program. There is no attempt to prove the truth of non-reductive physicalism in this book. The primary goal is to demonstrate the logical compatibility of a minimal physicalism and a non-reductive pluralism. Along the way we get an attempt to combine realist truth and the relativity of interpretation, to defend the objectivity of values, and to demonstrate the compatibility of some kind of theism with non-reductive physicalism.