scholarly journals Chalmers’ defense of the conceivability argument

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-55
Author(s):  
Dusko Prelevic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Modal Rationalism ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
Minimal Physicalism

Modal rationalism is a view according to which conceivability a priori entails metaphysical possibility. One of the most influential objections against this view is the claim that there are necessary a posteriori statements. For it seems that their falsity is conceivable but nevertheless metaphysically impossible. However, David Chalmers argues that modal rationalism could be compatible with the existence of necessary a posteriori statements because epistemic two-dimensional semantics framework could explain their nature and there are relevant senses of conceivability and possibility which could plausibly be connected. This paper assesses Chalmers? argument and shows that shifting the burden of proof to the skeptics is one of its best features. The zombie argument is a useful example which shows that even without epistemic two-dimensional semantics modal rationalism could be effective in metaphysics (i.e. it could defeat minimal physicalism). It is also argued in this paper that making parody of the zombie argument, in order to turn the table on modal rationalists, could be a better tool for distinguishing two senses of ideal positive primary conceivability. The zombie argument could be expressed in ?non-idealized? sense of ideal positive primary conceivability, while parody is bound to its ?idealized? reading only. This makes parody liable to objections which do not affect the zombie argument. The zombie argument and modal rationalism still stand.

scholarly journals Naming and necessity in a two-dimensional semantic framework

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
János Kovács
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Causal Model ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Naming And Necessity

This paper surveys the relevance of Kripke’s semantics of proper names. In his Naming and Necessity Kripke takes issue with Frege’s and Russell’s descriptive semantics of proper names. He proposes a new model called the causal model of proper names. Kripke’s model of the philosophy of language have challenged the relation of the metaphysical concepts necessity/contingency and the epistemological concepts apriority/a posteriority, respectively. Since Kant it has been accepted that all a priori truth is necessary, while all a posteriori truth is contingent. Kripke’s book has changed these tenets and nowadays it is accepted that the four concepts are independent of each other and that the complex concepts generated with them have instance.   This paper investigates Kripke’s arguments on necessity and apriority in a two-dimensional semantic framework. The paper argues that the two-dimensional model is in harmony with Kripke’s model although Soames has been claiming the opposite in several publications. The paper claims that Soames’ theory of direct reference is unable to account for necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements.

Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Frege’S Puzzle ◽  
Frege's Puzzle ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Errors And Confusions

This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his treatment of these matters and disentangles them from errors and confusions that mar some of his most important discussions. It argues that there are two Kripkean routes to the necessary a posteriori—one correct and philosophically far-reaching; the other incorrect, philosophically misleading, and the source of damaging errors that persist to this day. It connects two false principles involved in the second, unsuccessful, route to the necessary a posteriori with the plausible and potentially correct idea that believing a singular proposition that o is F always involves also believing a richer more descriptively informative proposition in which some further property plays a role in the agent’s thoughts about o. It explains why this idea will not save the failed second route to the necessary a posteriori and suggests that it may help reconcile Kripke’s insights with the lessons of Frege’s puzzle.

Plantinga's Necessary A Posteriori Truths

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-327
Author(s):  
Gregory W. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truths

Alvin Plantinga has recently argued that there are certain propositions which are necessary but known only a posteriori. If Plantinga is correct then he has shown that the traditional view that all necessary truths are knowable a priori is false. Plantinga's examples deserve special attention because they differ in important respects from other proposed examples of necessary a posteriori truths. His examples depend on a certain conception of possible worlds and in particular on his conception of the actual world. It will be argued that these examples of necessary a posteriori propositions can be understood in two different ways. According to one way of understanding Plantinga, the propositions turn out to be contingent a posteriori truths, and according to the other way they turn out to be necessary a priori truths. The plausibility of Plantinga's position is due to a confusion between the two possible interpretations.

scholarly journals Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not

2019 ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
Dmytro Sepetyi
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
Zombie Argument ◽  
A Priori Entailment

In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.

Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 481-489
Author(s):  
Peter Nicholls ◽  
Dan Passell ◽  
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori

scholarly journals Subgrid modelling for two-dimensional turbulence using neural networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 858 ◽  
pp. 122-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Maulik ◽  
O. San ◽  
A. Rasheed ◽  
P. Vedula
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Numerical Data ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Optimization Analysis ◽  
Turbulence Closures ◽  
Flow Evolution ◽  
Promising Development

In this investigation, a data-driven turbulence closure framework is introduced and deployed for the subgrid modelling of Kraichnan turbulence. The novelty of the proposed method lies in the fact that snapshots from high-fidelity numerical data are used to inform artificial neural networks for predicting the turbulence source term through localized grid-resolved information. In particular, our proposed methodology successfully establishes a map between inputs given by stencils of the vorticity and the streamfunction along with information from two well-known eddy-viscosity kernels. Through this we predict the subgrid vorticity forcing in a temporally and spatially dynamic fashion. Our study is botha priorianda posterioriin nature. In the former, we present an extensive hyper-parameter optimization analysis in addition to learning quantification through probability-density-function-based validation of subgrid predictions. In the latter, we analyse the performance of our framework for flow evolution in a classical decaying two-dimensional turbulence test case in the presence of errors related to temporal and spatial discretization. Statistical assessments in the form of angle-averaged kinetic energy spectra demonstrate the promise of the proposed methodology for subgrid quantity inference. In addition, it is also observed that some measure ofa posteriorierror must be considered during optimal model selection for greater accuracy. The results in this article thus represent a promising development in the formalization of a framework for generation of heuristic-free turbulence closures from data.

Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism

Philosophy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen K. McLeod
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Logical Positivist ◽  
Contingent Truth ◽  
Contingent A Priori ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Necessary Truth

AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.

Kripke’s sole route to the necessary a posteriori

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 388-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Eaker
Keyword(s):  
A Posteriori ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Scott Soames ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke’s second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames’ misinterpretation.

scholarly journals A Interpretação Epistêmica da Semântica Bidimensional

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-143
Author(s):  
Júlia Telles Menezes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Content ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Linguistic Terms ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Epistemic Interpretation

O presente artigo pretende apresentar e avaliar criticamente o projeto racionalista de David Chalmers e Frank Jackson na interpretação epistêmica da chamada semântica bidimensional. Diferentes versões do aparato formal da semântica bidimensional são lançadas para resolver certos problemas no âmbito da filosofia da linguagem, a saber, dar conta do conteúdo semântico de termos indexicais, produzir uma explicação para os híbridos modais como instâncias do necessário a posteriori e contribuir para o debate acerca da determinação do conteúdo mental. De um modo geral, a semântica bidimensional estipula uma dupla dependência de expressões linguísticas frente a possibilidades ou cenários. Uma das noções centrais para a construção das possibilidades relevantes é a noção de “cenário”. O presente trabalho procura responder a duas objeções aa noção de cenário empregada por David Chalmers em sua interpretação do aparato bidimensional. AbstractThis paper aims at presenting and critically assessing the epistemic interpretation advanced by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson of the two-dimensional semantic framework. Different versions of the formal apparatus of the two-dimensional framework are used to account for philosophical phenomena such as the content of indexical terms, modal hybrids, such as posteriori necessities and the individuation of mental content. Generally, two-dimensional framework stipulates a double dependence of linguistic terms on possibilities or scenarios. One of the central notions for the construction of the relevant kind of possibility is the notion of “scenario”. The aim of the paper is to defend the two- dimensional framework from two objections regarding the notion of scenario.

Modal Realism, Modal Rationalism, Modal Naturalism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Focus Of Attention ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Modal Rationalism

This chapter summarizes the accounts of modal realism, modal rationalism, and modal naturalism. It details the author's attempt to develop a framework that is compatible with the denial of actualist accounts of modality. It also alludes to some ways that the contrast between modal naturalism and modal rationalism connects with many of the issues that have been the focus of attention in recent philosophical discussions about reference, intentionality, and knowledge: Frege puzzles about singular reference, the phenomenon of a posteriori necessities, the interpretation and application of two-dimensional modal semantics, contextualism about knowledge. This book has not been about those problems, but the development of the framework of modal semantics is motivated in large part by its relevance to them.

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