A Global Workspace Model Implementation and its Relations with Philosophy of Mind

This work seeks to study the beneficial properties that an autonomous agent can obtain by imitating a cognitive architecture similar to that of conscious beings. Throughout this document, a cognitive model of an autonomous agent-based in a global workspace architecture is presented. We hypothesize that consciousness is an evolutionary advantage, so if our autonomous agent can be potentially conscious, its performance will be enhanced. We explore whether an autonomous agent implementing a cognitive architecture like the one proposed in the global workspace theory can be conscious from a philosophy of mind perspective, with a special emphasis on functionalism and multiple realizability. The purposes of our proposed model are to create autonomous agents that can navigate within an environment composed of multiple independent magnitudes, adapting to its surroundings to find the best possible position according to its inner preferences and to test the effectiveness of many of its cognitive mechanisms, such as an attention mechanism for magnitude selection, possession of inner feelings and preferences, usage of a memory system to storage beliefs and past experiences, and incorporating the consciousness bottleneck into the decision-making process, that controls and integrates information processed by all the subsystems of the model, as in global workspace theory. We show in a large experiment set how potentially conscious autonomous agents can benefit from having a cognitive architecture such as the one described.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

Cognitive Robots and the Conscious Mind: A Review of the Global Workspace Theory

Purpose of Review The theory of consciousness is a subject that has kept scholars and researchers challenged for centuries. Even today it is not possible to define what consciousness is. This has led to the theorization of different models of consciousness. Starting from Baars’ Global Workspace Theory, this paper examines the models of cognitive architectures that are inspired by it and that can represent a reference point in the field of robot consciousness. Recent Findings Global Workspace Theory has recently been ranked as the most promising theory in its field. However, this is not reflected in the mathematical models of cognitive architectures inspired by it: they are few, and most of them are a decade old, which is too long compared to the speed at which artificial intelligence techniques are improving. Indeed, recent publications propose simple mathematical models that are well designed for computer implementation. Summary In this paper, we introduce an overview of consciousness and robot consciousness, with some interesting insights from the literature. Then we focus on Baars’ Global Workspace Theory, presenting it briefly. Finally, we report on the most interesting and promising models of cognitive architectures that implement it, describing their peculiarities.

Body Schema in Autonomous Agents

A body schema is an agent’s model of its own body that enables it to act on affordances in the environment. This paper presents a body schema system for the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. LIDA is a conceptual and computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory, also integrating other theories from neuroscience and psychology. This paper contends that the ‘body schema’ should be split into three separate functions based on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory. There is (1) an online model of the agent’s effectors and effector variables (Current Body Schema), (2) a long-term, recognitional storage of embodied capacities for action and affordances (Habitual Body Schema), and (3) “dorsal” stream information feeding directly from early perception to sensorimotor processes (Online Body Schema). This paper then discusses how the LIDA model of the body schema explains several experiments in psychology and ethology.

Global Workspace Theory and Animal Consciousness

Peter Carruthers has recently argued for a surprising conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is both correct and fully reductive, then there are no substantive facts to discover about phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. I present two problems for this conditional. First, it rests on an odd double-standard about the ordinary concept of phenomenal consciousness: its intuitive non-gradability is taken to be unchallengeable by future scientific developments, whereas its intuitive determinacy is predicted to fall by the wayside. Second, it relies on dismissing, prematurely, the live empirical possibility that phenomenal consciousness may be linked to a core global broadcast mechanism that is (determinately) shared by a wide range of animals. Future developments in the science of consciousness may lead us to reconsider the non-gradability of phenomenal consciousness, but they are unlikely to lead us to accept that there are no facts to discover outside the paradigm case of a healthy adult human.