A Global Workspace Model Implementation and its Relations with Philosophy of Mind

This work seeks to study the beneficial properties that an autonomous agent can obtain by imitating a cognitive architecture similar to that of conscious beings. Throughout this document, a cognitive model of an autonomous agent-based in a global workspace architecture is presented. We hypothesize that consciousness is an evolutionary advantage, so if our autonomous agent can be potentially conscious, its performance will be enhanced. We explore whether an autonomous agent implementing a cognitive architecture like the one proposed in the global workspace theory can be conscious from a philosophy of mind perspective, with a special emphasis on functionalism and multiple realizability. The purposes of our proposed model are to create autonomous agents that can navigate within an environment composed of multiple independent magnitudes, adapting to its surroundings to find the best possible position according to its inner preferences and to test the effectiveness of many of its cognitive mechanisms, such as an attention mechanism for magnitude selection, possession of inner feelings and preferences, usage of a memory system to storage beliefs and past experiences, and incorporating the consciousness bottleneck into the decision-making process, that controls and integrates information processed by all the subsystems of the model, as in global workspace theory. We show in a large experiment set how potentially conscious autonomous agents can benefit from having a cognitive architecture such as the one described.

A Design of Global Workspace Model with Attention: Simulations of Attentional Blink and Lag-1 Sparing

There are many developed theories and implemented artificial systems in the area of machine consciousness, while none has achieved that. For a possible approach, we are interested in implementing a system by integrating different theories. Along this way, this paper proposes a model based on the global workspace theory and attention mechanism, and providing a fundamental framework for our future work. To examine this model, two experiments are conducted. The first one demonstrates the agent’s ability to shift attention over multiple stimuli, which accounts for the dynamics of conscious content. Another experiment of simulations of attentional blink and lag-1 sparing, which are two well-studied effects in psychology and neuroscience of attention and consciousness, aims to justify the agent’s compatibility with human brains. In summary, the main contributions of this paper are (1) Adaptation of the global workspace framework by separated workspace nodes, reducing unnecessary computation but retaining the potential of global availability; (2) Embedding attention mechanism into the global workspace framework as the competition mechanism for the consciousness access; (3) Proposing a synchronization mechanism in the global workspace for supporting lag-1 sparing effect, retaining the attentional blink effect.

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

An Active Inference Model of Conscious Access with and without Report

Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of report. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability – maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.

Human Prefrontal Cortex

This chapter and the next one consider how to account for the astonishing difference in intelligence between humans and our nearest living ancestors, the great apes. An integrated system that includes the dorsal prefrontal cortex and the parietal association cortex is activated when subjects attempt tests of non-verbal intelligence. It has been suggested that this system might act as a ‘multiple-demand system’ or ‘global workspace’ that can deal with any problem. However, closer examination suggests that the tasks used to support this claim have in common that they involve abstract sequences. These problems can be solved by visual imagery alone. But humans also have the advantage that they also have access to a propositional code. This means that they can solve problems that involve verbal reasoning, as well as being able to form detailed plans for the future. They can also form explicit judgements about themselves, including their perceptions, actions, and memories, and this means that they can represent themselves as individuals. The representation of the self depends in part on tissue in the medial prefrontal cortex (PF).

Modeling Long-Term Intentions and Narratives in Autonomous Agents

Across various fields it is argued that the self in part consists of an autobiographical self-narrative and that the self-narrative has an impact on agential behavior. Similarly, within action theory, it is claimed that the intentional structure of coherent long-term action is divided into a hierarchy of distal, proximal, and motor intentions. However, the concrete mechanisms for how narratives and distal intentions are generated and impact action is rarely fleshed out concretely. We here demonstrate how narratives and distal intentions can be generated within cognitive agents and how they can impact agential behavior over long time scales. We integrate narratives and distal intentions into the LIDA model, and demonstrate how they can guide agential action in a manner that is consistent with the Global Workspace Theory of consciousness. This paper serves both as an addition to the LIDA cognitive architecture and an elucidation of how narratives and distal intention emerge and play their role in cognition and action

Cognitive Robots and the Conscious Mind: A Review of the Global Workspace Theory

Purpose of Review The theory of consciousness is a subject that has kept scholars and researchers challenged for centuries. Even today it is not possible to define what consciousness is. This has led to the theorization of different models of consciousness. Starting from Baars’ Global Workspace Theory, this paper examines the models of cognitive architectures that are inspired by it and that can represent a reference point in the field of robot consciousness. Recent Findings Global Workspace Theory has recently been ranked as the most promising theory in its field. However, this is not reflected in the mathematical models of cognitive architectures inspired by it: they are few, and most of them are a decade old, which is too long compared to the speed at which artificial intelligence techniques are improving. Indeed, recent publications propose simple mathematical models that are well designed for computer implementation. Summary In this paper, we introduce an overview of consciousness and robot consciousness, with some interesting insights from the literature. Then we focus on Baars’ Global Workspace Theory, presenting it briefly. Finally, we report on the most interesting and promising models of cognitive architectures that implement it, describing their peculiarities.

Body Schema in Autonomous Agents

A body schema is an agent’s model of its own body that enables it to act on affordances in the environment. This paper presents a body schema system for the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. LIDA is a conceptual and computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory, also integrating other theories from neuroscience and psychology. This paper contends that the ‘body schema’ should be split into three separate functions based on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory. There is (1) an online model of the agent’s effectors and effector variables (Current Body Schema), (2) a long-term, recognitional storage of embodied capacities for action and affordances (Habitual Body Schema), and (3) “dorsal” stream information feeding directly from early perception to sensorimotor processes (Online Body Schema). This paper then discusses how the LIDA model of the body schema explains several experiments in psychology and ethology.